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ABSTRACT 
This work deconstructs the High Court of Australia’s interpretation of the ‘free 
exercise clause’ of the Australian Constitution. Then, the work draws conclusions on 
the potential for that clause to evolve and operate as a rule requiring the 
Commonwealth to be tolerant and secular. Finally, this work considers the 
constitutional validity of federal anti-discrimination laws that impact the religious 
freedom of Australian persons. This work addresses three questions: 
1. How has the free exercise clause in section 116 of the Australian Constitution 
been constructed by the High Court of Australia and is this construction 
adequate – why, or why not? 
2. How is religious freedom an issue in Australia, and how does the free 
exercise clause in section 116 of the Australian Constitution relate to the 
social issue of religious freedom? 
3. Having regard to the free exercise clause in section 116 of the Australian 
Constitution as a potential constraint, are federal anti-discrimination laws 
constitutionally valid? 
The work is split between two divisions. The first provides an examination of High 
Court and Federal Court judgements relating to the ‘free exercise clause’ of the 
Australian Constitution. The key principles are identified and critically evaluated 
through a combined textualist and contextual lens, having regard to the legal 
realities of modern Australia. A conclusion is drawn as to the proper construction of 
the free exercise clause and its relationship with religious freedom in Australia. The 
second division pinpoints conflicting religion-law interests and cross-references the 
legislation that prompts those conflicts either demonstrably in case law or 
theoretically on a plain doctrinal reading. The language of civilised religion is 
adopted to objectively discuss the issue of religious freedom through the perspective 
of a constitutionalist and legalist. The constitutional validity of federal anti-
discrimination law is then examined. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis is divided into two divisions, respectively addressing the 
constitutional doctrine of section 116 of the Australian Constitution and the 
sociological issue of religious freedom. The challenge this work has sought to 
respond to has been in synthesising the available observable secondary data to best 
assess what the conflict over religious freedom is, in real terms, so as to identify an 
objective solution. This work is primarily concerned with the legal protection of 
religious freedom, associated policy questions, and the underlying objective of 
secular government (focusing on the federal constitutional framework and anti-
discrimination law). This work is not concerned with promoting any rationale for 
protecting religious freedom. 
 This work hopes to emulate such scholars in the field as Luke Beck, Anthony 
Gray, and Reid Mortensen. It is important to acknowledge that separate scholars 
(much like artists) can consider the same subject matter, yet see it very differently. 
Fundamental jurisprudential questions underlie this work, especially: what is the 
law? What is the purpose of law? Is the law a vehicle for morality or greater ideals 
of right and wrong? Does the law have an innate limitation to natural phenomena? 
What, figuratively, ‘belongs to Caesar’ (in the sense of ‘what is the proper ambit of 
the state’)? It is not the goal of this work to prescribe for the reader an ideal 
religious freedom or political framework, however; it is the goal of this work to 
illuminate the logical conclusions of the ongoing trend for the state to operate as a 
‘moral authority’ and assess that trend’s consistency with existing constitutional 
principles.  
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 This work has been written from the perspective of a constitutionalist and a 
legalist. In adopting these terms, it is acknowledged that there is some degree of 
ambiguity in this language, which could be used quite differently in other contexts. 
In this work, the notion of a constitutionalist – an attributive form of 
constitutionalism – is simple in that it refers to a person who understands a 
constitution to be a set of law underpinning government and the making of law. 
With a constitution, a common point of reference is provided that allows an 
objective analysis of the law. This might be phrased in terms of a law’s validity. 
Whether a law is good (in a moral or philosophical sense) is an irrelevant question 
to this thesis. Instead, this thesis asks, objectively, whether a law is constitutional. In 
this, the thesis has an objective standard, albeit, limited. The objective standard is 
however, appreciated across a whole population, it is the standard which a nation 
sets for itself. This approach is related to the second lens – that of a legalist. 
 Legalism, in this work, is used to refer to a value neutrality. Outside of the 
objective standard of validity provided by constitutionalism, this thesis has no 
particular vision for the law, or society under the law. This lens is adopted on the 
assumption that neutrality toward the value of a given law or prescription implies 
objectivity, and, objectivity is an ally of the truth. This allows the thesis to honestly 
declare what it concludes – absent of bias or a value judgement that may prompt 
disagreement or disbelief over the conclusions or their applicability. In short, the 
work has been written in the pursuit of an objective truth – one that cannot be 
argued against on a basis of values. Ultimately, however, it must be acknowledged 
 3 
that the value of this endeavour (and the significance of a law’s validity) is itself 
entirely subjective.  
 The thesis, by adopting this approach, will make several conclusions. The 
thesis will argue that the free exercise clause of the Australian Constitution 
establishes a tolerant, secular Commonwealth. This thesis will conclude that the 
High Court’s current approach to constructing the free exercise clause of the 
Australian Constitution is acceptable with both a proper understanding of a law’s 
objective and a legalist application (applying the doctrine even to laws declared 
non-religious, yet which are functionally religious). This thesis will show that the 
language of ‘civilised religion’ can describe the relationship between law and 
religion objectively. The thesis will anticipate that the constitutional validity, of 
certain controversial federal anti-discrimination laws, is questionable on the basis 
that those laws are intolerant and rely on a questionably secular (a possibly 
religious) rationale – antithetical to the constitutional doctrine which establishes a 
tolerant, secular Commonwealth. 
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I THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
 The principle legal doctrine that this work is concerned with is the ‘free 
exercise clause’ within section 116 of the Australian Constitution, specifically: 
The Commonwealth shall not make any law … for prohibiting the free exercise of 
any religion …1 
This clause is more complicated than what it might initially appear. In 1943, Justice 
Rich warned against the High Court adopting a general interpretation of the free 
exercise clause and while this may have eventuated in practice, the High Court has 
been polarised in its response to the small number of attempts to litigate the 
clause. Recent public inquiries and the broader literature have variously described 
the free exercise clause of the Australian Constitution as being narrow, limited, and 
ineffective.2 Or, alternatively, ‘that s 116 of the Constitution is capable of having a 
broader effect than usually considered’.3 
 Division I of this work is concerned with specific questions orientated 
towards identifying what ongoing legal significance the free exercise clause has and 
could be: what amounts to ‘a law for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’? 
How has the judiciary interpreted and subsequently applied the clause? What is the 
significance of the term ‘for’? What is the test to ‘qualify the absolute language’ in 
the section? What is the role of the section in the context of the Australian 
Constitution? What principles should motivate the judiciary’s interpretation and 
                                                     
1 Australian Constitution s 116. 
2 See, eg, Carolyn Maree Evans, Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia (The Federation 
Press, 1st ed, 2012) 87. 
3 Luke Beck, ‘Clear and Empathic: The Separation of Church and State under the Australian 
Constitution’ (2008) 27(2) The University of Tasmania Law Review 161, 196. 
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application of the clause? Three matters decided in the High Court, and several 
lower court decisions that have sought to apply the High Court’s judgements, 
provide us guidance to the proper answers to these questions. This article is not 
concerned with a detailed examination of the nature of ‘religion’, what the 
jurisdictional application of the section is or should be (especially as to its 
applicability to the States and Territories), or what technically constitutes ‘making a 
law’. After comprehensively examining the relevant High Court decisions, this work 
will make informed conclusions on the condition of the free exercise clause as a 
cause of action for litigation and critically examine secondary literature to 
ultimately prescribe the clause as a guarantee of a tolerant, secular 
Commonwealth. 
 
A The Construction and Evolution in Australian Courts 
 The work now turns to the High Court judgements that have involved the 
interpretation and application of the free exercise clause. Three matters are 
available to be considered in turn: Krygger v Williams4 (‘Conscription Case’), 
Adelaide Co of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth5 (‘Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Case’), and Kruger v Commonwealth6 (‘Stolen Generations Case’). The High Court’s 
construction of section 116 and the free exercise clause has been applied in, or 
influenced, various lower court decisions, however, examining the High Court 
matters will illuminate the current jurisprudence surrounding the free exercise 
                                                     
4 (1912) 15 CLR 366 (‘Conscription Case’). 
5 (1943) 67 CLR 116 (‘Jehovah’s Witnesses Case’). 
6 (1997) 190 CLR 1 (‘Stolen Generations Case’). 
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clause (this process might be described as a doctrinal study). This work undertakes a 
relatively limited textual analysis of these cases, initially, before proceeding to 
engage the broader literature. Having done so, this work will have the grounding to 
make informed conclusions about the status of the clause as a cause of action and a 
limit on federal law-making power. 
 
1 The Conscription Case 
 The very first decision in Australian law to involve the free exercise clause 
was decided in 1912. In the Conscription Case the High Court held, on an appeal 
from a Court of Petty Sessions in Victoria, that: 
The provisions of the Defence Act 1903-1910 imposing obligations on all male 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth in respect to military training do not prohibit the 
free exercise of any religion, and, therefore, are not an infringement of sec. 116 of 
the Constitution.7 
The appellant in the matter argued that undergoing military training would cut 
them off from their god and that ‘[s]ixty-four hours drill a year would prohibit the 
free exercise of my religion.’8 The original judgement by a magistrate saw the 
appellant convicted and ordered to a period of confinement for 64 hours ‘being the 
time of personal service not rendered’.9  
 The appellant’s argument in the High Court was, inter alia, ‘[t]hat the 
provisions of the Defence Act 1903-1911 … are unconstitutional, ultra vires, and 
                                                     
7 Conscription Case (n 4) 366. 
8 Ibid 368. 
9 Ibid. 
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contrary to the provisions of sec. 116 of the Constitution.’10 The arguments 
pertaining to section 116 were noted in the reported judgment, the plaintiff’s 
including such particulars as: 
The Act, so far as it compels persons to undergo military training is an infringement 
of sec. 116 of the Constitution … The word “religion” in that section is not limited to 
the performance of religious rites, but includes the acting in a manner which is 
dictated by religion …11 
And by the respondent: 
None of the provisions of the Act complained of prohibit the free exercise of any 
religion, though they may compel a man to do that which he has religious 
objections to do.12 
The judgements of the High Court can be examined here very quickly due to their 
brevity. Two judgements were produced. Both dealt with the constitutional 
argument concisely while their concern was principally the text of section 116.  
 
(i) Chief Justice Griffith 
 Chief Justice Griffith held that the free exercise clause referred to 
‘prohibiting the practice of religion – the doing of acts which are done in the 
practise of religion’.13 A definitional limitation in the section was set out by the 
Chief Justice, who found that: 
                                                     
10 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
11 Ibid 368-369. 
12 Ibid 369. 
13 Ibid. 
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To require a man to do a thing which has nothing at all to do with religion is not 
prohibiting him from a free exercise of religion. It may be that a law requiring a 
man to do an act which his religion forbids would be objectionable on moral 
grounds, but it does not come within the prohibition of sec. 116 …14 
The Chief Justice was unconvinced that the free exercise clause would prohibit laws 
that set out a non-religious positive duty, as opposed to a negative duty regarding a 
religious act. Which is to say, a law that requires a person to do a non-religious 
thing (even assuming that it was forbidden by the religion), is very different from a 
law that requires a person to not do a religious thing. The Chief Justice interpreted 
the prohibition of the free exercise clause to refer to negative duties, on the basis 
that the words ‘free exercise of religion’ in section 116 referred to the ‘doing of acts 
done in the practice of religion’. Therefore, in this very first judgement, for the Chief 
Justice, the issue to be emphasised was the meaning of ‘free exercise’ and their 
resolution was derived from the definition of the words used in the section (what 
might be described as a textualist, or literal construction).  
 
(ii) Justice Barton 
 Justice Barton seems to have emulated the Chief Justice’s approach, again 
being concerned primarily for the effect of the law, they* decided that 
the Defence Act is not a law prohibiting the free exercise of the appellant’s religion, 
nor is there any attempt to show anything so absurd as that the appellant could not 
exercise his religion freely if he did the necessary drill.15 
                                                     
14 Ibid. 
* ‘They’ is used throughout this work as a gender-neutral alternative to the singular ‘he’ or ‘she’. 
15 Ibid 372-3. 
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Justice Barton was concerned with the effect of the law and was unconvinced that 
the law did, in fact, prohibit the free exercise of the appellant’s religion (were the 
appellant to perform the military drills in accordance with the conscientious 
objection provisions).16 
 
Summary of the Conscription Case 
 On the passages cited here it is clear that the High Court, in its first 
consideration of the free exercise clause, took the view that the clause referred to 
negative duties and did not constrain parliament from enacting positive, secular 
duties subjectively inconsistent with a religious belief that did not in fact prohibit 
the free exercise of a religion. The free exercise clause would prohibit a law that 
stops a person from doing something, but not a law that will require them to do 
something (even if that something is objectionable). This is, on its face, a relatively 
limited construction due to it excluding from the ambit of the free exercise clause, a 
religion that calls on a person to abstain from certain conduct (as was argued by the 
appellant) that, while might appear to be unrelated to religion for others, is an 
important ‘exercise’ of that religion. The appellant’s argument that ‘free exercise’ 
includes the ability to refrain from conduct generally, in accordance with their 
religion, was rejected in favour of a reading that left the clause only invalidating 
those laws that themselves clearly prohibit a positive religious exercise (ie ‘practice’ 
                                                     
16 Ibid. Justice Barton considered the operation of the conscientious objection provisions and held 
that under those provisions, ‘[the appellant] has a right to be allotted to non-combatant duties as far 
as possible, but that is not a right to refuse to be trained at all’: at 372. 
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in the sense of an ‘activity’, ‘rite’, or perhaps a ‘ritual’). The two decisions in the 
Conscription Case bring to the forefront a consideration of factual circumstances 
and the substantially subjective question of whether a certain activity is genuinely 
an exercise of a religion (the plaintiff described that their religion required them to 
have nothing to do with war, whereas the court understood their religion to refer to 
abstaining from combatant roles), or, whether the activity was merely related to a 
religion (and thus the law may only be ‘morally objectionable’).  
 On a plain reading of the Conscription Case there are many hypothetical 
issues to be drawn just from the interpretation of the clause by the Court. How can 
it be precisely determined when a law has the effect of imposing a negative duty on 
a religious exercise? Would the clause always invalidate a law with such an effect? 
However, functionally, the extent of the prohibition in the free exercise clause was 
minimal in the Conscription Case, to such a point that the judiciary did not even 
need to qualify its operation as it has in later cases. The High Court, through a text 
based positivistic construction of the clause and a finding that the law simply did 
not amount to a ‘prohibition on the free exercise of religion’, took to the free 
exercise clause with what could be fairly read as a relatively dismissive attitude 
towards the plea of freedom.  
 
2 The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case 
 The second matter to involve the construction of the free exercise clause 
has been the subject of extensive debate throughout the secondary literature. The 
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High Court in 1943 (now with a bench of five) undertook a more comprehensive 
examination of the free exercise clause. The Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses Incorporated owned and used certain property in South Australia as a 
religious meeting place for Jehovah’s Witnesses (a religious group). The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, motivated by their religious beliefs, published material that was inter 
alia anti-war propaganda. On the back of a decision by the Governor-General in 
1941 under the National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations, to declare 
both the incorporated body and the religious group as prejudicial to the defence of 
the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth directed an 
officer of the Commonwealth to take possession of the property. The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses commenced a claim in trespass in the High Court. It was argued, inter 
alia, that the decisions and regulations were unconstitutional.17  The final decision 
of the High Court, regarding section 116 (the claim succeeded on other grounds), 
was that: 
[Section] 116 of the Constitution does not prevent the Commonwealth Parliament 
from making laws prohibiting the advocacy of doctrines or principles which, though 
advocated in pursuance of religious convictions, are prejudicial to the prosecution 
of a war in which the Commonwealth is engaged.18 
On this excerpt, it might be difficult for an observer to see how the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses Case has had continued significance for the better part of a century. To 
appreciate this, the obiter dicta and ratio decidendi of the five separate judgements 
need to be considered thoroughly for a full appreciation of the principles that led to 
                                                     
17 The factual circumstances are set out from page 117 to 119 of the judgement: See, generally, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 117-119. 
18 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 116. 
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the final judgement which has influenced the future direction of section 116 and 
the free exercise clause. There are three relevant questions of law considered by 
the High Court in the Jehovah’s Case, dealing with respectively: the competency of 
an incorporated association to bring an action under section 116, whether certain 
enacted regulations contravene section 116, and whether certain decisions of both 
the Governor-General in Council and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth 
contravene section 116.19 
 
(i) Chief Justice Latham 
 Chief Justice Latham declared the significance of the matter to the ‘nature 
and extent of the protection which is given to religion under the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth’.20 Finding that the text of section 116 was by itself sufficient to 
indicate that ‘this provision is intended to place some restriction upon the power of 
the Commonwealth to enact legislation which favours any religion, or which 
interferes with any religion’,21 Chief Justice Latham framed the issues of 
constitutional validity under 116 in three context specific questions22 but proceeded 
to undertake an extensive discussion of the character of the section generally, 
                                                     
19 Ibid 119. 
20 Ibid 122 [1]. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. Those questions were: 
 Does s. 116 prevent the Commonwealth Parliament from legislating to restrain the activities 
 of a body, the existence of which is, in the opinion of the Governor-General, prejudicial to 
 the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war, if that body is a 
 religious organization? Is the answer to this question affected by the fact that the 
 subversive activities of such a body are founded upon the religious views of its members? 
 Can such a body be suppressed? 
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covering a range of issues derived from both the text and context of the section. 
The Chief Justice observed 
that s. 116 is an express prohibition of any law which falls within its terms … Section 
116 therefore cannot be regarded as prescribing the content of laws made with 
respect to religion upon the basis that the Commonwealth Parliament has some 
power of legislating with respect to religion … It does not compete with other 
provisions of the Constitution so that the Court should seek to reconcile it with 
other provisions. It prevails over and limits all provisions which give power to make 
laws.23 
Noting the focus of section 116 being the subject of ‘religion’, the Chief Justice 
spent some time defining the scope of that term, going on to note that the non-
discriminating language in the section made it applicable to all and not ‘one 
particular religion’.24 Religion was to be construed as broadly as possible (regardless 
of one’s perception of the truth or goodness of the religion) including where the 
notion of religion would connote: 
[A] system of beliefs or statement of doctrine … [or] as prescribing a code of 
conduct … [or] as involving some prescribed form of ritual or religious observance.25 
The Chief Justice maintained a broad approach to the definition of religion, even in 
contemplation that: 
What is religion to one is superstition to another. Some religions are regarded as 
morally evil by adherents of other creeds. At all times there are many who agree 
with the reflective comment of the Roman poet – ‘Tantum religio potuit suadere 
malorum.’26 
                                                     
23 Ibid 122-123 [2]. 
24 Ibid 123 [3]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice was likely referring to the Roman, Lucretius; ‘To such 
heights of evil are men driven by religion’. 
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From the subject of religion, the Chief Justice introduced the theme of religious 
freedom, that section 116 ‘operates’27 to protect it, but also that it operates to 
protect ‘the right of a man to have no religion’.28 Connecting religious freedom to 
toleration, the Chief Justice held that ‘[s]ection 116 proclaims not only the principle 
of toleration of all religions, but also the principle of toleration of absence of 
religion.’29 
 Addressing an argument over the limitation of the section, to the effect that 
it only protects a ‘religion’ if it was a religion in the general opinion of the present 
day; while acknowledging the importance of the popular meaning of the word, the 
Chief Justice turned to the context of the section that: 
[I]t should not be forgotten that such a provision as s. 116 is not required for the 
protection of the religion of a majority. The religion of the majority of the people 
can look after itself. Section 116 is required to protect the religion (or absence of 
religion) of minorities, and, in particular, of unpopular minorities.30 
On the notion of ‘freedom of religion’, the Chief Justice responded to the distinction 
between ‘freedom of religious opinions’ and freedom of ‘acts which are done in 
pursuance of religious belief’.31 For the Chief Justice, the distinction was irrelevant 
for the purpose of interpreting section 116: 
It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the 
interpretation of s. 116. The section refers in express terms to the exercise of 
religion, and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any 
Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the 
                                                     
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 124 [4]. 
31 Ibid 124 [5] (emphasis in original). 
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section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in 
pursuance of religious belief as part of religion.32 
The Chief Justice acknowledged the diversity of religion throughout history, 
generalising the European mindset as involving a theistic belief but noting the 
religious character of non-theist systems such as Buddhism.33 For the Chief Justice, 
the content of religion was subjective to each person.34 This left the Chief Justice to 
conclude that ‘[i]t is not for a court, upon some a priori basis, to disqualify certain 
beliefs as incapable of being religious in character.’35 
 The Chief Justice considered the implications of the meaning of religion and 
the principle of freedom of religion, for the structure of government. The Chief 
Justice noted that a theocracy does not ‘draw the distinction between government 
and religion which is implicit in s. 116’.36 To illustrate the relationship between 
religion and politics, the Chief Justice considered the beliefs of Anabaptists:  
Such beliefs are concerned with the relation between man and the God whom he 
worships, although they are also concerned with the relation between man and the 
civil government under which he lives. They are political in character, but they are 
none the less religious on that account.37 
The Chief Justice offered a converse example, apparently, alluding to a dual 
religious-political nature of the Shinto religion of Japan which they describe as 
operating under the ‘worship of the Emperor as divine …’.38 From there, the Chief 
                                                     
32 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
33 Ibid 124 [6]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 125 [6]. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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Justice noted that many religions have existed throughout history that have been 
considered ‘as essentially evil and wicked’.39 The Chief Justice provided examples of 
some religions that promote human and animal sacrifice, polygamy, and violent 
activity generally (such as the ‘Thugs of India’ and Hindu practice of ‘suttee’40) and 
went on to describe how religious duties might be inconsistent with political duties 
(drawing examples from both early Christians who refused to the worship of the 
Roman Emperor and Christian converts in Korea abstaining from Shinto 
ceremony).41 That, in such circumstances (of an inconsistency between duties to the 
state and the religion): 
The State view is that the ceremony which has been obligatory is merely political in 
character – a form of “saluting the flag” – but the other view of the question is that 
it is something which requires a true believer to abjure part of his cherished faith.42 
Returning to the role of section 116, the Chief Justice then surmised, that: 
Section 116, however, is based upon the principle that religion should, for political 
purposes, be regarded as irrelevant. It assumes that citizens of all religions can be 
good citizens, and that accordingly there is no justification in the interests of the 
community for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.43 
The Chief Justice evidently read the section very broadly (especially when compared 
to the decision in the Conscription Case), but arrived at a two-part conundrum when 
an argument is made that ‘a particular law infringes the constitutional provision …’: 
Can any person, by describing (and honestly describing) his beliefs and practices as 
religious exempt himself from obedience to the law? Does s. 116 protect any 
                                                     
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid 126 [6]. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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religious belief or any religious practice, irrespective of the political or social effect 
of that belief or practice?44  
It was clear to the Chief Justice, that some religious beliefs ‘may be inconsistent 
with the maintenance of civil government’ and ‘[t]he complete protection of all 
religious beliefs might result in the disappearance of organized society’.45 
 This conundrum was made all the more complicated by the explicit 
reference to free exercise within section 116. The Chief Justice found this to be 
‘vague and ambiguous’,46 lacking a dictionary definition,47 and context specific. 
Especially so after considering other High Court and Privy Council decisions dealing 
with the meaning of ‘free’ in the context of section 92 of the Australian 
Constitution, and some jurisprudence from the United States of America also 
dealing with the meaning of ‘freedom’. The Chief Justice concluded that ‘an 
obligation to obey the laws which apply generally to the community is not regarded 
as inconsistent with freedom’.48 Turning to the First Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States, a ‘provision which is very similar to that contained in s. 116 of 
our Constitution’,49 the Chief Justice considered the most recent (as it was at the 
time) American jurisprudence which purportedly solved the problem ‘in large 
measure by holding that the provision for the protection of religion is not an 
absolute, to be interpreted and applied independently of other provisions of the 
Constitution’.50 The Chief Justice pointed to this as meaning that the ‘Supreme 
                                                     
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid 126 [8]. 
47 Ibid 127 [8]. 
48 Ibid 126-127 [8]. 
49 Ibid 127 [8]. 
50 Ibid. 
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Court of the United States has refused to regard the provisions relating to freedom 
of religion ... as involving the invalidity of all laws which in any degree interfere with 
such freedom’.51 Noting the undue infringement test propounded in the matter of 
Cantwell v Connecticut52 and commentary on the First Amendment that it is limited 
to protecting against religious persecution but that ‘[i]t does not protect unsocial 
actions.’53 The Chief Justice then addressed the United States’ approach prior to 
1900 (approximately when the Australian Constitution was adopted), for which they 
summarise, that the cases ‘quite dearly determined that such protection was not 
absolute and that it did not involve a dispensation from obedience to a general law 
of the land which was not directed against religion’.54 The Chief Justice noted that 
this approach might be questioned as antithetical to what might be the ‘very object 
of the constitutional protection … to prevent the law of the land from interfering 
with either the holding of religious beliefs, or bona fide conduct in pursuance of 
such beliefs’.55 
 Despite deciding that there is ‘full legal justification for adopting in Australia’ 
the undue infringement test to a constitutional freedom of religion (as that 
approach was practically in effect already before the enactment of the Constitution 
of Australia) which would make ‘it possible to accord a real measure of practical 
protection to religion without involving the community in anarchy’,56 the Chief 
Justice instead decided that in the context of the facts of the Jehovah’s Case, a 
                                                     
51 Ibid 128 [8]. 
52 Ibid, citing (1940) 310 US 296, 303. 
53 Ibid 128 [8]. 
54 Ibid 129 [9]. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 131 [10]. 
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narrower principle was available that would avoid the criticism implicit to that 
‘undue infringement’ approach. They instead turned to John Stuart Mill’s Essay on 
Liberty, concluding that: 
It is consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to restrain 
actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the maintenance of civil 
government or prejudicial to the continued existence of the community.57 
But also, that the final determination of this issue was not for parliament, but a 
court, lest it ‘would remove all reality from the constitutional guarantee’.58 The 
Chief Justice concluded: 
The courts will therefore have the responsibility of determining whether a 
particular law can fairly be regarded as a law to protect the existence of the 
community, or whether, on the other hand, it is a law ‘for prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion.’ The word ‘for’ shows that the purpose of the legislation in 
question may properly be taken into account in determining whether or not it is a 
law of the prohibited character.59 
This, as shall be seen later in this work, is an often-ill-understood series of 
conclusions with potentially far-reaching consequences. From this, the Chief Justice 
considered the laws in question as being ‘laws to protect the existence of the 
community’. Seemingly affirming the conclusion of the High Court in the 
Conscription Case60 as one consistent with the goal of national security and safety of 
government, the Chief Justice spoke to the role of parliament in relation to 
                                                     
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid 132 [10]. 
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60 Ibid 133 [11], citing Conscription Case:  
 [T]hat the provisions of the Act imposing obligations on all male inhabitants of the 
 Commonwealth in respect to military training do not prohibit the free exercise of any 
 religion, and, therefore, are not an infringement of s. 116 of the Constitution.  
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subversive activities, that, ‘[i]t is for Parliament, and not for the courts, to 
determine whether the use of a particular means of discouragement is necessary or 
wise.’61  
 The Chief Justice dismissed the issues under section 116, holding that ‘it is 
obvious that a company cannot exercise a religion … the plaintiff company has been 
dissolved. It is therefore no longer a competent plaintiff’.62 On the law’s validity 
contested under section 116: ‘If they are invalid for this or any other reason the 
defendant should not be allowed to rely upon them.’63 It seems, on the face of the 
judgement, that the Chief Justice was immediately prepared to limit the scope of 
the prohibition in the section even if there was in strict terms a ‘prohibition on the 
free exercise of a religion’ – though, their conclusions do not indicate such a finding 
that there was.64 
 
(ii) Justice Rich 
 Justice Rich did not divert drastically from the reasoning of Chief Justice 
Latham. Justice Rich however was somewhat more cautious in their approach. 
Justice Rich warned against the production of a general rule or abstract proposition 
for section 116, suggesting ‘[i]t is typically a provision the interpretation of which 
should be developed by specific decisions applicable to the particular facts of the 
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64 See, generally, ibid 146-148 [22]. 
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given cases.’65 Justice Rich was concerned first with the ‘precise account of the 
beliefs professed by the individuals who form the incorporated company’ which 
comprised the facts which section 116 must be applied to.66 Justice Rich elected to 
assume that the regulations were otherwise valid on their face, but then undertook 
a consideration whether ‘the operation of those Regulations on those facts would 
contravene any of the prohibitions contained in s. 116’.67 Focusing on the free 
exercise clause as the relevant law, Justice Rich was plainly unconvinced that on the 
facts there was a prohibition in the effect of the regulations, they said: ‘I cannot 
believe that the suppression of the plaintiff corporation prohibits the free exercise 
of any part of the religious faith ascribed … to the individual corporators.’68 By itself, 
this would have responded to the issues before the court as a textual based 
resolution concerned for the effect of the regulations. However, Justice Rich set out 
additional contextual justifications for the Regulations. 
 Justice Rich stated that while the law has developed ‘towards religious 
toleration’69 and that while ‘religious liberty and religious equality’70 had been 
attained, it does not imply an ‘unlimited licence to propagate or disseminate 
subversive doctrines’.71 Justice Rich, citing a House of Lords decision, held that the 
safety of the State is of paramount consideration in the relationship between the 
civil and criminal law with a religion and, necessarily, laws that empower the State 
to further prohibit the spreading of ‘subversive principles or doctrines or … 
                                                     
65 Ibid 148-149. 
66 Ibid 149. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 149, citing William Holdsworth, History of the Law, vol. VIII, 402-420. 
70 Ibid 149, citing Maitland, Constitutional History of England, 520. 
71 Ibid 149. 
 22 
prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the 
war do not infringe s. 116’.72 For Justice Rich, the freedom of religion (or ‘faith’) 
found in section 116 was not absolute and at the very least ‘subject to power and 
restrictions of government essential to the preservation of the community’.73 
Justice Rich concluded that: 
Any competition between governmental powers and liberty under the Constitution 
can be reconciled and made compatible. They co-exist without invasion of their 
respective spheres of action. Accordingly I consider the Regulations in question do 
not infringe the section.74 
Consistent with Chief Justice Latham’s approach, Justice Rich only offered a level of 
protection to religions while being prepared to qualify the section in the case of 
national security. However, Justice Rich acknowledged the difficulty present in the 
section’s terms, that it is wide in what it seeks to protect, but also narrow in the law 
that it disallows as impinging upon ‘the freedom of faith’.75  
 
(iii) Justice Starke 
 Justice Starke considered section 116 briefly, describing the issues to be of a 
nature similar those found by Chief Justice Latham and Justice Rich. Justice Starke 
held that:  
The critical question is whether the particular law, as in this case, is reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the community and in the interests of social order. 
                                                     
72 Ibid 149, citing Bowman v Secular Society Ltd (1917) AC 406, 466-467. 
73 Ibid 149. 
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In my opinion the present Regulations, if they had been within power, would not 
have transcended those limits.76 
In coming to this conclusion however, Justice Starke offered an approach grounded 
in societal subjectivism, that: 
The Parliament is given no express power to legislate with respect to religion, but it 
has many other legislative powers. And those other powers cannot be exercised in 
contravention of the provision for religious liberty or freedom protected and 
guaranteed by the Constitution. But liberty and freedom in an organized 
community are relative and not absolute terms.77 
Justice Starke responded to a minority judgement of a US matter, rationalising that 
section 116 refers to a freedom ‘in a community organized under the 
Constitution’.78 With a contextual approach, for Justice Starke this meant that 
section 116 ‘does not protect unsocial actions or actions subversive of the 
community itself’.79 Necessarily, the freedom in section 116 was to be limited to the 
extent it is ‘reasonably necessary for the protection of the community and in the 
interests of social order’.80 For Starke, the conclusion was straightforward beyond 
this, that ‘laws or regulations may be lawfully made … controlling the activities of 
religious bodies that are seditious, subversive or prejudicial to the defence of the 
Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war’.81 Following the lead of the 
Chief Justice, Justice Starke was clearly less concerned about whether there was in 
                                                     
76 Ibid 155. 
77 Ibid 154. 
78 Ibid 155. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
 24 
strict terms a ‘prohibition’ and at the forefront prioritised limiting the absolute 
operation of the clause. 
 
(iv) Justice McTiernan 
 Justice McTiernan, having agreed with the Chief Justice’s reasons and 
conclusion pertaining to the standing of the company, diverts to some extent from 
both the undue infringement and the national security tests. In response to the 
second question before the court (pertaining to the constitutional validity of the 
enacted regulations), Justice McTiernan merged a textualist interpretation with a 
purposive, construing the Regulations as plainly not being ‘in terms “a law for 
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion”’ and that 
it does not appear that the real object of the Regulations is to arm the Executive 
with power to prohibit or restrict the exercise of any religion or that there is any 
attempt ‘to mock’ the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.82 
In response to the third issue (pertaining to the constitutional validity of the Order 
in Council and the direction by the Attorney-General), Justice McTiernan initially 
pronounced a broad interpretation of the text of section 116,83 but they returned to 
a concern for national security and agreed with the reasons pronounced by the 
                                                     
82 Ibid 156, citing James v Cowan (1932) AC 542, 558. 
83 Ibid 156: ‘The question turns upon the interpretation of the provisions of s. 116, which prohibit 
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Chief Justice. Justice McTiernan ultimately agreed with the reasons of the Chief 
Justice in describing the protection as not being absolute.84 
 
(v) Justice Williams 
 Justice Williams, in the final written judgement of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Case, acknowledges the judgement of Justice Starke (see above) and their finding 
that 
that the plaintiff and the association of persons known as, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
proclaim and teach matters prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth and 
the efficient prosecution of the war, but that otherwise their doctrines or beliefs 
are primitive religious beliefs.85 
Justice Williams describes the case in terms of three ‘contentions’, resting on a 
cause of action in trespass whilst the Commonwealth sought to defend itself by 
relying on the powers conferred by its own enacted regulations.86  
 In order to resolve the first contention based on section 116, Justice 
Williams declared their contextual focus on the operation of the constitution as a 
document concerned with the legislative power of the newly created federal 
government, they held that: 
[T]he meaning and scope of s. 116 must be determined … as one of a number of 
sections intended to provide in their inter-relation a practical instrument of 
government, within the framework of which laws can be passed for organizing the 
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citizens of the Commonwealth in national affairs into a civilized community, not 
only enjoying religious tolerance, but also possessing adequate laws … which the 
Constitution recognizes that the Commonwealth Parliament should be empowered 
to legislate …87 
And while this is a long passage, in it, Justice Williams tackles the same issue of 
balance between the State and religion which is addressed by Justice Rich. 
However, Justice Williams emphasised the importance of the original meaning of 
the language in a statute, ‘the problem being to ascertain what the phrase or word 
meant in its ordinary popular acceptation at the date the statute was passed’.88 
Justice Williams applied this to the Constitution, and the notion of ‘free exercise’ as 
not being considered popularly as being interfered with when laws prohibit 
polygamy and human sacrifice as crimes. Justice Williams instead described such 
laws as ‘ordinary secular laws relating to the worldly organization of the 
community’89 going on to proffer a populist argument that such would be the case 
even if their indirect effect might be to prevent some religious sects indulging in 
practices which in the ordinary popular acceptation would be regarded as crimes 
and as having no connection with any observance which an enlightened British 
community would consider to be an exercise of religion.90 
Returning to the importance of national security, Justice Williams adopted the same 
approach of the Chief Justice, where the free exercise of religion would be subject 
to national security and the maintenance of civil society organised under the 
Constitution: 
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The right to the free exercise of religion conferred by the Constitution postulates a 
continuous right to such freedom in a Commonwealth which will survive the ordeal 
of war … laws which become necessary to preserve its existence would not be laws 
for prohibiting the free exercise of religion.91 
Justice Williams applied this reasoning to eventually surmise that: 
If the Regulations only conferred such powers as were reasonably required to 
prevent bodies disseminating principles and doctrines prejudicial to the defence of 
the Commonwealth during the war, they could not be impeached under s. 116 … 
because in its popular sense such principles and doctrines would not be considered 
to be religion, but subversive activities carried on under the cloak of religion.92 
However, the key word was ‘if’.  
 Justice Williams turned to address a contention based on the defence power 
and having examined the purpose and real effect of the regulations, concluded:    
As the religion of Jehovah's Witnesses is a Christian religion, the declaration that 
the association is an unlawful body has the effect of making the advocacy of the 
principles and doctrines of the Christian religion unlawful and every church service 
held by believers in the birth of Christ an unlawful assembly. Apart from s. 116 such 
a law could not possibly be justified by the exigencies and course of the war. But it 
is also prohibited by s. 116. 93 
Justice Williams diverted to some extent from the other judgments of the court but 
remained dependant on a qualification of section 116 which was made all the easier 
by there being a clear public interest in waging an ongoing war. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that in doing so, Justice Williams imputes the notion of a popular sense, 
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rather than relying on the contextualism emphasised by Chief Justice Latham (who 
acknowledged the importance of a constitutional protection to ‘minority’ religions).  
 
Summary of the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case 
 The Jehovah’s Case marked a somewhat more receptive High Court. Three of 
the five justices considered the idea of toleration as noteworthy in their 
construction of the section,94 however; the factual circumstances lent themselves to 
an uphill battle against a clear public interest of national security (the matter was 
heard during a war posing a real, potentially serious threat to the Australian 
nation’s very existence). Due to this common ground, the technical differences 
between the five justices were practically irrelevant. However, the division between 
different theoretical approaches to the clause was well established. From the 
Jehovah’s Case; the competition between duties (either to the state or a religion) 
were set out, the test for purpose was introduced (the ‘object’ of a law was 
considered by Justice McTiernan), the notion of a public interest as a qualifying 
factor was laid out plainly, and the importance of a clear undergirding principle for 
section 116 itself was made apparent. 
 The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case offered a more rounded collection of 
judgements where the members of the High Court (for the most part) adopted a 
principled approach to the clause. As examined above: Chief Justice Latham 
described the section as a protection of religious freedom (relating to a right to 
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have no religion), connecting this protection with toleration and that law assumes 
that all religions are capable of producing ‘good’ citizens.95 Justice Rich attributed 
some significance of tolerance to section 116, but also, that toleration does not 
require the law to permit the spread of doctrines that are subversive of the society. 
Justice Starke did not offer a particularly principled rationale for the clause, but 
acknowledged that it stands for religious ‘liberty or freedom’, but also, that that 
freedom is not absolute – it is qualifiable for the sake of the continued existence of 
the community and ‘the interests of social order’. Justice McTiernan noted the role 
of the section as a guarantee of religious freedom, but that national security would 
still prevail. Justice Williams, adopted the language of civilised community, 
toleration of religion, and secular law. Following from the adoption of such 
principles, the scope of the prohibition was generally expanded upon, compared to 
the construction it was given in the Conscription Case (which emphasised the kind 
of duties being imposed by the relevant law). 
 The Justices in the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case interpreted the section in such 
a way that the scope of the prohibition was widened from only laws with negative 
duties to seemingly, potentially, interferences (notably so in Chief Justice Latham’s 
decision). Even then, the widening of the prohibition, by itself, did not result in a 
favourable decision for the religious party. The High Court cemented the result by 
qualifying the extent of the prohibition under the greater goal of national security, 
though the Justices adopted a variety of language to do so including such ideas as 
the protection or preservation of the community and good government or social 
                                                     
95 See above n 43. 
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order. On reflection, the willingness of the Justices to give a broader scope and 
higher threshold to the qualification, seems to have followed the emphasis placed 
by the respective Justices on the notion of toleration and the proper role of 
government as to its responsibility relating to activities of the religious. Certainly, in 
comparison to the Conscription Case (where no mention of higher ideals is to be 
found), the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case saw the investigation of much more 
philosophical language. 
  
3 The Stolen Generations Case 
 The Stolen Generations Case included a significant examination of the free 
exercise clause as it was posed as a constitutional freedom that invalidated certain 
Acts, Ordinances, and Regulations of the Northern Territory which enabled the state 
to remove ‘Aboriginal Australian’ children from their families.96 The Stolen 
Generations Case saw a claim being brought against the Commonwealth of 
Australia. It was contended by the plaintiff that the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 
(NT), Northern Territory Acceptance Act 1910 (Cth), Northern Territory 
Administration Act 1910 (Cth) ‘were invalid upon several grounds’.97 This included, 
inter alia, ‘that they prohibited the free exercise of religion contrary to s 116 of the 
Constitution’.98 The 1918 Ordinance was subordinate to both of the 1910 
enactments, but ‘was repealed from 13 May 1957’.99 
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 A full court of six Justices of the High Court of Australia heard arguments as 
to the construction of section 116. One of the issues in the Stolen Generations Case 
was the applicability of section 116 to the Territories, that is, whether the 
prohibition of the section extended to laws enacted under section 122 of the 
Australian Constitution.100 Justice McHugh adopted the reasons of Justice Dawson 
in their conclusion pertaining to section 116, namely, that ‘the power to legislate 
under s 122 of the Constitution is not restricted by s 116 of the Constitution.’101 This 
work shall leave both Justice Dawson and McHugh’s judgements to the side as the 
jurisdictional issue lies outside the scope of this work. In the Stolen Generations 
Case, for those Justices that did apply or consider the construction of section 116 
beyond the jurisdictional aspects, a ‘for the purpose of’ test was prominently 
featured and it is that test which is of particular concern for the remainder of this 
work.  
 
(i) Chief Justice Brennan 
 Chief Justice Brennan dealt with the argument under section 116 concisely, 
citing the matter of Attorney-General (Vict) ex rel Black v The Commonwealth102 
(‘DOGS Case’), and demonstrating a ‘for the purpose of test’. They held that: 
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applicability to the States and Territories, though they agreed with Justice Gummow, ‘for the reasons 
given by him, that the 1918 Ordinance contains nothing which would enable it to be said that it is a 
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To attract invalidity under s 116, a law must have the purpose of achieving an 
object which s 116 forbids. None of the impugned laws has such a purpose.103 
The reasoning for this conclusion was not explored in any detail whatsoever, by the 
Chief Justice, and so we shall leave it also to the side for the moment, to consider 
the remaining three judgements. 
 
(ii) Justice Toohey 
 Justice Toohey considered that, as opposed to the jurisdictional issue, the 
‘[t]he real problem for the plaintiffs in this aspect of their claim lies in 
demonstrating that the Ordinance is a law “for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion”.’104 Concerned with a purposive test, Justice Toohey affirmed the DOGS 
Case approach, citing that section 116 was ‘directed to the making of law … not 
dealing with the administration of a law’.105 Justice Toohey then found support for 
the significance of the purpose by citing Chief Justice Latham’s interpretation of the 
word ‘for’ that ‘the purpose of the legislation in question may properly be taken 
into account …’106 Noting that ‘purpose’ refers to the ‘end or object which 
legislation may serve’,107 Justice Toohey considered that there might be several 
purposes to any given law but whether a purpose of the law was to prohibit the 
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free exercise of the religion was the threshold to be met.108 Regarding this, Justice 
Toohey decided in the negative, finding that: 
It may well be that an effect of the Ordinance was to impair, even prohibit the 
spiritual beliefs and practices of the Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory, 
though this is something that could only be demonstrated by evidence. But I am 
unable to discern in the language of the Ordinance such a purpose.109 
Clearly, for Justice Toohey, the text (or terms) of the enacted law was the primary 
indicator as to whether there was a purpose for the prohibition (or impairing) of the 
free exercise of a religion. 
 The nature of the evidence brought to the proceedings appears to have 
inhibited the willingness of Justice Toohey to strike the legislation down. They noted 
the arguments made, commenting that: 
In their written submissions the plaintiffs have referred to official reports and 
correspondence which, they say, evidence the very purpose of the policy embodied 
in the Ordinance as the removal of half-caste children to prevent them from 
assimilating the ‘habits, customs and superstitions of the full-blooded 
Aboriginals’.110 
It is not altogether clear what persuasive value Justice Toohey placed on the 
evidence they refer to, but maintaining their concern for the text of the law in 
question and even ‘[a]ssuming that the material in question is admissible in the 
construction of the Ordinance’, they held that ‘it cannot be relied upon in the 
proceedings as they are now before the Court’.111 
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(iii) Justice Gaudron 
 While the application of section 116 to laws enacted under section 122 was 
a significant concern for Justice Gaudron, they affirmed that the ‘accepted approach 
to constitutional interpretation is that constitutional provisions “should be 
construed with all the generality which the words used admit”’.112 Justice Gaudron 
went on to consider (in light of the party’s arguments focusing on the free exercise 
clause) that:  
There are two issues involved in the question whether the Ordinance infringed that 
aspect of s 116, namely, whether the Ordinance was a law ‘prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion’ and, if so, whether it was a law ‘for prohibiting’ it ...113 
Having set out their approach, determining that section 116 did, in their view, apply 
to laws enacted under section 122, Justice Gaudron responded to the plaintiff’s 
claim for damages (rather than simply a declaration of invalidity): 
It makes no sense to speak of a constitutional right to religious freedom in a 
context in which the Constitution clearly postulates that the States may enact laws 
in derogation of that right. It follows, in my view, that s 116 must be construed as 
no more than a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power…114  
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In considering the two issues, Justice Gaudron assumed for argument’s sake that 
there was a ‘religion’ for the purpose of section 116115 and further deconstructed 
the issues by describing them first, ‘whether, in terms of s 116, the Ordinance was a 
law "prohibiting the free exercise of any religion"’116 and second, ‘whether it was a 
law made for that purpose’.117  
 On the first question, Justice Gaudron adopted a broad test for what 
constituted a prohibition of free exercise, disagreeing with both the emphasis on 
‘negative duties’ in the Conscription Case (see above) and the requirement for the 
law to ‘in terms’ ban or forbid a religious practice (referencing Chief Justice 
Barwick’s ‘making but not administration’ rationale derived from the DOGS Case 
also referred to by Justice Toohey, see above).118 Justice Gaudron offers several 
arguments to form a basis to disagree with these two approaches. 
 Regarding the requirement for the prohibition to be ‘in terms’ of the law, 
Justice Gaudron offers two points. The first, which they describe as a ‘textual’ 
reason, citing Chief Justice Latham’s decision in the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case, that: 
s 116 speaks of the exercise of religion, and it follows … that ‘it is intended to 
protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the 
exercise of religion’.119 
The second, a ‘contextual consideration’, was that:  
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[T]he Commonwealth has no power to legislate with respect to religion, and, thus, 
a law which, in terms, prohibits religious practice would, ordinarily, not be a law on 
a subject-matter with respect to which the Commonwealth has any power to 
legislate.120 
Justice Gaudron then considered broader concerns of constitutional interpretation 
and the existing High Court jurisprudence that suggests in other terms, adopting a 
liberal construing of constitutional guarantees so as not to be concerned with ‘form 
rather than substance’.121 Acknowledging the risk of construing section 116 as only 
constraining laws that in terms prohibit the free exercise of a religion, in that the 
constraint in section 116 ‘may be circumvented by legislative provisions which 
purport to do indirectly what cannot be done directly’,122 Justice Gaudron 
concluded: 
that s 116 extends to laws which prevent the free exercise of religion. And … s 116 
extends to provisions which authorise acts which prevent the free exercise of 
religion, not merely provisions which operate of their own force to prevent that 
exercise.123 
However, applying this construction to the matter before them, Justice Gaudron 
concluded that ‘[t]he question whether the Ordinance authorised acts which 
prevented the free exercise of religion involves factual issues which cannot 
presently be determined.’124 Even so, they continued with a hypothetical: 
[I]f Aboriginal people had practices and beliefs which are properly characterised as 
a religion for the purposes of s 116, and if … those practices were carried out in 
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association … removal from their communities and their traditional lands would, 
necessarily, have prevented the free exercise of their religion.125 
Assuming so, Justice Gaudron proceeded: ‘[T]he question arises whether the 
Ordinance was a law “for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion”.’126 
 On this second question, Justice Gaudron set out to define the ‘criterion of 
invalidity selected by s 116’,127 disagreeing with Chief Justice Latham’s judgement 
that an illegitimate ‘purpose’ was optional,128 they held that: 
The use of the word ‘for’ indicates that purpose is the criterion and the sole 
criterion selected by s 116 for invalidity. Thus, purpose must be taken into account. 
Further, it is the only matter to be taken into account in determining whether a law 
infringes s 116.129 
Having set out the significance of the purpose as the ‘criterion of invalidity’,130 
Justice Gaudron softened the strict requirement for purpose by accepting Chief 
Justice Latham’s approach to qualify section 116 under the guise of conducting a 
war, to protect the existence of the community, or maintain civil government.131 
 Diverging from Chief Justice Barwick’s reasoning in the DOGS Case, Justice 
Gaudron decided that the terms of section 116 and the free exercise clause 
especially, are not ‘directed to laws the express and single purpose of which offends 
one or other of the proscriptions. Rather, its terms are sufficiently wide to 
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encompass any law which has a proscribed purpose’.132 Proceeding to address a 
plea of the Commonwealth’s (‘that the purpose of the Ordinance was “the 
protection and preservation of persons of the Aboriginal race”’133), Justice Gaudron 
decided that a law might potentially involve multiple purposes, possibly ‘subsumed 
in a larger or more general purpose’.134 Applying their reasoning to the facts of the 
Stolen Generations Case: 
Indeed, in the absence of some overriding social or humanitarian need … it might 
well be concluded that one purpose of the power conferred by s 16 of the 
Ordinance was to … prevent their participation in community practices. And if those 
practices included religious practices, that purpose necessarily extended to 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.135 
However, Justice Gaudron qualified this conclusion by adopting the same approach, 
as in the tests for the implied freedoms of political communication and movement 
and association, that: 
[A] law will not be a law for ‘prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’, 
notwithstanding that in terms, it does just that or that it operates directly with that 
consequence, if it is necessary to attain some overriding public purpose or to satisfy 
some pressing social need. Nor will it have that purpose if it is a law for some 
specific purpose unconnected with the free exercise of religion and only 
incidentally affects that freedom. 136 
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Justice Gaudron, in explicitly deciding that ‘the purpose of a law is to be determined 
by reference to “the facts with which it deals”’137 concluded that the purpose of the 
Ordinance could not be determined with the evidence available.138  
 
(iv) Justice Gummow 
 Justice Gummow handily subtitles the issue of the free exercise of religion 
separately from their consideration of the interaction between section 116 and 
section 122 of the Australian Constitution. Justice Gummow briefly reviewed a mix 
of authorities, noting the section as a limit on legislative power for the protection of 
a human right,139 the section as a proclamation for toleration of religion and the 
absence of religion,140 a fundamental necessity for a legal limitation on freedom of 
exercise yet a sacredness for freedom of belief141 and, seemingly imputing a 
requirement to be tolerant on the religions themselves, that: 
Action in pursuance of a particular religious belief that is both monotheistic and 
eager to proselytise may conflict impermissibly with toleration both of other 
religions and of an absence of religion.142 
Justice Gummow cited a US Supreme Court decision to hold that ‘[a] law which 
protects or regulates the personal or property rights of others will not ordinarily 
                                                     
137 Ibid 134, citing Arthur Yates & Co Pty Ltd v Vegetable Seeds Committee (1945) 72 CLR 37, 68. 
138 Ibid 134. 
139 Ibid 160, citing DOGS Case (n 102) 603. 
140 Ibid 160, citing Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 123. 
141 Ibid 160, citing Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vict) [1983] HCA 40; 
(1983) 154 CLR 120, 135-136. 
142 Ibid 160. 
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offend s 116’.143 It appears that for Justice Gummow, laws of general application 
included especially, that law which dealt with tangible interests. 
 Ultimately, Justice Gummow upheld the reasoning in the DOGS Case and the 
Conscription Case’s emphasis on negative duties by emphasising the word ‘for’ 
within section 116. They determined that the test was ‘whether the Commonwealth 
has made a law in order to prohibit the free exercise of any religion, as the end to 
be achieved’.144 Justice Gummow did consider the effect of the law but in this case, 
primarily gave value to the terms of the law by holding that: 
No conduct of a religious nature was proscribed or sought to be regulated in any 
way … The withdrawal of infants … from the communities in which they would 
otherwise have been reared, no doubt may have had the effect … of denying their 
instruction in the religious beliefs of their community. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing apparent in the 1918 Ordinance which suggests that it aptly is to be 
characterised as a law made in order to prohibit the free exercise of any such 
religion, as the objective to be achieved by the implementation of the law.145 
Justice Gummow noted the reliance on extrinsic material by the plaintiffs in their 
written submissions (‘the relevancy and admissibility of which would be an issue at 
trial’146). Justice Gummow was unwilling to accept those submissions in the 
condition they were presented and so concluded that: 
It may be that a particular law is disclosed as having a purpose prohibited by s 116 
only upon consideration of extraneous matters indicating a concealed means or 
                                                     
143 Ibid 160, citing Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith [1990] 
USSC 90; (1990) 494 US 872, 878-880. 
144 Ibid 160, citing DOGS Case (n 102) 653; Conscription Case (n 4) 369. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid 161. 
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circuitous device to attain that end, and that it is permissible to apply s 116 in that 
fashion. But these can only be matters for another day.147 
Hence, from this, it might be seen that Justice Gummow has acknowledged the 
possibility of implicit purposes which can cause a law to contravene section 116. 
 
Summary of the Stolen Generations Case 
 The Stolen Generations Case has presented litigants with options, albeit, 
limited to arguments over the purpose of the law. The Stolen Generations Case 
represented a continuation of the purposive test but revealed an open-ended 
potential for the High Court to receive comprehensive arguments of what actually 
constitutes a ‘purpose’. But this potential is far from authoritative and hardly an 
encouraging platform for future litigation (which may well have been a desired 
effect of the Justice’s decisions).  
 Those Justices that did consider the claim made under section 116 (either 
accepting or assuming that it did apply to laws made under section 122148), applied 
the reasoning set out in the DOGS Case. Even then, there were some significant 
variations in the decisions. Justice Toohey was clearly focused on identifying at least 
‘a’ purpose of the law in its terms (but did not entirely disregard the relevance of 
other evidence). Justices Gaudron and Gummow diverted from the purposive test 
more dramatically. Justice Gaudron (while describing the purpose as the ‘sole 
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165 CLR 360, 401; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436, 472-474. 
148 Australian Constitution s 122. 
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criterion’) elected to consider the effects of the law as being directly relevant to 
identifying a law’s purpose (and that a law might have multiple purposes) which 
may not be apparent solely in the terms of the law. Justice Gummow in this case, 
uniquely, adopted a more principled construction, referring to the clause inter alia 
as a protection of a human right and a proclamation of ‘toleration’. 
 Possibly, one of the reasons there is a lack of confidence in the clause as a 
negative duty directed to the state itself, since the Stolen Generations Case, is the 
absence of a dominant, motivating principle by which a potential plaintiff might test 
the waters of litigation. It is certainly not apparent that the ideal of a ‘tolerant’ 
government will motivate the High Court in the future – instead – the courts seem 
to have returned to a cold legalism as first demonstrated in the Conscription Case 
that could swing either way depending on the persuasiveness of the evidence. 
Certainly, a somewhat riskier proposition for a legal practitioner. Even Justice 
Gaudron, whose own judgement emphasised the broader approach taken by Chief 
Justice Latham almost half a century before, was unwilling to follow through in the 
constancy of a principled constitutional religious freedom (they were only willing to 
assume there was a ‘prohibition’ in fact, for argument’s sake). Indeed, it is likely 
that regardless of any willingness of the Justices to lower the threshold for the 
plaintiff on the issue of free exercise, the quality of the evidence presented (and 
their method of argument) inhibited that possibility in the same way the court in 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case was entirely unified on the point of national security. 
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4 A Note About the Clause and the Authorities 
 The High Court has clearly had some difficulty in finding a consistent 
approach to the free exercise clause and this has, unsurprisingly, attracted a variety 
of critique in the secondary literature (some of these critiques are considered below 
in Part B). Three distinct generations of the High Court have been represented in 
three very different factual circumstances. In these few matters, the High Court has 
fluctuated in the approach taken to constructing the free exercise clause. The 
Conscription Case commenced the history of litigation with a narrow and almost 
dismissive reading which focused on the text to impute a requirement that there be 
a negative duty imposed by the relevant law. The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case saw the 
consideration of a range of issues that would be wrestled with for years to come 
(including the potential for ‘religious exercises’ to have a political character) but 
ultimately fell upon an uncontroversial public interest in national security. The High 
Court in the Stolen Generations Case, through an ‘establishment clause 
mutation’,149 has emphasised a ‘purposive’ test. This test has proven contentious as 
the Justices were split in their means of identifying the purpose of a law; whether it 
could be identified on the strict terms of the relevant law, whether extraneous 
material can assist that identification, whether there were multiple purposes to a 
law, and, even then, split on the appropriate rationale to qualify the clause. 
                                                     
149 A transition has been identified in the literature, from the approach in the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Case, to the purposive approach adopted in the DOGS Case (what Reid Mortensen describes as an 
‘establishment clause mutation’, after the establishment clause of section 116 which was the focus 
of the DOGS Case): Cf Reid Mortensen, ‘The Unfinished Experiment: A Report on Religious Freedom 
in Australia’ (2007) 21 Emory International Law Review 167, 173-175. 
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 Having considered these matters, it might seem to an observer that the 
threshold for a case built on the free exercise clause is quite high. Indeed, it is high, 
in the sense that as compared to the broadest construction of the free exercise 
clause one could imagine, the elements that have needed to be satisfied by a 
plaintiff have been thus-far such that (as of the date of writing this work) the author 
(as just one among others150) has not identified a single successful attempt at 
litigating the clause and the High Court’s interpretation of the clause (and section 
116 generally) is consistently described as being ‘narrow’ by commentators. It 
remains open to debate whether the results of litigation have been limited by the 
High Court’s erring construction or, alternatively; that government has simply not 
objectively contravened the clause (or indeed, section 116 generally). This 
narrowness has come to define the free exercise clause. But the nexus of this 
defining limitation is in two broad themes which can be respectively described as 
the scope and reliability of the clause.151 Both are derived from the judgements of 
the High Court and have continued to manifest in lower courts. Indeed, the dynamic 
was identified, vaguely, by Justice Rich when they described section 116 as ‘wide in 
the area of religious faith which it seeks to protect, but … narrow in its description 
of the kinds of laws which it disallows’.152 The point is that the protection of the 
‘free exercise’ of religion, ostensibly provided for in section 116 against 
Commonwealth law makers, is not infinite and cannot be realistically expected to 
                                                     
150 See, eg, Alex Deagon, ‘Liberal Assumptions in Section 116 Cases and Implications for Religious 
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protect absolutely anything that a person does while they claim it as being done 
under the banner of a religion.  
 It remains that there are some significant hurdles that any potential litigant 
should either accommodate within their arguments, or, seek to contest. Yet, 
despite whatever limitations the clause now suffers from, the law has clearly 
evolved and this offers opportunity in the future.153 This does not mean necessarily 
that the clause will outpace the power granting provisions of the Constitution. 
Despite the narrow construction, attempts have been made in various courts to call 
upon the clause as a civil rights mechanism in the style of a protection of religious 
freedom. It has been maintained by both State and federal judiciaries, in these 
circumstances, that the type of law which the clause will prohibit is a very specific 
one and that any attempt to argue the free exercise clause as a protection of some 
‘right’ to religious freedom is plainly mistaken.154 A recently published public 
inquiry, the Religious Freedom Review, only addresses section 116 briefly wherein 
the expert panel charged to conduct the review reported that: 
[S]ection 116 is a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power; it does not create 
a ‘right’ for individuals to hold or manifest their faith. Nor does it create a positive 
obligation on the Commonwealth to do anything to ensure freedom of religion … A 
law will only fall foul of the ‘free exercise’ limb of section 116, for example, if its 
purpose is to restrict religious practice, even if its effect is to burden 
disproportionately the practices of a particular religion.155  
                                                     
153 Two landmark High Court matters, while not examined in detail in this work, have impacted the 
development of the free exercise clause indirectly. See generally, DOGS Case (n 102); Church of the 
New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vict.) (1983) 154 CLR 120. 
154 See, eg, Durston v Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (No 2) [2018] TASSC 48. 
155 Expert Panel, Religious Freedom Review: Report of the Expert Panel (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 18 May 2018), 35-36 [1.90-1.91], citing Stolen Generations Case (n 6).   
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So-far, it does appear that Australian courts have been unwavering in an apparent 
preference for giving Federal Parliament its own brand of supremacy and thus, it 
would pay for a prospective plaintiff to keep in mind that ‘[i]t is not generally for the 
court to determine where the balance ought be struck; rather to assess the validity 
of the balance reached by the democratically-accountable Parliament’.156 It is the 
tests used by the courts to assess the validity of a law that are both open to change 
and the concern of this work: can we predict how the court will, or suggest how it 
should, respond to litigation in the future? 
   
B The Current Condition of the Clause 
 While the High Court decisions examined in Part A are not the only matters 
to involve an attempt to litigate the free exercise clause or section 116, nor the only 
times when a court has been required to consider the clause,157 they do provide a 
definitive gauge for the current state of High Court jurisprudence and are 
fundamentally relevant to any future attempts to litigate the section. This must be 
acknowledged, however, in light of the doctrine of precedent and the responsibility 
of the High Court in matters involving the Commonwealth pursuant to Chapter III of 
the Constitution158). So far, this work has considered the highest-level matters 
involving the construction of the free exercise clause, however, it is not clear which 
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approach a court will adopt (out of the many technical differences) as authoritative. 
Practically, it might be impossible to assert there is some clearly predictable 
precedent. The High Court is not technically bound by previous decisions and lower 
courts can be creative, to a degree, by distinguishing the facts to bypass the 
applicability of higher decisions. Utilising the phrasing of ‘orthodoxy’ as others 
have,159 to describe the current jurisprudence of the High Court is therefore quite 
appropriate (the examination of judgements is not a particularly precise science).  
 We can, having examined the construction of the clause in the High Court 
matters examined, conclude that there are some elements that a plaintiff should 
seek to pre-emptively address (albeit, they may not be individually determinative of 
a final judgement) in an argument based on the free exercise clause; that a law is 
contrary to section 116 and thus should be struck down (wholly or partially). These 
elements include: 
1. That the Commonwealth has made a law, and 
2. That the effect of that law prohibits the free exercise of any religion, 
and 
3. That the purpose of that law is to prohibit the free exercise of any 
religion, and 
4. That the law is not justified by an (overriding) public interest. 
The first element in this list acknowledges the ‘structural’ limitations that are 
uncontestably present in the text of the section yet which could be described as 
relatively uncontroversial compared to the other elements. These structural 
limitations involve the technical meaning of what constitutes ‘making a law’ and the 
                                                     
159 Mortensen (n 149) 176. 
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jurisdictional issue of who constitutes the ‘Commonwealth’ (particularly, whether 
the legislatures of the Territories are included).160 These ‘structural limitations’, 
however, are quite distinct from the remaining three elements and remain outside 
the scope of this work. The second and third elements, in setting out what the 
prohibition is directed against, have come to revolve around the High Court’s 
interpretation of the word ‘for’ and set out whether a certain law will fall under the 
prohibition altogether. The fourth element pertains to the absolute language of the 
clause and the question of whether the clause itself will (or should) prohibit every 
law that falls under its terms (to protect every exercise of any religion) in any 
circumstance. While there is little room to realistically expect that the High Court 
will expand its construction of section 116 so as to apply it to the States and 
Territories (a debate for another time161), there is some hope that the jurisdiction it 
does apply to will face a significant prohibition (though not necessarily, always, a 
politically relevant one). 
 Whatever limitations it faces; the free exercise clause is not sourced from 
the common law nor some simple Act of Parliament. The free exercise clause is 
found within the Australian Constitution, and by its placement there, it holds a 
special status. Along with any abstract implications of constitutionalism, the text of 
section 116 can only be modified in accordance with the processes found in the 
Constitution, which is to say, a referendum.162 There have been a small number of 
attempts to change the text of section 116 through referendum, in light of the High 
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Court’s limited construction (particularly motivated by the jurisdictional limitations). 
Accounts of these attempts are examined in more detail elsewhere163 and it is 
sufficient to note here that those efforts were ultimately unsuccessful – the section 
has remained unchanged since it was drafted.164 Besides the requirement for 
referendum, the Federal Court has now been granted original jurisdiction in matters 
‘arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation’165 (this is also subject 
to change). Yet, the reference to the ‘Commonwealth’ within section 116 also 
ostensibly brings it under the purview of the High Court’s original jurisdiction under 
Chapter III of the Constitution where the ‘Commonwealth’ would expect to be a 
party to a matter.166 The task of interpreting the existing text lies with the judiciary, 
within which, the highest authority is the constitutionally established High Court of 
Australia which has appellate jurisdiction over ‘any other federal court, or court 
exercising federal jurisdiction’ (again, notwithstanding limitations imposed by 
further Acts of Parliament).167 
 This work proceeds on the basis that there are two common themes to the 
High Court’s judgements, respectively; the scope of the prohibition (pertaining to 
what ‘it’ is that the clause is directed at) and the reliability of the prohibition 
(pertaining to the judiciary’s qualification of the scope of the prohibition so that 
certain religious exercises might not attract the protection, thus the clause is, to a 
point, unreliable). Depending on how one reads the clause and whether one is more 
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or less inclined to inhibit a particular undertaking of the Commonwealth’s, the 
prohibitive or protective capacity of the clause might be preferably broadened or 
suppressed.  
 
1 The Scope of the Prohibition (and the Protection) 
 As a consequence of the High Court’s judgements, the scope of the free 
exercise clause is perhaps the most hotly debated aspect of the clause. The issue for 
the plaintiff or applicant being literally: what constitutes a law ‘for prohibiting the 
free exercise of any religion’? If indeed, there can be described to be an orthodox 
view of the clause, it hinges not on simply identifying a ‘prohibition’ in the effect of 
the law, but also on a purposive test – whether the law had a relevant ‘purpose’. A 
number of authors have examined the High Court’s construction of the clause. Luke 
Beck has described the importance of this undertaking, commenting that: 
As a matter of principle, getting the details of constitutional interpretation correct 
is important in its own right and as a means of presenting a coherent analysis of the 
law.168  
Some of the published criticisms are considered here, including Beck’s, but it 
remains while writing this work the most contentious issue in the most current 
literature is the purposive test which has come to dominate the orthodox view of 
the clause (as exampled in the Stolen Generations Case). 
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 There are a range of approaches, or lenses that one can take to considering 
the issue. It is typical in the literature to approach the issue through a comparative 
lens with a concern for details of the drafting history. Beck has produced grounded 
examples of such research, especially by examining the competition between two 
potential constructions of the word ‘for’; the orthodox purposive or alternatively, a 
‘with respect to’ construction as is typical of the United States’ equivalent of section 
116.169 Beck has described the implications, that: ‘In practice, the difference 
between the two interpretations affects the scope of the limitation imposed by s 
116 on Commonwealth legislation.’170 The comparative lens based contention, rests 
in an historical conversation over the extent that American law should influence the 
Australian. The comparison between the Australian Constitution’s section 116, and 
the American Constitution’s First Amendment is typically made due to the similarity 
between the two and because the Australian is ostensibly based upon the American 
with only slight changes, though the details of those changes are sometimes glossed 
over171 or alleged to be the justification for the different interpretations.172 This is 
the subject of the contention which Mortensen addresses in describing the 
‘bloated’ emphasis placed on the word ‘for’ in the High Court’s orthodox view, 
originating in the DOGS Case.173 This debate over the word ‘for’ however, is really 
directed at identifying what kind of law the clause is scoped to prohibit. 
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 Identifying the type of law that the clause is directed to is just one part of 
the puzzle because underpinning this disagreement over the word ‘for’, is ambiguity 
regarding the word ‘exercise’. The Conscription Case approach, most clearly set out 
by Chief Justice Griffith, saw ‘exercise’ as a noun (as a separate thing to be done 
within the religion) while in contrast, for Chief Justice Latham and Justice Gaudron, 
the word operated as a verb (the religion itself was being exercised). The distinction 
being, that one refers to religious exercise (eg rites or rituals), the other, to 
exercising a religion generally.174 The second is broader because, theoretically, 
anything can be attributed religious significance, even the things viewed as 
unrelated to a religion by others. The defining of the word ‘exercise’, is really 
directed at identifying what kind of activity the clause is scoped to protect. 
 The reality is that the approach taken by the High Court has been centred on 
the existence in fact of a prohibition on the free exercise of any religion which forms 
the cause of action (ie the arguments) for the matter in the first place. What 
argument would there be to make unless the law to be impugned was being argued 
to actually ‘prohibit’ the free exercise of a religion? Yet, at the same time, purpose is 
the technical apex of the High Court’s judgements and jurisprudence (the ‘criterion 
of invalidity’). There are two questions to address then. Firstly; what is, and is it 
necessary, that there has been in fact some prohibition on the free exercise of a 
religion? Secondly, once we accept that a ‘purposive test’ is the current orthodoxy; 
what is the significance of the purposive test and what can be adduced to 
determine the so-called ‘purpose’ of a law?  
                                                     
174 This interpretation was contested in the Conscription Case: See above pt A div I. 
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The Fact of a ‘Prohibition’ 
 As to the first question; the High Court has only inconsistently considered 
the effect of the law being debated. In the Conscription Case, the court was looking 
for a prohibition of a rite of some kind. The argument was put forward by the 
plaintiff that religion ‘is not limited to the performance of religious rites, but 
includes the acting in a manner which is dictated by religion’.175 This did not 
persuade the Justices sitting at the time. However, the next generation of Justices 
appear more favourable to that line of argument. Chief Justice Latham revised the 
Conscription Case approach by deliberately examining the broader relationship 
between government and religion, the idea of religious freedom, and the political 
toleration of religion. Chief Justice Latham was clearly more sensitive to the 
religious beliefs which enabled them to impute on the section the notion that law 
was to be blind to religion.176 To broaden the prohibition from only negative duties 
on rites, the Chief Justice relied on a point of logic (responding to a hypothetical 
distinction between religious opinions and actions ‘sometimes suggested in 
discussions on the subject of freedom of religion’) that the section does not only 
protect ‘liberty of opinion’, ‘[i]t protects also acts done in pursuance of religious 
belief as part of religion’.177 The nature of the activity was not otherwise significant 
in the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case. This same approach to the kind of activity the 
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clause protects, was adopted in the Stolen Generations Case by Justice Gaudron in 
taking the view that a religion is being exercised, rather than religious ‘exercises’ 
being done.178 
 In-between these two matters, a development in the High Court has 
cemented the view that a wider range of activity is to be covered by the clause. The 
matter of The Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax179 
(‘Scientology Case’) has offered the Australian law, a common definition of ‘religion’ 
and specifically incorporated the significance of religious beliefs within the notion of 
the exercise of any religion. The definition was provided principally in the joint 
judgement of Acting Chief Justice Mason and Justice Brennan, who held that:  
[T]he criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or 
Principle; and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to 
that belief …180  
What this definition directs us to is a view that an ‘exercise of any religion’ is an 
activity that is giving effect to a certain belief, pursuant to an adopted canon. Not 
necessarily, only an activity that is positively mandated by a religious canon. The 
exercise hinges on a belief. Regardless of their attention being held by other issues, 
recent generations of the High Court have clearly demonstrated a willingness to 
extend the protection in the free exercise clause to activities where that activity 
done is in the pursuit of a religious belief generally. 
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 The significance in the difference between the approaches to the ‘kind of 
exercise protected by the clause’, while perhaps a mostly theoretical consideration, 
is an important one. Anthony Gray has considered the adaptability of the 
Conscription Case approach to the context of the well-known and publicised Roman 
Catholic rite of confession. Gray noted that to enact a law with a positive duty 
comprising the mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse with information 
gleaned from the rite, while subjectively may be a morally objectionable law, could 
be defended against a constitutional challenge by adopting the construction of 
Chief Justice Griffith.181 However, as also illustrated by Gray, the approach appears 
weak in contrast to its alternatives. Construing the clause as to only apply to 
negative duties, technical debates arise. Would a negative duty (for example, to not 
treat the confession as privileged) be practically different to a positive duty to 
disclose information? How would such a law be enforced? Would a law that 
penalises a priest with imprisonment for failing to abide by the law, itself, be a law 
that prohibits the free exercise of other members of that religion?182 The Federal 
Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association, 
considered technical issues very much on this level.183 The generation of Justices 
sitting in the Jehovah’s Witnesses Case most assuredly would have taken the view 
that the kind of activity that confession is, including a withholding of evidence of 
child abuse, amounts to an exercise of a religion. This is also likely to have been true 
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of the Justices in the Stolen Generations Case, if the Scientology Case’s provided 
definition of religion and Justice Gaudron’s judgement are any indication.  
 So, as long as the orthodox view of the active generation of Justices rests on 
a wide concept of ‘religion’ that emphasises the significance of belief to a religious 
‘exercise’, it will likely mean that the broader of the two approaches to ‘exercise’ 
will dominate. But, this does not in and of itself mean that the threshold for making 
an argument under the clause is low. Indeed, it will possibly be the opposite due to 
the role of a law’s purpose, which, the High Court has come to recognise as the 
‘criterion of invalidity’. To attempt to answer then, the question of whether it is 
necessary that a person has had the free exercise of any religion prohibited for the 
clause to be of any use, we should say strictly, that no, it is not necessary. The 
‘establishment clause mutation’ has rendered the purpose of the law the central 
issue facing litigants over the effect felt by it (and the latter is quite subjective). A 
prima facie examination of a matter, only considering the factual circumstances, will 
lead one to an incomplete analysis of the input-output function of a law. Rather 
than addressing the law from the perspective of the person suffering from it 
(especially through a civil liberties lens), litigants should cast their mind to the 
position of the law-maker and consider the law foremost from the issue of 
legislative power. The purpose of the law will then take the place as the central 
theme of the pleadings and submissions, which would be consistent with the 
jurisprudence of the High Court. The specifics of which, this work turns to now. 
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‘For the Purpose of’, or, ‘in Respect to’? In Terms or Implicit? 
 The emphasis on the purpose of the law has been perpetuated but also 
developed upon in the most recent cases dealing with section 116. The evolution of 
the orthodox approach is a subject of criticism, both, in the adoption of a purposive 
test184 but also the details of that test. The first judicial reference to the object of 
the law, in the context of the free exercise clause, were in two judgements of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Case. Chief Justice Latham held that purpose may be 
considered185 and Justice McTiernan assessed the law for the ‘real object’ in its 
terms.186 In the Stolen Generations Case, the High Court fully adopted an exclusive 
focus on the ‘purpose’ of the law. In doing so, the High Court relied on the DOGS 
Case dealing with the establishment clause of section 116. Some of the problems 
with such an approach were exposed in the Stolen Generations Case, albeit to no 
avail of the plaintiffs. While only three of the six Justices discussed details of the 
test, the court did unanimously apply it (or held it to not bind the Territories). The 
issues discussed by the Justices included whether the prohibition of free exercise 
needs to be a purpose or the purpose of the law, and whether a law’s purpose can 
be identified in its terms or if extrinsic material can assist identifying an implicit 
purpose. 
 Regarding the meaning of ‘purpose’ and their plurality, Mortensen 
summarises the orthodoxy of the Stolen Generations Case, that ‘the majority of the 
Court accepted Justice Gummow's view that “for” did not limit the Court to 
                                                     
184 See, eg, Beck (n 168). 
185 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 132 [10]. 
186 Ibid, 156 (McTiernan J) citing James v Cowan (1932) AC 542, 558. 
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assessing the Parliament's motives for passing legislation, but allowed it to consider 
the objects or ends of the legislation’.187 The reality of modern Australian law, is 
that the purpose of a law is to be given special attention by the judiciary in the 
process of constructing an Act of Parliament.188 Curiously enough (the correlation is 
perhaps a discussion for another time), it would appear that this mandatory 
approach to statutory construction arose in 1981, the same year that the purposive 
test was espoused in the DOGS Case. Chief Justice Brennan demonstrated the 
legalism (and the concern for legislative power) of the test, in holding simply that 
‘none of the impugned laws on its proper construction can be seen as a law for 
prohibiting the free exercise of a religion’.189 However, it does not appear that there 
is, or will be, an issue in the future as to whether a law can only have a single 
‘purpose’. It does appear that this issue is fairly resolved, at least academically, to 
the point that a law need not have the sole purpose of prohibiting the free exercise 
of any religion, but the lower threshold of a purpose.190 Of course, on the 
examination above we can say that only two Justices addressed this concern 
directly (Toohey and Gaudron) to promote the view that there can be multiple 
purposes to a law. Chief Justice Brennan and Justice Gummow were silent about 
this issue, implying either that they accepted the higher threshold or that they 
simply took the view that no purpose whatsoever of the relevant law contravened 
section 116. While then, even though it could appear to be the orthodox at present, 
                                                     
187 Mortensen (n 149) 176, citing Stolen Generations Case, 160-161. 
188 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA; Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth); Acts 
Interpretation Amendment Act 1984 (Cth); Statute Law Revision Act 1981 (Cth). 
189 Stolen Generations, 40. 
190 Luke Beck has addressed the broader reasons for why the lower threshold of a purpose is 
appropriate. See, Beck (n 168) 514. 
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the higher threshold for a singular purpose surely lies on shaky foundations. Yet, an 
even more controversial issue is where the purpose (or purposes) of a law can be 
identified and how one might identify it (or them).  
 In the context of the cases examined above, there appear to be two possible 
answers to the question regarding the source of a law’s purpose. The first might be 
described as an in-terms purposive test which, itself, has the effect that even where 
everybody or a select few people feel that the law prohibits the free exercise of any 
religion, if such a thing is not written into the law (if the law is not ‘for’ it), then that 
law will not, on its face, contravene the clause. A critic of this in-terms purposive 
test might suggest that the legislature will be able to evade the prohibition by 
careful drafting.191 A rebuttal to that critique could be that while there may have 
been some ‘indirect' impact on a religious exercise, the law itself was not genuinely 
concerned with the exercise of any religion and thus the law was not a prohibition 
as it was made, only in its administration,192 technically leaving the law outside the 
ambit of section 116. Perhaps the most significant jurisprudential development 
then, is that a select few Justices of the High Court have clearly considered the 
possibility that a parliament might bypass section 116. Justices Gaudron and 
Gummow indicated some receptiveness to extraneous material being used to 
support an argument over the purpose of a law (though this was not put into 
                                                     
191 See, eg, Anthony Gray, ‘Section 116 of the Australian Constitution and Dress Restrictions’ (2011) 
16 Deakin Law Review 293, 316. 
192 DOGS, 581 [26]-[27] (Barwick CJ):  
 The next observation I wish to make as to s. 116 is that it is directed to the making of law. It 
 is not dealing with the administration of a law. But, if that administration is within the ambit 
 of the authority conferred by the statute, and does amount to the establishment of a 
 religion, the statute which supports it will most probably be a statute for establishing a 
 religion and therefore void as offending s.116. That is so, not because of the manner of the 
 administration but because the statute, properly construed, authorizes it. 
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practice in that case due to a deficiency in the admissibility of the evidence in 
question). 
 Assuming then, that a law can have multiple purposes, when could a law 
have its purpose be for ‘prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’ yet not actually 
contain that purpose in its terms? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is 
likely to be context sensitive. Beck summarises the alternative to the in-terms 
approach, quoting Chief Justice Barwick in the DOGS Case, that: 
A law will be for a prohibited end therefore if it has as a purpose, whether express 
or implicit, the attainment of an end prohibited by s 116. The best view of this test 
appears to be as Barwick CJ put it: a law's 'operational effect will be the 
determinant' of whether the law has a prohibited purpose and so violates s 116.193 
This conclusion might be viewed as optimistic compared to the conclusions of other 
researchers’ attempts to identify the orthodoxy. Mortensen described the 
significance of the purposive test (it seems, they took the view that a singular 
purpose represents that orthodoxy) that: 
By extending the [DOGS Case] interpretation of the word ‘for’ to the Free Exercise 
Clause, it follows that if Parliament had the necessary secular purpose it could 
validly and effectively prohibit the free exercise of any religion.194 
What this recognises is that if a ‘good’ purpose (or a ‘legitimate’ purpose) can be 
attached to the law, that law might avoid the prohibition despite any ‘incidental’ 
effect on a religious exercise. But this raises the question, how could a law have an 
effect yet not simultaneously be ‘for’ that effect? Part of the difficulty presented in 
                                                     
193 Beck (n 3) 170. 
194 Mortensen (n 149) 175. 
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the Stolen Generations Case, was that it was retrospective. Even had the declaration 
of invalidity been granted, the plaintiffs could hardly make practical use of it. A case, 
which involves a question about the validity of a law which at the time of litigation 
had an active prohibitive effect, if successful, would expectedly enable that plaintiff 
to alter or maintain their conduct. A more recent matter, Cheedy on behalf of the 
Yindjibarndi People v State of Western Australia195 (‘Cheedy’), was perhaps a 
circumstantial opposite to the Stolen Generations Case because it involved a 
decision, enabled by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), that might eventuate in a 
prohibition.196 This case has demonstrated the continued significance of the effect 
of a law in question (highlighting the question to which kind of activity the clause is 
directed197) but also indicates that Mortensen’s description is the apt one. The court 
held that ‘[s]ome of the mandatory considerations … demonstrate a concern by the 
legislature with the protection of religious freedom.’198 The terms of the law 
demonstrated some parliamentary concern for protecting religious freedom and 
this, inter alia, kept it safe from section 116 despite what Chief Justice Barwick 
opined in the DOGS Case, that: 
The manner of [a law’s] administration can have no independent effect. What may 
lawfully be done in its administration forms part of the consideration of the validity 
                                                     
195 Cheedy on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People v State of Western Australia [2011] FCAFC 100 
(‘Cheedy’). 
196 The court held:  
 Thus, there are a series of actions under Commonwealth and State legislation which must 
 be taken before the appellants’ religious practices are impacted.  No doubt for this reason 
 the appellants’ argument accepted that s 38 and s 39 of the Act did not directly achieve a 
 prohibition on the free exercise of religion.  The contention, therefore, was that s 38 and s 
 39 resulted in or had the effect of prohibiting the free exercise by the appellants of their 
 religion.’: ibid 24 [87]. 
197 Ibid 25-26 [95]. 
198 Ibid 25 [92]. 
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of its enactment: and what can be lawfully done is determined by the construction 
of the statute, the determination of its meaning and its operation.199 
This might prompt one to wonder, if a law’s administration could have the effect of 
‘prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’, should that not render it invalid? 
 If a law is constructed as not having the purpose of prohibiting the free 
exercise of a religion (whatever that refers to and regardless if that effect is felt) 
then it follows that a potential plaintiff’s exercise is technically permitted, albeit, 
confined within the operation of the law – while they are not immune to that law, 
they can predictably expect to push its limits. What this represents, is that up until 
the law unequivocally prohibits the free exercise of a religion, a person can 
technically pursue any religious exercise though it may not be easy, indeed, it may 
not be a ‘free’ pursuit. This is demonstrated in the native title case of Cheedy, 
where the plaintiff was successful to a point, but could not attain a total victory of 
their own terms.200 Under this orthodoxy, even though a person may feel that a law 
prohibits the free exercise of a religion, if that prohibition is not held to be the 
purpose then there will be no cause of action. If the law has an otherwise legitimate 
purpose with an ‘indirect’ effect, that law can be immune to the free exercise 
clause. This demonstrates that a subjective viewpoint of civil rights will not lend 
itself as a good predictor to any future litigation (at least, not at a constitutional 
level). A plaintiff needs to establish that the attention of the law maker was 
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200 Cheedy (n 194) 25 [95] (emphasis added):  
 [T]he State and FMG had demonstrated a willingness to cooperate … and the imposition of 
 the four extra conditions in the mining leases would mitigate the impact of mining on the 
 land. There was thus a finding of fact that the free exercise of religion of the appellants 
 would not be prohibited by the grant of the mining leases on condition. 
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directed at the prohibition of religion; perhaps that the law maker knew it would, or 
could, effect a prohibition. Access to parliamentary debates and records may assist 
such an endeavour.201 
 
The Meaning of a Slogan - ‘Free’ 
 The scope of the free exercise clause is primarily a debate over the kind of 
actions and laws it respectively protects and prohibits. But, as this work has alluded 
to, the inclusion of the word ‘free’ adds another layer to that debate. The meaning 
that can be given to it will depend on (or influence) our understanding of the scope 
of the rest of the clause. The oddity is that the word ‘free’, in the clause, could be 
removed entirely and the sentence would still function. The significant question is: 
does a prohibition of free exercise (whatever ‘exercise’ might refer to) include 
merely interfering with (ie regulating) that exercise (whereby that exercise would 
be prohibited from being free), or must it be an absolute forbidding of the exercise? 
There appears to have been two approaches conceived in the High Court 
judgements. Textually, the word ‘free’ could be either be an adjective to emphasise 
the quality of the exercise that must not be prohibited, or an adverb, to protect the 
doing of religion ‘freely’ (referring to the quantum of pursuing one’s religion). 
 In the case of construing ‘exercise’ as a noun, as exampled in the 
Conscription Case, the use of ‘free’ as an adjective should imply that even 
                                                     
201 Modern access to digitised records and legal history might then imply a more consistent handling 
of fundamental civil freedom issues, where doctrine that responds to those issues remains the same 
but the population subject to it, itself changes. 
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interferences of (or ‘regulating’) an ‘exercise’ would fall under the prohibition. The 
clause would, prima facie, extend to a law directed to limiting or burdening an 
exercise of a religious nature. Taking this approach means that the scope would be 
limited to a certain subset of activities, excluding laws with ‘non-religious’ positive 
duties from its ambit (and likely discarding the significance of religious belief to a 
person’s general conduct). This approach should be contrasted to constructing 
‘exercise’ as a verb (in doing so, Chief Justice Latham maintained the significance of 
religious belief202). The use of ‘free’ would instead seem (by its placement 
immediately before the verb) to qualify the kind of ‘doing’ of any religion and bring 
the clause closer to the phraseology of such popular rhetoric as ‘free speech’ (in 
which, as discussed by Chief Justice Latham, the speech to be free is not unlimited) 
– as in which case – free can be a limiting concept in the quantum of doing one’s 
religion (where ‘free’ is placed as an adverb). By taking the view that exercise is a 
verb, to acknowledge the word free we could suggest that, for clarity, the word 
exercise should be properly written as exercising (even then though, the sentence 
structure can be jarring). This approach prompts a broader kind of activity to be 
protected, but also a narrower kind of law to be prohibited subject to whatever 
interpretation of ‘free’ is selected. This latter approach is what the orthodoxy has 
gravitated towards, as exampled in Cheedy, where a broad kind of activity was 
accepted as being protected by the clause but also that a degree of practical 
interference was acceptable so that a secular objective (in that case, the operating 
of a mine) could be met.  
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 The only High Court Justice to give extensive, explicit consideration to the 
word ‘free’ in the cases examined above was Chief Justice Latham, for whom, its 
inclusion provided an opportunity to qualify the remainder of the clause – free 
exercise was held to be narrower in purview than simply exercise (this was 
consistent with their broader understanding of the clause as a protection of 
‘religious freedom’). The problem in this approach, logically, was that it necessitated 
an examination of what ‘free’ meant – a thoroughly subjective notion and one the 
Chief Justice ultimately sought to avoid by instead turning to a relatively 
uncontroversial public interest of ‘national security’. Several decades later, Justice 
Gaudron, as an example, chose to adopt the phrasing of ‘overriding public purpose’ 
and ‘pressing social need’.203 This follows the trend for Justices to assert a justifiable 
public interest that will override the clause, because the clause represents some 
vague protection of ‘religious freedom’ rather than an absolute protection of a 
religious activity. 
 
2 The Reliability of the Protection – The Qualification of the Clause 
 What should be apparent at this stage is that in its current state, the clause 
is not very reliable. Even if a plaintiff could identify that a law had a purpose, 
especially one that explicitly states that purpose in its express terms (to be further 
assisted by those terms effectively prohibiting a religious rite and not merely an 
action motivated by a religious belief), the clause does not guarantee the striking 
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down of a law. While for the best chance at litigation the law sought to be 
impugned should be directed in both its administration and making to prohibiting 
the ‘free’ exercise of any religion, the qualification of the section pertains to the 
occasional strategy of High Court Justices to limit the operation of the section with 
what amounts to a public interest test. The specifics of this test are derived from 
somewhere other than the strict terms of the section, plainly, because the language 
of the section does not itself explicitly provide for exceptions to its operation, 
unless one constructs the word ‘free’ to do so on a subjective basis. 
 The issue (and likely, a crucial particular in a future defendant 
Commonwealth’s case theory) is when will a law that is ‘for’ something, which 
directly or incidentally prohibits the free exercise of any religion, be justified and 
thus immune from the clause? The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case has demonstrated 
that national security in war time can suppress the clause (this was also seen in the 
Conscription Case204), but are there are broader mechanisms by which the 
qualification of the clause can occur? Chief Justice Latham considered a textual 
basis to qualify the clause through the word free (prompting an acknowledgement 
of an American ‘undue infringement test’) where other Justices in that case 
variously described in their obiter such things as the ‘interests of social order’ 
(noting Justice Starke’s judgment). While these comments were not necessarily 
ratio in that matter, they point to the broader politics that surround the clause. The 
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 Careful provision has been made by the legislature for the case of those who really have 
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same theme of the public good was noted when the High Court produced a 
definition of religion in the Scientology Case, when it was held that ‘canons of 
conduct which offend against the ordinary laws are outside the area of any 
immunity, privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion’.205 What exactly 
though, is an ‘ordinary law’, in the context of the free exercise clause? The Stolen 
Generations Case saw some judicial consideration of this theme in the judgements 
of Justices Gaudron and Gummow. Justice Gaudron was a proponent of a 
‘proportionality’ approach, recognising the Commonwealth’s claim that the 
‘Ordinance was to protect and preserve Aboriginal people’ but opined, in favour of 
the plaintiff, that the purpose of the law ‘necessarily extended to prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion’. Balancing this was their obiter that a law would not 
contravene the clause if it was ‘necessary to attain some overriding public purpose 
or to satisfy some pressing social need … nor … if it is a law for some specific 
purpose unconnected with the free exercise of religion and only incidentally affects 
that freedom’. Justice Gummow took the simpler view that ‘a law which protects or 
regulates the personal or property rights of others will not ordinarily offend s 116’, 
and while this appears much closer to the qualification espoused in the Scientology 
Case, an ‘ordinary law’ has been specified to be one that regulates personal or 
property rights. 
 What we have then is a sliding scale between an absolute protection (or 
‘freedom’), and a limited, socially maintainable, ‘free’. On one end, any manner of 
religious exercise is to be lawful under federal law, but this shifts with an 
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acknowledgement that religious freedom must be suppressed so that the 
constitutionally established community itself can exist. Sliding to the other end of 
the scale, religious freedom is effectively suppressed in any case that federal 
government can point to an otherwise valid reason for the law. With this then, a 
distinction is to be noted between the existence of a society (a jurisdiction) and the 
quality of that society. The issue is obvious: who gets to decide what amounts to a 
good kind of society and on what basis is this to be decided? The problem with any 
construction that seeks to reconcile the free exercise clause with a public interest so 
that government can ‘indirectly’ prohibit the free exercise of religion, is that it 
demands a value judgement. In the proportionality test, what is ‘necessary’? Will a 
law of ‘general application’ really be just that if it disproportionally burdens a 
religious exercise? When is an infringement ‘undue’? 
 
The Importance of a Public Interest 
 In either case of a purposive, or an effect based test, a court will have a 
choice to qualify the operation of the section on the basis of some overriding public 
interest (or, as Mortensen describes, where there is some ‘secular’ purpose). Having 
satisfied the dual-threshold of there being a prohibition, and that the law is for that 
prohibition, the plaintiff would do well do pre-emptively respond to any argument 
that there is some public interest in not allowing the plaintiff to rely on the section 
116 argument. When though we talk of the ‘public interest’ – literally, what the 
public has an interest in – we really come to refer to the values of the public (and 
specifically, the dominant ones). If every law (especially in a democratic system) can 
 69 
be said to be motivated by a value (an ‘interest’) held by the public (ostensibly 
represented by government), it should be no surprise that we need to consider the 
values of those laws that may contravene section 116.  
 Over time, the court’s reliance on the strict purposive test has left Federal 
Parliament supreme in its handling of religious liberty. It almost appears that the 
High Court will be satisfied provided the law does not pursue outright persecution, 
that they will avoid upsetting civil government. The benefit of that purposive test, 
for the High Court, is that a contention over the public interest simply does not 
need to be addressed when the threshold cannot even be met by the plaintiff. What 
this provides is a thin veneer of protection for religious freedom, while giving 
federal level government a large measure of control. However, regardless of the 
high threshold, the significance of the public interest will continue to manifest if 
academic predictions regarding High Court jurisprudence prove accurate. Gray 
notes that the jurisprudence surrounding the clause is currently stale, that: 
Given the criticism of the current approach to s 116 interpretation, and the fact the 
High Court has not considered the section in detail for some years, it is possible it 
may take a different approach to s 116 issues in future.206 
With this in mind it may well be, as Gray suggests, that a proportionality test could 
be adopted (or even an American model emphasising laws of general 
applicability).207 Alex Deagon has argued for the adoption of the proportionality test 
on the basis of ‘contextual constitutional structure and principled argument’208 
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(where, that principled argument refers to ‘compatibility with democracy’209), being 
the same approach used in the context of other constitutional freedoms, including 
the implied freedom of political communication.210  
 Such an approach would work – but – as a proportionality test it does rely on 
a court making a value judgement (contrary to the legalist method). Beck describes 
the second limb of the ‘Lange test’, which  
asks whether the impugned provision is reasonably appropriate and adapted, or 
proportionate, to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is compatible with the 
maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative 
government.211 
What is seen here is the need to identify a ‘legitimate end’. Gray has traced recent 
developments in the High Court’s jurisprudence of the proportionality test, which 
has been set out in a three-part test in McCloy v New South Wales. The third part of 
that test requires: 
comparing the positive effect of the law with its interference with the right or 
freedom; the greater the restriction on the freedom, the greater the positive effect 
of the law would need to be, in order to be constitutionally valid.212 
This clearly demands an assessment of the value of a law as to the value of a right 
or freedom. An inconsistency between this approach and legalism is unavoidable. 
Gray demonstrates the ease by which we can adopt value judgements, holding that 
‘[n]o-one could deny that it is a legitimate objective for a government to seek to 
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provide a safe environment for children.’213 This is a moral appeal – and as 
counterintuitive as it might seem – this objective is not legitimate merely because it 
has popular moral appeal; it only holds legitimacy in so far it can be pursued in 
accordance with the power granted to the government (such as by a finite list of 
powers).  
 An alternative to the proportionality test is found in the view that a strictly 
applied purposive test, a legalistic approach, would not leave us with the 
qualification issue, which is something a bereaved plaintiff will always struggle 
against unless the government somehow only represented a minority’s values in 
the democracy (independent of the given minority’s lobbying strength). If the object 
of the clause, as described by Chief Justice Latham, is ‘to prevent the law of the land 
from interfering with either the holding of religious beliefs, or bona fide conduct in 
pursuance of such beliefs’, then how can a court justify imposing a qualification 
more substantial than what is absolutely necessary for the consistent operation of 
the Constitution as  a ‘practical instrument of government’ (ie the ‘continued 
existence of the community’ and not necessarily a particular kind of community 
under a political ideology)? From this perspective, we could surmise that provided 
the initial thresholds of there being a prohibition and a law for that prohibition are 
satisfied, the law must be struck down as invalid on the basis that the clause is 
entirely overriding. This however, would be argued by some to prompt legal 
absurdities. If genuinely held beliefs continued to diversify, the law would be forced 
to retreat. But what is an absurdity in the context of religious freedom?214 The 
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purposive construction of the clause clearly has some bearing on the capacity of the 
court to give constancy to the clause because it requires the court to approach the 
issue in the language selected by the parliamentarians (which is, expectedly, not 
advantageous for a plaintiff seeking to upset civil government). Further, by using 
‘purpose’ orientated language, the court has backed itself into a debate over the 
value of any given law. Either the clause can offer a complete protection against 
interferences of religious exercises or, an incomplete protection of ‘religious 
freedom’ ultimately subject to the vision of the High Court’s popular view of ‘good 
government’215 (something liable to change over time and across generations). The 
justiciability of whichever iteration of a public interest test is adopted, can only 
really be considered with reference to a broader question of the ‘conception 
underlying the section’.216 So then, at this stage, we come to ask: what is the point 
of the clause?217  
 
C The Role and Future of the Clause  
 Our principled reading of the clause will necessarily impact our perception of 
its proper scope and, if necessary, the qualification of that scope. That principled 
reading, preferred by a justice or judge, will also naturally influence their 
                                                     
 The extent to which the state may legitimately interfere with a person's religious beliefs and 
 practices must therefore be identified. Conversely there must be clear guidelines as to just 
 how far the state can go to protect the religious beliefs of some people before it infringes 
 on the rights of others who wish to be free from religion. This requires a delicate balance to 
 be adopted by the state and principally by the courts, who are charged with supervising that 
 balance. 
215 See Australian Constitution s 51, s 52. 
216 Cf McLeish (n 170) 208. 
217 Luke Beck adopts the phraseology of constitutive questions: See, Beck (n 164) 115. 
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conclusions and their willingness to be activist against the activities of government 
(through their respective theory of any given case).  They may be more or less 
willing to promote the constraining effect of the clause, or, the clause as an 
implication for the greater social order in Australia. With the ever-evolving role of 
government, the question arises whether the prohibitions in section 116 must 
develop, or, if the section is to be confined as a relic of a past generation. If the 
clause does stand for religious freedom of some form, what measure of 
freedom?218 This question is perhaps misleading. It has been demonstrated in the 
leading case law that the free exercise clause has limitations. Michael Eburn noted 
in 1995 that section 116 cannot be described as a guarantee of religious freedom in 
Australia. Describing the condition, Eburn comments that: 
[A] restriction may come in other forms, such as a law that outlaws conduct 
required by a religion, provided that such a prohibition is part of a law that is “for” 
the achievement of some valid Commonwealth aim … As far as the present 
Constitution stands, the concept of a guarantee of religious freedom is just that, 
more a “concept” than a reality.219 
However, the clause cannot be without some influence, it is after all, in the 
Constitution. It may merely be a force being kept in reserve, but it does ostensibly 
represent an indirect protection of ‘religious freedom’. While perhaps not as 
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comprehensive as some would have, it is written as a limit on Commonwealth law 
making. But, to what end? 
 
1 The Designation of a Tolerant and Secular Commonwealth 
 There have been a variety of answers offered in the secondary literature 
responding to both this constitutive line of inquiry and the uncertain future of the 
clause. Criticisms of the judiciary, legislature, and executive, are typically built on a 
thematic dissatisfaction with either the perceived breaking down of the barrier 
between government and religion, or alternatively with the level of ‘toleration’ 
displayed by that government. Many of those criticisms in the secondary literature 
have attempted to attribute a principle to the religion clauses (such as toleration, 
neutrality, or secularism) to support a certain personal vision of ‘good government’.  
 Perhaps the archetypal modern argument, Stephen McLeish decried the 
results of the High Court’s ‘federalism’ focus, commenting in 1992, that: 
The assumption that s 116 is concerned primarily with legislative power rather than 
civil rights has led the Court to apply it by examining a challenged law on its face 
rather than as it affects citizens in practice.220 
Stephen McLeish offered a hopeful alternative, that ‘[i]f the clause were construed 
as a guarantee of civil liberty, the focus might shift from such a characterization of a 
law to its impact on the citizen.’221 Making this case prior to the Stolen Generations 
Case, McLeish preferred Justice Murphy’s judgement in the DOGS Case, that 
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‘[s]ection 116 was not “a clause in a tenancy agreement” but “a great constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of and from religion”.’222 For McLeish, it was the contentious 
and assumed focus on legislative power that ‘guides the Court in a remorseless 
dissection of the text’223 prompting ‘impressionistic interpretations’ ultimately in 
the form of the purposive test. To avoid this, McLeish’s suggested solution was 
found in ‘permissible extrinsic aids to interpretation’. Failing to turn to those 
sources ‘risks reliance on preconceptions unsupported by the Constitution’.224 
McLeish turned to the historical origins of section 116 to arrive at the 
understanding that: 
[U]nderlying s 116 there exists a general conception of state neutrality toward 
religion, reflected both in the avoidance of religious preferences and in respect for 
the autonomy of individuals in matters of religion, especially as participants in the 
wider community.225 
Applying this to the theme of qualification (the same issue flagged in this work), the 
question became ‘what qualifications to the absolute guarantee of free exercise of 
religion 'neutrality' requires’.226 
 Luke Beck has contested McLeish’s advocating of the ‘neutrality theory’. 
Beck has instead, while focusing on the same historical subject matter, advanced 
the notion of section 116 as a ‘safeguard against religious intolerance’.227 However:  
The safeguard against intolerance theory is a constitutive theory of the origins of 
section 116 … In this respect, section 116 may be described as partial in the sense 
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that it is incomplete … A law concerning religion might not be captured by one or 
more of section 116’s clauses.228 
For Beck, the four clauses of section 116 deal with four distinct manifestations of 
‘intolerance’.229  Also, for Beck: 
There is a theme of pragmatism and caution running through the relevant history, 
inconsistent with the notion that section 116 gives the Commonwealth some sort 
of philosophical character trait or attitude.230 
If we accepted Beck’s understanding of intolerance and their understanding of the 
historical evidence, what this line of argument suggests, is that section 116 is not 
directed at the kind of Commonwealth being established, but the relationship 
between whatever Commonwealth was being established and the entities within it. 
 The practical differences between these two conceptualisations lie in the 
grammatical differences between them. In one, we have a partial warding against 
‘intolerance’. In the other, we have a provision requiring ‘neutrality’. Compare: a 
‘safeguard against intolerance’ (as Beck understands it) refers to a prohibition on 
persecution, not a requirement to avoid involving itself with anything that a 
religious person does. In contrast, a rule demanding ‘neutrality’ (as McLeish 
describes it) implies that one will actively avoid entering any space of religious 
activity. Beck describes McLeish’s neutrality conceptualisation as one that 
‘postulates a particular state of affairs and seeks to imbue the Commonwealth with 
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a particular virtue or character trait’.231 Beck goes on to criticise the neutrality 
conceptualisation, arguing that (inter alia):  
The relevant history requires that a coherent and persuasive constitutive theory of 
the foundations of section 116 have a negative direction and be conceptually 
modest in terms of its substantive content.232 
This work argues that both McLeish’s and Beck’s descriptions of the underlying 
conceptualisation, fail to reconcile the dual-function of the Constitution whereby it 
establishes a Commonwealth government while defining its form via its 
relationships – reminiscent of a contract setting out the relationships between 
parties (eg between it and the States, or it and the Australian people). The 
Constitution creates a government by defining what kind of authority it is and the 
power it has over the people. 
 Endeavouring though, to produce a legalistic answer to this issue (avoiding 
both historical political debates and populist arguments) we might turn first to the 
text and then context of the clause. While extrinsic material is a valuable resource, it 
is not needed. Indeed, turning to extrinsic material logically creates a higher risk of 
‘unsupported preconceptions’. This is precisely what has occurred in the arguments 
of both McLeish and Beck.233 Those arguments prompt a debate of originalism and a 
shifting emphasis on the vocal participants of the constitutional debates and 
drafting procedures. In order to find an objective underlying conceptualisation, we 
might first ask what the text itself tells us, then, what the context tells us. Only then, 
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if an answer escapes us, might we consider the history, which could resolve the 
problem if nothing else does. If one is not satisfied with the quality of historical 
sources, we could turn to comparative analysis to illuminate that history.234 This 
work will show that the text and context is sufficient. 
 
Guaranteed in Terms – A Tolerant Government 
 The first observation to be made here is that the text of the free exercise 
clause is relational by specifically requiring that the Commonwealth (through law) 
tolerate the free exercise of any religion. Where the clause literally reads that: ‘The 
Commonwealth shall not make any law … for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion …’.235 The text of this clause can be summarised that the Commonwealth 
shall ‘tolerate’ the free exercise of any religion. The word tolerate, here, simply 
refers to the clause’s forbidding of prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. 
Plainly, this constitutes a requirement that any Commonwealth law be tolerant of 
the free exercise of any religion by not being intolerant. What this means, logically, 
is that the Commonwealth is positively required by the free exercise clause to not 
make laws that fail to be tolerant of the free exercise of any religion, otherwise 
described, that Commonwealth laws must tolerate the free exercise of any religion. 
                                                     
234 Independent of any idea of religious freedom, section 116 is often compared to its ‘cousin’, in 
United States of America’s First Amendment. The religion clauses of the Australian Constitution are 
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Yet, the relationship with the First Amendment gives impetus to arguments that it should be read in 
a ‘civil rights lens’. This work purposefully eschews an examination of the American law because the 
Australian legal system (while related in a familial sense) is self-sufficient and culturally 
distinguishable. 
235 Australian Constitution s 116. 
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This is simple and should be relatively uncontroversial. But the absolute extent of 
that required toleration is not so clear, as this work has already noted; the question 
becomes what this tolerance need not extend to in practice.236  
 A brief criticism of Beck’s ‘safeguard against intolerance theory’ is 
appropriate. For Beck, there is some significance in the distinction between section 
116 as a ‘safeguard against intolerance’ and as a ‘guarantee of religious tolerance’. 
There is some difficulty having just examined the plain language, in attempting (as 
Beck does) to use ‘intolerance’ and ’tolerance’ as concepts that ‘sit at either end of 
a continuum’ rather than simply ‘binary opposites’.237  Beck takes a view that in the 
latter approach, a ‘safeguard against religious intolerance’ would necessarily be a 
‘guarantee of religious tolerance’. Attempting to justify this use of language, Beck 
suggests that ‘[t]here is some grey between the black and white of intolerance and 
tolerance’.238 However, a double negative is quite superfluous for this work’s needs. 
All that needs to be concluded at present is that the clause, specifically as a clause 
that itself requires the Commonwealth to tolerate the free exercise of any religion, 
implies that the clause is a designation of a ‘tolerant Commonwealth’. However, to 
be applied practically, this conclusion is insufficient. Acknowledging that a 
safeguard is not an antonym of a guarantee, we must look for some indication 
about the quality of the toleration being required of the Commonwealth, by the 
clause.239 We come full circle to the issue of qualifying that ‘tolerance’. It is 
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insufficient to simply describe the Commonwealth as being designated ‘tolerant’, 
the specific quality of that toleration needs to be further defined by what principle 
guides it.  
 The second textual observation to be made, pointing us to the underlying 
concept of the clause, is that it is the free exercise of any religion, that the 
Commonwealth must tolerate. Not merely varieties of Christian religions, nor 
merely those religions that Commonwealth law-makers favour. The clause literally 
refers to any religion. We must acknowledge that (textually) any religion might 
extend to religions, the free exercise of which, would conflict with values or 
interests (or ‘rights’) of other members of society. Which is to say, the free exercise 
of certain religions might even make it difficult or implausible for the 
Commonwealth to endure its own toleration. Does the tolerance required of the 
Commonwealth then, extend literally to every exercise of any religion, or just an 
arbitrary few? How can we resolve this issue? The text of the free exercise clause, 
clearly, does not by-itself provide us guidance to this end. We need to turn to the 
context of the clause (being the whole Constitution, and the remainder of section 
116). 
 
                                                     
occurrences are not necessitated. A counter argument is that on a general examination of the word 
toleration, there is no indication that promoting one religion, necessitates intolerance of another. 
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Necessitated by Context – A Secular Commonwealth 
 The question is, what does the content which surrounds the clause, indicate 
to us about the clause itself (especially, as to how we can qualify the requisite 
toleration of the Commonwealth, respecting the free exercise of any religion)? Two 
observations can be made. 
 The first observation, albeit a simple one, is that (partially following from the 
reference to any religion in the clause) as a part of a practical instrument of 
government the free exercise clause is not needed to protect the political majority, 
rather, the clause is necessary for the protection of ‘minorities’. Chief Justice 
Latham acknowledged the role of section 116 within the reality of a constitutionally 
established democratic government where the notions of majority and minority 
might indicate law making power via political power.240  This is merely political 
realism. It follows that Commonwealth law makers, in whatever else they can do, 
must perform their function tolerant of religious minorities. 
 The second observation is that the whole of section 116 negatives the law-
making role of the Commonwealth with respect to religion. By the whole section’s 
text, the law-making power of the Commonwealth is resigned to a sphere of activity 
unconnected to religion, amounting to a secular Commonwealth. The notion of a 
secular Commonwealth, for this work, is also quite simple. The Commonwealth (as a 
governing body, created by the Constitution) is literally separated from religion 
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 [I]t should not be forgotten that such a provision as s. 116 is not required for the protection 
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pursuant to section 116, which negatives from the law-making purview of the 
Commonwealth certain things respecting religion. Many governments around the 
world have pursued varying levels of ‘secularisation’, but such a comparative 
analysis is left to other works. At this theoretical level, the notion of secular 
government is simple. It refers to a polity that recognises the religiosity of its people 
and accepts that fact while the Commonwealth’s law-making capacity, respecting 
religion, is limited. 
 The literature has found some degree of consensus over the role of section 
116 of the Constitution being one to guarantee a ‘secular’ government but, at times, 
struggled with describing its implications. The Commonwealth’s authority is 
curtailed in matters of establishing a religion, creating religious observances, 
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, or making a Commonwealth office 
dependant on a religious test. It is these formal negations that simply frame the 
Commonwealth as a secular authority concerned with secular subject matter and 
not a religious authority. This is irrespective of the religiosity of the people who 
designed the Constitution (as is plainly evidenced in its preamble). The role of the 
judiciary in constructing the section and hearing arguments made under it 
ultimately means that, practically, ‘[i]n Australia, at the federal level, the 
constitutional “separation of Church and State” means only the legal effect of s 
116.’241 What precisely constitutes a ‘secular’ polity, is a potential issue in and of 
itself. (Made problematic, largely, by the concurrent difficulty that the law has had 
defining ‘religion’). Judges throughout Australia have accepted that a secular 
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government does not mean a government incapable of giving legal effect to 
traditionally religious activities. Traditionally religious activities have been 
secularised in recent years to reconcile this expectation of secular government. For 
example, federal marriage law (noting that marriage historically has close ties to 
religion) has been characterised, judicially, as secular.242 
 But despite what might be perceived to be a ‘leaking’ of religiosity into 
federal politics, section 116 formally limits the function of the federal polity to a 
secular one. What has been designed then, is a legal system that enables a certain 
flexibility; with an upper limit guarded by the judiciary yet ample space for the 
democratically elected officials to comprehensively debate and make law to reflect 
the Australian people’s secular needs. This comprises, simply, the secular 
Commonwealth of Australia (a unique solution to the secularisation of the state). In 
the sense that section 116 designates the Commonwealth as a ‘secular’ polity, an 
astute observer will notice that this does not preclude any so-called secular 
government from interacting with religion whatsoever. Any sphere of secular 
activity can overlap with a religious sphere, especially so, if the religious sphere of 
activity is a free market. If individuals have total control of their own religious 
proclivities (notwithstanding other sources of law, such as State law) their activities 
will expectedly diversify and infiltrate all aspects of that jurisdiction. However, the 
sphere of religious activity expanding does not by itself reduce the sphere of secular 
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activity. But what is to happen when those two spheres inevitably collide (other 
than that the Commonwealth is purportedly limited)? 
 By identifying in the whole text of section 116 an imputing of a secular 
characteristic on the Commonwealth, we are only guided as to the kind of law that 
the Commonwealth can make – the sphere of permissible laws. Extending that 
language to ‘secular law’ does not provide guidance as to what will happen when 
that sphere of activity engages with the religious sphere throughout a society. 
While the Commonwealth must (or at least should) under the Constitution have 
secular law, how must those secular laws relate to religious people? The 
combination of the concept of a secular Commonwealth, with a relational concept 
of a tolerant Commonwealth (framed by the practical necessity to tolerate the 
minority), fully guides what kind of authority the Commonwealth is, and what 
power it has. However, this conceptualisation would remain ambiguous where that 
minority pursues the exercise of a religion which burdens the Commonwealth or 
others within it. In the context of a secular government, it is logical to conclude 
though that it would be inconsistent with the point of the clause for a religious 
rationale to be accepted as an appropriate qualification of the concurrent 
requirement for the Commonwealth’s laws to be tolerant. 
 These observations provide substantial guidance as to the purposive test 
and qualification issue. We can conclude that the text of the free exercise clause 
requires the Commonwealth to be tolerant, the context designates a secular 
authority, and the reality of a democratic parliament requires that the clause 
especially operate to protect religious minorities. If this is indeed the light which is 
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accepted as the one to be shone on the clause, how does this conception of a 
tolerant, secular Commonwealth, affect our view of the purposive test? Does it 
reveal a deficiency? This work now turns to question how the purposive test can be 
both justified and effective.  
 
2 An Alternative – A Nuanced Purposive Test 
 While an observer might adopt a case theory for any matter involving the 
free exercise clause (ultimately, either that the clause should or should not 
invalidate the law) the rejection of any argument should be consistent with the 
constitutional framework. This work has reasoned that that framework rests on an 
underlying conception of a tolerant, secular Commonwealth. With this 
conceptualisation, it can be asserted that the Commonwealth has been granted a 
sphere of activity, but whatever it does do, its laws must be ‘tolerant’ (ie, not 
intolerant) and it can only qualify this requirement when the law is ‘secular’ (ie, not 
religious).  
 As set out earlier in the work, the orthodox construction of the clause offers 
a protection for any activity that can be attributed religious significance where a 
prohibition on the free exercise of any religion was the purpose of that law, though 
this is subject to the judiciary’s acceptance of a public interest motivating the 
relevant law. The orthodoxy, as it stands, is incredibly subjective. A simple solution 
would be for the High Court to return its construction of the clause to the religious 
rites focus of the Conscription Case. A more reliable form of protection would 
eventuate but religious persons would foreseeably need to crystallise their religions 
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to access the protection. But, if the orthodoxy maintains the wider scope based on 
‘religious freedom’ (which does acknowledge the significance of religious beliefs to 
religious conduct), courts will be ultimately required to qualify the scope of the 
clause (provided the law can be properly characterised as being for the prohibition).  
 This work argues that the purposive test (including the qualification of the 
scope of the clause) is not an issue per se, provided the clause ‘does what it is 
meant to do’ which, if the purposive test is perpetuated, merely requires a legalistic 
application of that test in accordance with the conceptualisation of a tolerant, 
secular Commonwealth. To this end, there are two points to address. The first is 
that to achieve a truly tolerant Commonwealth, the purposive test must be read 
‘liberally’ so that the clause is not circumvented. This requires an understanding of 
what ‘purpose’ really refers to. The second is that, assuming the qualification of the 
clause is inevitable under the orthodoxy, no religious rationale for that qualification 
can be accepted. This directs us to the importance of the legal definition of religion, 
but also, that there is a clear secular principle highlighted in the existing High Court 
judgements resting on the continued existence of the community. 
 
The Intrinsic Purposes of a Law 
 The purposive test needs to operate so that the kind of law which attracts 
invalidity, is that kind of law which can be properly characterised as being intolerant 
(of the free exercise of any religion).  The high threshold that the section faces and 
difficulties that might face a plaintiff, have been demonstrated in the attempts to 
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litigate the clause in lower courts. It is not determinative of the law’s validity, that a 
prohibition on the free exercise of a religion be felt. The test has a textual basis. 
While it might be an unsatisfactory one for some, and one that could be contested 
in the High Court, that future is not assured. Beck argues against the purposive test, 
pointedly: ‘that the “for the purpose of” interpretation is misconceived and 
therefore that the improper purpose test is wrong’.243 Beck offers instead, ‘[a] “with 
respect to” interpretation’244 (as is seen in the United States). While the similarities 
and drafting relationship with the United States’ Constitution cannot be denied, the 
emphasis one should place on that history does not necessarily go without saying. 
One does not need to consult the Americans’ law before they can arrive at the 
conclusion that section 116 is directed to the purpose of the law. This work 
recognises that such criticism of the existing approach is persuasive (and desirable) 
for some, but it may not manifest as change in future cases. Whether it is approved 
or not, the purposive test is a legal reality.  
 The secondary literature is right however, to criticise the high threshold 
placed on the religion clauses. Even though the religion clauses are written as a 
delineation of federal power, it does not demand that the court read the religion 
clauses with such a threshold that federal parliament can evade the prohibitions by 
careful drafting. What should help us reconcile the relatively unique Australian 
approach, is that the ‘purpose’ of law has been an ongoing theme for Australian 
courts (even in contexts other than section 116). Despite this, the phraseology is 
actually quite unhelpful (and inelegant). We need to deconstruct what ‘purpose’ 
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refers to. The first thing to be noted is that ‘purpose’ in this context really refers to 
the ‘object’ of the law. The word ‘objective’ would appropriately replace ‘purpose’ 
permanently, because it is not uncommon to see purpose used to refer to the ‘why’ 
(in the philosophical sense of a motivation) of an action, as distinct from the ‘end 
goal of an action’. 
 Beck noted in 2008 ‘the lack of clarification as to how that purposive test is 
to be properly understood and applied’,245 but also, that three Justices have 
pointedly referred to purpose as referring ‘to an end or object which legislation may 
serve’.246 In 2016, Beck described the ongoing significance of the effect of a law, 
when identifying a law’s object: 
The actual reasoning of the majority judges in the DOGS Case and the reasoning of 
Gaudron J in the Stolen Generations Case focussed on the effect of the impugned 
laws. The reasoning of the High Court in recent implied freedom of political 
communication cases indicates that among the purposes of a law is the purpose of 
achieving the law's obvious or likely consequences or effects. If this is correct then 
the purposive interpretation of the word 'for' in s 116 is, in practice, largely a 
rhetorical flourish and the inquiry as to invalidity is necessarily focussed on the 
effects of an impugned law.247 
This is consistent with the understanding of purpose laid out by Chief Justice 
Barwick.248 The understanding that the objectives and effects of a law are connected 
is not revolutionary. Both Justice Toohey and Gaudron in the Stolen Generations 
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Case, referred to the matter of Arthur Yates where it was held by Chief Justice 
Latham (themselves citing Stenhouse v. Coleman (1944) 69 CLR, 471 and James v. 
Coroan (1930) 43 CLR, 410-412) that: 
[T]he purpose of legislation is to be ascertained by considering the true nature and 
operation of the law and the facts with which it deals, and (as already stated) not 
by examining the motives of the legislative authority.249 
What this directs us to conclude, is that regardless of whether the term ‘for’ in 
section 116 expressly includes the effect of a law, it is logical that there is an implied 
purpose within any law for achieving that law’s effect, and such an approach could 
well fall under the language of a ‘for the purpose of’ test – which is what seems to 
be the exact approach Beck describes as being adopted in the ‘DOGS Case and … 
the Stolen Generations Case’.250  
 The issue really is: when can a law, that does not have an invalid objective, 
still have the prohibited effect? Again, this question is perhaps misleading. If a law 
does not prohibit the free exercise of a religion, then it is probably not ‘for it’. 
Concurrently, if a law has the effect of prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, 
then that must also be the objective of that law. If that law cannot be reasonably 
characterised as having that objective but still have that effect (ie the prohibition is 
‘incidental’), then that effect must be severable because that law will still have 
effects (and objectives) other than the prohibition of the free exercise of any 
religion. The strategy of any potential plaintiff should be to (notwithstanding the 
law expressing its objective in clear terms) demonstrate that the law has an implicit 
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purpose, clearly evidenced on material extrinsic to the legislation. Either that it has 
the effect, or that the law-maker had that effect as a desired outcome. Some might 
suggest that it is untenable to expect that any interference of a religious exercise 
will provide grounds for invalidity because the court will be forever declaring 
exemptions for unique circumstances (practically, this might be justified under the 
principle of legality). The reality is, the clause is a limit on federal law-making power 
and there is no way around that. It must be accepted by those subject to it (or at-
least, by constitutionalists) that the constitutional framework limits the federal law-
maker’s sphere of permitted activity and that certain political agendas are simply 
not permitted to be pursued at a national level. Federal government is not 
unlimited in its power and this power relates to the religiosity of the people. 
 
A Secular Test to Qualify the Clause 
 However, doing away with the ‘for the purpose of’ test, would only be the 
first step in widening the ‘narrow’ scope of section 116, because we are left with 
the task of qualifying the absolute operation of the section. If there is some 
purportedly compelling public interest justifying a prohibition on the free exercise 
of any religion, it could render the constitutional protection ultimately a question of 
political willpower. It is because of this, that the issue surrounding the purposive 
test is secondary to the issue of qualifying the clause. If we expect that a law will be 
(or has been) made with an invalid objective and the striking down of that law, or 
severing of its related effect, might be argued to result in an absurdity (against 
some overriding public interest); what allowance for its qualification is to be made? 
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We must return to the significance of the Commonwealth being secular. And 
secular, here, refers simply to binary opposite of religion – the absence of religion. 
 The archetypal secular rationale was set out by Chief Justice Latham who 
acknowledged that it would be inconsistent for the Constitution to protect 
something that would defeat that same Constitution – literally – where the very 
existence of a community organised under the Constitution was itself at risk. 
Besides this, various Justices have attempted to identify a rationale which can 
further qualify the clause (other than for national security). Chief Justice Latham 
turned to that national security approach for the very reason that an ‘undue 
infringement test’ employs a measure of subjectivity (and criticism) in the balancing 
of values. What then, we have, is a need to define that which is to be absent – not 
ultimately to set out an area of freedom or legal immunity, but to set out a 
limitation on legislative power.251 This is on the concession that the purposive test 
can only be qualified with a secular objective (ie, a secular rationale) so as to 
comprise an overriding (secular) public interest. Which is to say, a public interest, 
absent religion. In making the law, the public’s religiosity must not be apparent in a 
legally significant objective – religion must not be purposed by the law. 
 Beck has chronicled the meaning of ‘religion’, as it has been interpreted in 
the constitutional context by the High Court. It is clear, that the meaning of religion 
in the orthodoxy of Australian constitutional law, emphasises the presence of a 
belief in a supernatural being thing or principle.252 Where (as Beck notes) 
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supernatural ‘… generally means “belief that reality extends beyond that which is 
capable of perception by the senses.”’253 This confirms the law’s interest in 
empiricism – that which is not knowable by senses. Beck however, spent less time 
considering the question of what can be ‘religious’ – especially – what would make 
a law’s objective a religious one. When can it be said then, that the public interest in 
a law, is purposing religion? The obvious answer, is where the law’s objective is 
connected to a belief in a supernatural being, thing, or principle. Now though, when 
would a law of the Commonwealth with a religious objective be valid when no head 
of power allows for such a law in the first place?254 The answer will likely be, either; 
that a religious connection is not explicit, or, that a religious connection is secreted. 
 The suggestion made here, that the Commonwealth can only be allowed to 
rely on a secular rationale for the qualification of the scope of the clause, does not 
mean that the rationale must be totally absent of values – merely religious ones. 
What this suggests, at the very least (without undertaking a detailed examination of 
the nature of religion), is that a law’s rationale should be void of reference to the 
supernatural, thus, it should be based in empirical inquiry (the law values ‘evidence-
based enquiry’255). Yet, while religious beliefs might be said to not be based in 
empirical inquiry, they may be related to tangible things. This does not mean that 
the sphere of secular activity must shrink when faced by a wider sphere of religious 
activity, merely that the Commonwealth must itself have a secular rationale to 
impose on it. Property interests (as distinct from property ‘rights’), for example, are 
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a fundamentally tangible concern – things knowable by human senses. But if the 
supernatural was referenced in the design of property rights, it would take on a 
religious attribute. To the view that careful drafters might circumvent this 
prohibition, the Commonwealth cannot be permitted to rely upon a belief which it 
merely holds non-religious (despite being functionally religious). 
 This does imply a finite range of potential infractions, because what a law 
seeks to achieve will tend to be something quite tangible (thereby prima facie 
rendering an objective secular). However, it is quite possible for a tangible objective 
to take on a religious character when religiosity is given legal effect as part of the 
objective (likely, but not necessarily, legislated for by a religiously motivated 
parliament). This is to say, when a religion is purposed by a law that law is no longer 
secular and cannot be relied upon to justify intolerance. It is not the motivation per 
se that will cause failure under the secular test, but the identification of religion 
within a law’s objective. 
 There are perhaps two critical ways to view this ‘secular’ test. One view 
might be that a notion of a ‘secular rationale’ is vague and, if not infinite in its 
possibilities, close to it (thereby, there is no real, practical prohibition). 
Alternatively, it might be viewed that much of our law has a necessary relationship 
to religion, and attempting to isolate the law from religion will weaken the system 
or cause it to fail altogether. These concerns can be responded to briefly.  
 The Commonwealth has been given law making power under a specific list 
of powers. While the prohibition in the free exercise clause can be mitigated by the 
Commonwealth making laws that otherwise fall under the heads of powers it has 
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been granted by the people, there remains a clear prohibition on relying on 
religiosity to inform those laws. This clearly does not allow for an absolute ‘religious 
freedom’ (which would be tantamount to anarchy). Yet, this does comprise a 
pragmatic separation between government and a subject that necessarily lacks an 
empirical basis. Such an approach to the relationship between religion and state is, 
while not necessarily philosophically perfect, effective. 
 The express rejection of religion from the law, does not imply an anti-
religious state, nor, an irreligious parliament. The secular test produced in this work 
is predicated on the idea that politics and law can be separated. That a parliament 
can have religious members and religious motivations, yet not produce religious 
laws. While it is tempting (and an easy mistake to make) to attempt to impute on 
this secular test a requirement that the motivation for the law be a secular one, it is 
neither constitutional nor necessary for the secular test to have impact. The 
motivation of a law remains politically, but not legally, significant. A law, however, 
can involve a secular objective while simultaneously being religiously motivated 
(the Constitution might be said to be one such example, noting the preamble). What 
is significant under this secular test, though, is the identification of religion within 
the legally significant objective of a law. It is not for a court to rely on religion in its 
interpretation and application of the law. The practical consequence, is that the role 
of the Federal government is far from being a theocracy – it has been given 
responsibility over secular concerns and not religious ones. A religion that values 
control through the law, should expect to be disappointed by the constitutional 
limitations in Australia. 
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 Where the free exercise clause requires a secular rationale for an intolerant 
law, government is granted a measured authority. A certain privilege over, and 
responsibility for, the people. If read in isolation, absent of an expectation of 
responsible, representative democracy, the clause would have no real bearing. A 
secular rationale could be fraudulently produced and the clause rendered 
meaningless. If a tyrant were to replace parliament, there would be minimal point 
to the clause. But in a democracy, where the community has an active role in the 
operation of government, the clause provides a clear standard for how the 
authority granted to the government is to be wielded. It enables scrutiny to have 
substance and it operates concurrently with every other rule that frames the state. 
A clause, such as it is, is just a single component of a practical instrument of 
government. With it, Australian persons have a clearer baseline for how they might 
judge the propriety of a law and the Commonwealth has an institutionalised check 
on its power. 
 Necessarily, the check on government’s power which the clause resembles 
stops law-making for religious objectives. It is not in the permitted agenda of 
Commonwealth law makers to see that their religiosity be manifest by law. Some 
might ask, how can we reconcile the potentially dramatic impact that the clause will 
have? Simply said, there is no argument to be made about the shade which the 
clause casts. The clause was written as an overriding clause. This clearly has 
implications for the role of the Commonwealth and the purview of Federal law-
makers, and that is precisely what it should mean. The clause has sufficient 
limitations so that it will not (when properly applied) impede the proper business of 
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government, which the clause assists us to identify. The clause might not be 
elegant, or even a grand statement of principle, but it does not need to be for it to 
be respected. All that it needs, is to be consistently applied absent of one’s own 
values.  
 It can be concluded then by a legalist, who does seek to qualify the 
operation of the free exercise clause (irrespective of the theory, adopted under 
constitutionalism, motivating the qualification), that if a law of the Commonwealth 
is otherwise valid and has no connection to a belief in a supernatural thing, being, 
or principle, that law may escape the prohibition against intolerant laws, found in 
the free exercise clause of section 116. Such a law would be properly declared to be 
an intolerant, secular law. 
 
Conclusion to Division I 
 This work concludes that the purposive test is not necessarily misplaced, 
instead, that it is a satisfactory and justifiable mechanism by which a court might 
make a decision regarding the validity of a law. However, the danger remains that 
the evidence required to demonstrate the true purpose of the law will be either 
difficult to discover or impractical to present in accordance with rules of evidence. If 
a purposive test is maintained by the court in the future (contrary to some 
academic arguments), then litigants need to be free to explore extraneous material 
so that they might be capable of effectively arguing the purpose of the law sought 
to be impugned. Concurrently, if the purposive test is perpetuated then the court 
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will need to devise a clear and approachable test by which it will qualify the 
seemingly absolute extent of the prohibition. This is to say, the clause should be 
properly constructed so that what it promises on its face is known by potential 
litigants, its limitations set out clearly, and the extent of the prohibitions made 
reliable.  
 The judiciary should be alert to the potential influx of litigation and the 
legislature alerted to the clause’s role as a boundary on permissible political 
intrusions on the free exercise of any religion. A trap for a plaintiff will not be simply 
attempting to argue the construction of the clause, but arguing and exaggerating, 
their prescription for the revised construction. The limitations are there for well-
established reasons. While the current construction might have limitations, the best 
direction for the clause is not one that a radical plaintiff seeking absolute freedom 
should attempt to promote because it may discourage any court from giving the 
clause a nuanced construction.  
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II RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 Division I of this work examined the constitutional standard of religious 
freedom in Australia. That examination might prompt the question of why an 
Australian person should be concerned by that standard, but the merits of 
constitutionalism are a debate for another time.256 Presently, this work undertakes 
to do three things. The first is to introduce the sociological phenomenon (and 
‘issue’) of religious freedom and to examine the relationship between the free 
exercise clause of the Australian Constitution with that broader phenomenon. 
Secondly, this work will examine how Australian Federal anti-discrimination laws 
relate to the issue of religious freedom by examining the experience of religious 
persons in Australia. Finally, this work will evaluate how the free exercise clause 
might impact the constitutional validity of those Federal anti-discrimination laws, 
having regard to the conceptualisation of the clause set-out in Division I. 
 What is undertaken here, is an objective analysis of the society subject to 
the Constitution (as examined in Division I). The subject is not considered here as a 
matter of political science, for which; plenty of literature covers the debates over 
the nature freedom, liberal society, democracy, and so forth.257 However, a detailed 
analysis of discrimination law itself, as befitting a court room, is not produced here. 
The focus in this work is society and how existing law relates to it. 
                                                     
256 Suffice to say, the author generally accepts the view that a constitutional document should 
operate in practice as the source of law by which a state will measure its authority. This statement 
refers to a debate that is far more complicated than what this LL.M. thesis allows room for, however. 
257 For a work that deals with religious freedom and discrimination law as a substantially political 
subject, see Ahdar and Leigh (n 251). 
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A The Sociological Phenomenon and Issue of ‘Religious Freedom’ 
 Inspired by the well-documented community concern and literary 
consciousness of issues facing religious freedom in 21st century Australia, this work 
is concerned with ‘religious freedom’ which, itself, deals with the relationship 
between the state and a unique element of human society falling under the broad 
concept of religion. As was seen in Division I, it has been acknowledged at the 
highest echelon of law in Australia that the constitutional doctrine which protects 
the ‘free exercise of any religion’ should be limited for the sake of the public good. 
But, what does the law do to ‘religious freedom’ in modern Australia and what does 
the constitutional framework require of it? Is religious freedom more than a mere 
topic of concern and is it an issue in Australia? The history of the legal protection of 
religious freedom is considered elsewhere,258 as are the various philosophical 
arguments for it (the ‘why’ for religious freedom),259 but this work introduces the 
idea of religious freedom as it exists as a socio-legal conversation. Religious 
freedom is not simply an issue of either legal doctrine or philosophy, but an issue 
that demands an examination of the relationship between the law and society. 
 
1 What is ‘Religious Freedom’ and What is the Issue? 
 The phrase religious freedom refers to a potentially vague, abstract concept 
that a person is, should be, or even can be, ‘free’ in respect to religion. It would not 
                                                     
258 See, eg, Evans (n 2); Mortensen (n 149); Gray (n 156).  
259 See, eg, Evans (n 2). 
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be inappropriate to consider the phrase with a healthy cynicism (the word ‘free’ 
was of course described as a ‘slogan’ by a Chief Justice of the High Court260). The 
Australian Law Reform Commission’s (‘ALRC’) Traditional Rights and Freedoms 
report in 2015,261 among its various conclusions, adopted a relatively concise but 
technical conceptualisation of what ‘religious freedom’ is, by attempting to merge 
the language of ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’, that: 
Religious freedom encompasses freedom of conscience and belief, the right to 
observe or exercise religious beliefs, and freedom from coercion or discrimination 
on the grounds of religious (or non-religious) belief.262 
Expanding on the latter two aspects as respectively pertaining to a positive and 
negative form, the ALRC construed the first that:  
Positive religious liberty involves the ‘freedom to actively manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs in various spheres (public or private) and in myriad ways (worship, teaching 
and so on)’.263  
The second, that:  
Negative religious freedom, on the other hand, is freedom from coercion or 
discrimination on the grounds of religious or non-religious belief.264  
Yet, as shall be seen below, this conceptualisation has its problems. As an abstract 
idea, religious freedom ranges in its connotations to individuals (and every religious 
or non-religious identity) and the value attributable to religious freedom is open to 
                                                     
260 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 126 [8] (Latham CJ). 
261 Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2015). 
262 Ibid 129 [5.1]. 
263 Ibid 132 [5.15], citing Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford 
University Press) 128. 
264 Ibid 132 [5.15-5.16], citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 18.2. 
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debate. For instance, for some, ‘religious freedom’ may also connote freedom from 
religion.265 Sometimes described as a ‘composite freedom’, as noted by the ALRC,266 
religious freedom relates to freedom of belief and a range of other freedoms when 
it is exercised (such as association and speech).267 From this perspective, it might be 
said that there are two components to religious freedom; the internal (of belief) 
and the external (of conduct), where the external aspect can be further divided 
between how one treats and is treated by others.  
 In an ostensibly ‘liberal’ society (as Australia is often described to be), as an 
abstract idea, religious freedom is generally seen as a good thing to some degree. 
The value of religious freedom has been promulgated by the High Court of 
Australia, in the oft quoted passage, that ‘[f]reedom of religion, the paradigm 
freedom of conscience, is of the essence of a free society.’268 It is often lauded that 
‘Australians enjoy the freedom to worship and observe religion, and the freedom 
not to be coerced into engaging in religious practices’269 and this is certainly true 
when Australia is compared to other jurisdictions around the globe. In practice 
however, the subject of religious freedom is far from being an entirely resolved 
conversation in Australia.  
 Even at a theoretical threshold, there are alternatives to the 
conceptualisation of religious freedom espoused by the ALRC. Some choose to 
respond to the subject matter by focusing on a more traditional freedom of belief, 
                                                     
265 See, eg, Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 123 [3]. 
266 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 130 [5.10], quoting Jay Newman, On Religious 
Freedom (University of Ottawa Press, 1991) 99-100. 
267 Ibid 130-131 [5.10]. 
268 Scientology Case (n 178) 130. 
269 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 129 [5.3]. 
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for an example of which, we might consider Campbell and Whitmore’s (in a work 
referred to by the ALRC) consisting of ‘an individual’s freedom to form and adhere 
to ideas, views and convictions … regardless of whether they are conveyed to 
others’.270 Relating to the same subject matter which the ALRC’s definition is 
directed to, Campbell and Whitmore described the intrinsic connection to the 
manifestation of a belief, that: 
Freedom of belief cannot be dissociated from freedom to communicate beliefs, and 
when those beliefs pertain to how individuals ought to behave, to what is right, 
wrong and obligatory conduct, claims made in the name of freedom of belief reach 
beyond the domain of belief into that of conduct which visibly affects others.271 
This approach reveals that the ‘negative religious liberty’ espoused by the ALRC, is 
merely a layer to a certain conceptualisation (or variation) of the abstract ‘religious 
freedom’. If the ALRC’s conceptualisation is assessed critically we might ponder how 
anyone could argue with integrity that members of a religion which, when it is itself 
exercised might involve religiously motivated discrimination (or coercion) by its 
believers, themselves must not suffer from discrimination or coercion by non-
believers. To achieve this, the concept of ‘negative religious liberty’ appears to 
demand that a person be blind to religion, which is plainly incomprehensible to any 
religion which holds itself to be objectively true and encourages segregation (by 
retreating from, pushing against, or even pulling others) for the sake of that truth. 
Reid Mortensen described the significance of discrimination to religious freedom 
                                                     
270 Enid Campbell and Harry Whitmore, Freedom in Australia (Sydney University Press, 2nd rev ed, 
1973) 376. 
271 Ibid. 
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that: ‘To a large degree in Australia, religious freedom only takes on real meaning in 
the extent to which it is lawful for religious groups to discriminate.’272 
 
A ‘Right’ to Freedom of Religion 
 For some, ‘religious freedom’ has evolved from the notion of a ‘freedom’ 
and now holds a peculiar status as a ‘right’ (either naturally or by legal construction) 
to be universally respected by others.273 The ALRC in 2015 attempted to insert this 
conceptualisation of a ‘right’ to religious freedom in their report. This, to be fair to 
the ALRC, is consistent with the popular modern conceptualisation of religious 
freedom which has in recent years come to be more accurately referred to in the 
language of a ‘human right to religious freedom’. The Religious Freedom Review 
(released to the Australian public in 2018), as an example, saw an expert panel 
charged with the task of examining specifically the status of the ‘human right to 
religious freedom’ in Australia.274 The Australian government has acknowledged the 
                                                     
272 Reid Mortensen, ‘A Reconstruction of Religious Freedom and Equality: Gay, Lesbian and De Facto 
Rights and the Religious School in Queensland’ (2003) 3(1) Queensland University of Technology Law 
and Justice Journal 320, 4: 
 The value pluralism underlying religious freedom and other liberties of conscience endorses 
 the capacity of sub-groups and sub-cultures to make judgments about the moral 
 significance of factors like sex, gender, sexuality and marital status that society-at-large, 
 through its elected Parliaments, may well judge differently. Evidently, the right to 
 discriminate on religious grounds is essential to the freedom as the group could not exist as 
 a distinctive religious entity without it. 
273 See, eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 
December 1948). 
274 Expert Panel (n 155) 8 [1.2]. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its response to that review,275 
describing the ‘freedom of religion’, and that: 
[T]he Australian Government accepts the central conclusion of the Religious 
Freedom Review, that there is an opportunity to further protect, and better 
promote and balance, the right to freedom of religion under Australian law and in 
the public sphere.276 
The Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’), established by the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), has itself been responsible for a range of 
publications dealing with ‘religious freedom’, focusing on a conceptualisation based 
on the international doctrine which the commission is named for. A relevant article 
is the Australian Human Right’s Commission’s 2011 report: Freedom of religion and 
belief in 21st century Australia.277 The report acknowledges its context, that freedom 
of religion and belief is recognised as a ‘fundamental human right’ under 
international rights instruments.278 The Australian Government response to the 
Religious Freedom Review included an affirmation by the incumbent government 
(noting the reference to inherent dignity, a moral construction) that: 
As the Religious Freedom Review noted, respecting diversity, including with respect 
to religious belief, is not only fundamental to recognising the inherent dignity of the 
individual, but also contributes to the democratic life of our community.279 
                                                     
275 Australian Government, Australian Government response to the Religious Freedom Review 
(December 2018) 2:  
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been in force for Australia for 
 almost 40 years. The Covenant commits countries to respect, protect and fulfil the 
 fundamental civil and political rights of individuals, including: the right to life; freedom of 
 religion; freedom of expression; the right to peaceful assembly; freedom of association; and 
 the right to non-discrimination and equal protection of the law. 
276 Ibid 4. 
277 Australian Human Rights Commission, Freedom of religion and belief in 21st century Australia 
(2011). 
278 Ibid 2. 
279 Australian Government (n 262) 4. 
 105 
The question that arises from a statement such as this, is; what is being valued? 
Does the government value a certain kind of diversity (revolving around the so-
called ‘inherent dignity of the individual’) and a religious freedom that promotes 
that diversity? Or, does the government value religious freedom, with the view of 
accepting what that freedom will entail for diversity? 
 
Religious Freedom as an Observable State of Affairs 
 Clearly, religious freedom is more than merely an abstract idea referenced in 
the occasional domestic doctrine and international treaty. The subject has tangible 
implications for the lives of people. The Religious Freedom Review noted the 
broader function of an individual’s religious freedom in that ‘its exercise contributes 
to the character of society as a whole’.280 Further to this, the Religious Freedom 
Review connected the issue of religious freedom to autonomy and religious 
pluralism, citing Ronan McCrea, that: ‘religious freedom is seen as important for its 
contribution to individual autonomy and to the overall pluralism which ought to 
characterise democratic societies’.281 The ALRC similarly reported in 2015, that 
‘[t]he concept of religious freedom recognises the existence of multiple identity 
groups in a pluralist democratic society.’282 This is all to say, a consequence of 
religious freedom is a degree of religious pluralism and, conversely, religious 
pluralism implies some degree of religious freedom (one would think, at the very 
                                                     
280 Expert Panel (n 155) 9. 
281 Ibid 9, citing Ronan McCrea, ‘Singing from the Same Hymn Sheet? What the Differences between 
the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts Tell Us about Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination, and 
the Secular State’ (2016) 5 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 183, 186. 
282 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 133 [5.21]. 
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least, a choice of belief). Viewed in this way, religious freedom is a sociological 
phenomenon (an observable state-of-affairs) because religious freedom has a 
correlation with religious pluralism (a sociological theme directed toward 
demographics and culture). If the scope of religious freedom in a society has 
implications for the nature of the religious pluralism in that same society, it might 
be self-evident then that limiting religious freedom (through law, or any other social 
mechanism283) will result in a more exclusive religious pluralism (either practically 
with enforcement, or formally). This even includes, logically, where the expression 
of ‘religious diversity’ is to be ‘subject only to the importance of respecting the 
rights of others’.284  
 Mortensen considered the issue on the cusp of the 21st Century, a time 
when religious pluralism was increasing and the demographic of Australia rapidly 
changing.285 They wrote, perhaps presciently, that: 
Indeed, how increasing religious pluralism is to be accommodated is possibly one of 
the most important issues to confront government in Australia in the near future.286  
The management of religious pluralism is, at the very least, a significant aspect of 
the debate over religious freedom in modern Australia, in part, because religious 
pluralism is taken by some to be a distinct value in and of itself (much the same as 
multiculturalism might be) and a relatively high-standard of religious freedom has 
resulted in a measure of pluralism in Australia. The question might be posed 
                                                     
283 A person’s religious freedom will quite possibly be shaped by such other things as cultural norms.  
284 Expert Panel (n 155) 9 [1.11]. 
285 See, Reid Mortensen, ‘Rendering to God and Caesar: Religion in Australian Discrimination Law’ 
(1995) 18(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 208, 208. 
286 Reid Mortensen, ‘The Secular Commonwealth: Constitutional Government, Law and Religion’ 
(PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 1995) 31. 
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though: what kind of religious freedom does Australia have and which identity 
groups can manifest their beliefs in ‘various spheres’ and ‘myriad ways’? It should 
be unsurprising that this a controversial subject, but it is not controversial to note, 
as Carolyn Maree Evans does, that ‘the law and legal system play an important role 
in determining the level of formal protection that will be given to freedom of 
religion and belief’.287 Obviously, the law can also interfere with religious freedom. 
The issue though, in view of religious freedom as a sociological phenomenon, is in 
how the state manages the pluralism in Australia. 
 
The Balancing of Protections and Interferences 
 When a law is made, and especially one that regulates interests or 
relationships in the ‘private sphere’ (distinguished by some, as was seen in the 
government’s response, from the ‘public’ sphere)288, that law might be said to, in 
some combination, protect or interfere with the internal and external components 
of religious freedom. Some consider that freedom of belief is immutable whilst only 
religious conduct can be, acceptably, interfered with by the rules of society.289 Some 
hold that ‘belief’ and ‘exercise’ are entirely distinguishable, or at the least, that the 
law is capable of distinguishing between the two.290 These questions are altogether 
related to political or philosophical arguments over whether the law should involve 
itself with belief and restrain itself to matters of exercise. The protection or 
                                                     
287 Evans (n 2) 2. 
288 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 143 [5.78]. 
289 Gray (n 156) pt 3. 
290 Ibid. 
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interference by law will necessarily impact the quality of religious pluralism within 
that jurisdiction and may well be directed to making that society more, or less, 
accommodating (at least, formally) of certain religious identities. A problem, on the 
basis that ‘religious freedom’ is a subjective value, is that what constitutes an 
‘interference’ is dependent on that subjectivity. Similarly, whether a law ‘protects’ 
religious freedom (also, whether it is sufficient protection) will be quite subjective. 
 The legal protection of religious freedom has been described as a relatively 
‘modern’ development.291 Evans provides a summary of the various means by which 
law can directly and indirectly protect religious freedom in Australia, including 
through constitutional freedoms, bills of rights, statutory rights (including the 
provision of general religious or conscientious exemptions), the common law, and 
perhaps most importantly, the simple absence of regulation.292 The absence of 
regulation is an especially noteworthy aspect of this conversation as, perhaps self-
evidently, ‘[w]here the law is silent, people are free to act in accordance with their 
faith so long as doing so does not interfere with other laws.’293 The lack of 
international treaties in the direct protection of religious freedom in Australia might 
perhaps be a surprise for some, however; Evans conveniently describes the role of 
international treaties in Australian law: 
International treaties have implications for Australian law. While they do not 
directly become part of Australian law, they do influence the interpretation of 
legislation and the development of the common law.294 
                                                     
291 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 132 [5.18]. 
292 Evans (n 2) 94-137. 
293 Expert Panel (n 155) 34 [1.79]. 
294 Evans (n 2) 23:  
 In addition, and perhaps most importantly, they provide a basis which both permits the 
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The various sources for the protection of religious freedom vary widely in their 
scope but each contribute to the whole status of religious freedom and pluralism in 
Australia.  Despite the variety, the legal protection of religious freedom in Australia 
tends to be considered as quite limited, yet, it is not often said that religious 
freedom per se is especially lacking. This follows the logic that positive legal 
protections are not a necessity to attain religious freedom, nor do they necessarily 
result in religious freedom because a cultural value for the freedom is required.  
 Whatever conceptualisation of ‘religious freedom’ that a person adopts (eg 
as a ‘positive and negative liberty’ or as a ‘fundamental right’), it is going to have 
implications for the form in which any legal protection is sought-after, crafted, and 
enforced (and indeed, whether those protections are considered satisfactory). It is 
the legal protections and their respective limitations (that allow for interferences or 
infringements) that substantially motivate the widespread and technical debates 
over religious freedom in Australia. Evans addressed the subjective nature of the 
debate over what measure of protection should be given to religious freedom: 
The appropriate degree of protection of religious freedom in a given society 
depends on a range of factors, including the degree of political and popular 
commitment to the principle of religious freedom, and the legal and institutional 
arrangements for its protection.295 
                                                     
 Commonwealth to legislate on matters relating to religion and also imposes boundaries on 
 the extent of that power.  
295 Ibid 2. 
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However, whichever conclusion a person favours, the debate is always underpinned 
by a balancing of an ‘ideal’ religious freedom with other values or interests be they 
material, philosophical, or theological.   
 A converse to legal protection, the interference with religious freedom, by 
legal systems, can be found all through human history in a diverse range of 
circumstances that matches the diversity of religion itself. It is plainly beyond the 
scope of this work to provide an examination of the full extent of the history of 
religious freedom. Anthony Gray however, has traced some of the most relevant 
aspects of Australia’s inherited religion-state relationship in part one of their 
article.296 Of that history, perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that 
the legal systems of modern times (Australia included) have been substantially built 
upon systems themselves designed by deeply religious societies and that for a legal 
system to project religious ‘intolerance’ has not necessarily been an uncommon 
thing. ‘Christianity’ generally, for one example, has at times been considered 
integral to English law297 and it is a popular opinion sometimes still held (though the 
truth and significance of this perception is also outside the scope of this work).  
 The ‘interference’ with religious freedom by the state has been considered 
by a variety of interest groups and concerned persons in a range of contexts. As an 
example, the ALRC examined what might generally constitute interference with 
                                                     
296 Gray, (n 156) pt 1. 
297 See, eg, Rex v. Taylor (1676) King’s Bench (Chief Justice Lord Hale): ‘Christianity is parcel of the 
laws of England, therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law.’ 
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religious freedom, though (consistent with its adopting the language of ‘rights’), 
turned to the language of infringement: 
Freedom of religion is infringed when a law prevents individuals from exercising 
their religion or requires them to engage in conduct which is prohibited by their 
religion. Alternatively, the freedom will also be infringed when a law mandates a 
particular religious practice.298 
The ALRC reported that infringement was not a real issue per se for Commonwealth 
law, but, that: 
Encroachments arise in ‘balancing religious freedom with other protected 
freedoms, such as freedom of speech’. Issues remain about ‘the balance to be 
struck between the rights of religious organisations to conduct their affairs in 
accordance with their own beliefs and values and general non-discrimination 
principles in the community’.299 
The subjectivity of legal interferences is especially apparent when the competing 
values are being balanced with so-called ‘general non-discrimination principles’. The 
ALRC attempted to identify the problem facing religious freedom in modern 
Australia, reporting that: 
Such challenges to freedom of religion as do exist in Australia can been [sic] seen as 
falling outside liturgical and worship settings and involving ‘questions of freedom of 
conscience in a commercial or service provision setting, the integrity of religious 
education, and the manifestation of belief in other ways’.300 
                                                     
298 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 141-142 [5.66], citing Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson 
and Rosalind Croucher (eds), Law and Religion (Routledge, 2005) ch 4; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 75; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 55; Freedom 4 
Faith, Submission 23; P Parkinson, Submission 9. Cf Campbell and Whitmore (n 270) 376: 
 Freedom of belief may be inhibited in a variety of ways: by coercing people into disclosing 
 their beliefs under pain of sanctions; by penalizing them simply by reason of the beliefs they 
 hold; by forcing them to recant their beliefs; and even by restricting the communication of 
 ideas in such a way that belief is regimented. 
299 Ibid 142 [5.68] citing Law Council of Australia, Submission 75; P Parkinson, Submission 9. 
300 Ibid 142 [5.67] citing Australian Christian Lobby, Submission 135. 
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The debate over the interference of religious freedom, in a range of circumstances, 
is far reaching and the subject of an enormous, collection of material.301 However, 
the challenges identified by the ALRC recognise that religious freedom can pertain 
to more than just whether a ‘belief’ can be held or ‘rites’ performed. The ‘doing’ of 
one’s religion truly does extend to things generally done in pursuit of a religious 
belief. Here, the conceptualisation of religious freedom as a ‘composite freedom’ is 
important as it demands we pay greater attention to the impact that the regulation 
of other civil liberties implicitly has on religious freedom. For example, if a law is 
purposed to regulate ‘freedom of association’ (or, as a derivative of ‘association’, 
discrimination in matters of employment) in some way, it could well be 
inadvertently (or covertly) interfering with a certain idea of religious freedom. The 
Religious Freedom Review noted this very problem: 
The Panel agrees that the relationship between the right to freedom of religion or 
belief and the rights to equality and non-discrimination requires careful 
consideration in light of the particular laws and facts concerned.302 
This may raise the question, again, of what is a ‘justifiable’ constraint on ‘religious 
freedom’? While this is a confronting question, this work is focused on identifying 
what the issue for religious freedom is. While there is clearly a balancing between 
                                                     
301 Fortunately, there is a finite number of substantive laws or themes (not even considering 
procedural laws) that are recorded at least as being of concern to the Australian public (and may 
indeed actually be, or are argued to be, infringing religious freedom of some form). Even a brief 
review of submissions from private persons to the Expert Panel conducting the Religious Freedom 
Review reveal that these concerns include such topics and activities as the education of children in 
religious beliefs (especially regarding sexuality, transgenderism, or creationism), bio-ethics 
(extending to such subjects as abortion, sexual activity, and the medical treatment of children), 
marriage law, vilification and hate speech law, the wearing of religious clothing in public, the extent 
of freedoms to communicate religious opinions, the merits of the public financing of religious 
undertakings, and criteria for tax exemptions and charity status.  
302 Expert Panel (n 155) 30 [1.63]. 
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the protection and interference of some abstract idea taking place, this does not in 
and of itself mean that there is an ‘issue’ for religious freedom. At least (at this 
stage) not an issue that can be viewed and solved objectively. 
 
A Legalist’s View of The Role of the State – The Scope of Civilised Religion 
 Accepting that the state conducts a balancing act between legal 
interferences and protections, but also that ‘religious freedom’ is a subjective value 
with implications for a sociological phenomenon; describing what the state does is 
difficult without, at the same time, entering a debate of traditional political issues 
or even philosophy and theology (and indeed, if it can be distinguished, morality). 
The subjectivity underpinning the conversation (especially: what religious freedom 
is, whether it has value, how it should be protected, and whether it is being 
infringed) makes it difficult to objectively describe the status of ‘it’. How can we 
describe what is being ‘done’ by the law to an abstract and subjective value while 
avoiding biased judgements regarding the values being balanced by the state or the 
quality of the religious pluralism? If one managed to do so, they would surely be on 
the right track to adopting a value-neutral approach to the issue (the legalist’s 
approach303). 
 It is in the dual-natured relationship between religion and law, grounded in 
the protection and interference of religious freedom, that we might conceptualise a 
                                                     
303 The notion of legalism is considered in Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James Stellios, Hanks 
Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2013). 
‘Legalism emphasises the distinction that is said to exist between law and politics’: at 118 [1.8.5]. For 
this work, legalism is used to refer to value neutrality, emphasising objectivity. 
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value-neutral approach to what the law does. Namely, that the law (when enforced) 
will limit which religious beliefs and practices exist in society as lawful ones – in 
fewer words: the state sets the scope of civilised religion in a society. A religion 
(even a specific belief or practice) that is consistent with (or ‘fits’ in) the legal 
system of a jurisdiction might then be academically categorised as a civilised religion 
(or specifically, a civilised belief or practice). Conversely, a religion that is 
inconsistent might be logically categorised as uncivilised. This conceptualisation 
allows us to examine the relationship between the law and a religion in a binary 
form whilst focusing on the most important aspect of the relationship, which is, 
whether a religious identity really can positively manifest their religious beliefs and 
practices ‘in various spheres’ and in ‘myriad ways’. In this way, we can also 
recognise the importance of religious freedom to the ultimate condition of the 
religious pluralism in Australia.  
 The notion of civilisation (or civility) has a range of connotations. Recently 
for example, it has come to be referenced by human rights advocates as code for 
‘secular society’.304 The notion of ‘civilisation’ was even seen on occasion in the 
High Court cases considered in Division I of this work. In this work however, it is 
used as a purely descriptive term where the standard of measurement is the laws of 
a society and the subject is religious beliefs and practices (ie religions). Thus, in this 
language we are equipped with the means to fairly describe the relationship 
between religion and the state and, importantly, the impact of law on religious 
freedom in Australia. 
                                                     
304 Australian Human Rights Commission (n 264) 8-9. 
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 Having adopted this language of ‘civilised religion’, what then, is the issue 
for religious freedom? Consider the scope of civilised religion, or specifically, that 
some religious beliefs and practices are set outside that scope (for example; a 
religion that pursues ritualistic human sacrifice is implicitly designated uncivilised by 
criminal laws that prohibit murder without exceptions for religious killing). Where 
religious freedom is fundamentally a subset of the political debate over religion-
state relations, the law ultimately has a role in formally directing the religious 
pluralism of a society – be it a state endorsed pluralism, or the setting-up of a 
national religion, or something in between. The political commitment to a certain 
kind of religious freedom is liable to shift (as is typical throughout history), and 
along with it, the scope of civilised religion. The interplay and popularising of 
international doctrines and broader principles, pertaining to human rights, have 
especially contributed to the enactment of a range of legislation that might 
arguably prohibit or make difficult the pursuit of some religious conduct. And, when 
those principles are taught, challenge religious beliefs inconsistent with human 
rights. Mortensen described the ‘inherent paradox in all discrimination laws’: 
[T]hat, although they aim to protect social pluralism, the principles of equality they 
usually promote also present a threat to the protection of religious pluralism in the 
political sphere. This occurs when, despite the traditional recognition of rights of 
religious liberty, the discrimination laws apply to religious groups that deny the 
moral imperatives of, say, racial, gender or sexual orientation equality.305 
The ‘issue’ (if it can be called that) here, when objectively described, is that the 
scope of civilised religion in Australia is facing change and potentially, a narrowing. 
                                                     
305 Mortensen (n 285) 231. 
 116 
 A limit being imposed on religious freedom, and consequently the scope of 
civilised religion, is to be expected in any society. It has been acknowledged in the 
highest levels of Australian law that it is impractical, in a ‘civilised society’, for any 
abstract concept of religious freedom to result in absolute immunity from the law of 
the land. However, there are existing protections for religious freedom built into the 
law of Australia and to some extent, religious freedom is respected by the state 
independent of any strict legal requirements to do so. But a society does not need 
to first positively protect religious freedom, for there to be an interference with the 
concept. Those legal protections however, may be an indication as to when the 
interference with the concept, being relative to the values of a society, is 
considered bad by that society. While it is not within the scope of this work to 
examine a society’s motivation for protecting religious freedom,306 the work’s 
concern is with the relationship between the law of Australia and those subject to 
it, with a focus on religious freedom as an issue. But, as considered above, religious 
freedom is in and of itself a subjective value subject to the whims of popular 
commitment – there is no objective issue or solution to be found outside of the 
doctrine that society creates for itself. It is in the changing scope of civilised religion 
that we might detect the issue (but not necessarily a solution). 
 
                                                     
306 The issue of why the law protects religious freedom is the subject of works elsewhere and the 
author would recommend for interested readers Evans (n 2). 
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The State as a Moral Authority 
 Described at an elementary level, the governance of the Australian nation 
was directed by the political philosophy of constitutionalism and the process of 
federation which culminated in the Australian Constitution in 1900. The Australian 
people in coming together as a nation, faced similar issues as many peoples have 
throughout the modern era all around the globe; broadly, what the ‘role of religion’ 
was to be, but also in answering the question ‘to what degree, if any, should the 
new constitution reflect and incorporate the religious beliefs of a majority of the 
population?’307 The religiosity of the Australian people (as at the time of federation) 
was enshrined in the introductory passages of the Australian Constitution, which 
state, inter alia that: 
WHEREAS the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, 
and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed, to 
unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby 
established …308 
Regardless of this inclusion, the Australian Constitution was not (plainly evidenced 
in the text of the document) by-and-large ‘concerned’ with the ‘role’ of religion. In 
fact, the document is almost silent. The only explicit reference to religion and its 
role in the constitutional framework is in section 116 (the same section considered 
in Division I of this work) which purports, on its face, to exclude the subject of 
religion from the ambit of Commonwealth law makers. As considered in Division I, 
                                                     
307 Jeremy Patrick, ‘Religion and New Constitutions: Recent Trends of Harmony and Divergence’ 
(2013) 44 McGeorge Law Review 903, 903. 
308 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12. 
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section 116 has some notable limitations. This has contributed to the ‘role of 
religion’ in Australia ultimately being characterised by a flexible separation.309 
Compared to one possible extreme where the Australian people may have 
partnered government to a religion or, another extreme where the people may 
have absolutely separated government from anything related to religion. Australia 
sits somewhere in-between with a ‘co-habitation’ of sorts.310 Some are more 
receptive to this arrangement than others. For example, it is sometimes lamented 
in the literature that Australia does not, at a national level, have an enshrined ‘right’ 
to religious freedom to the degree seen in the United States of America. A 
comparison is often made by scholars between Australia and the United States of 
America, whose own federation influenced the later Australian process. Mortensen 
writes: 
The most significant difference with U.S. jurisprudence, however, remains that the 
Religion Clauses have no application to the polities that, under the Constitution, are 
most likely to legislate in ways that affect religious life – the States and 
Territories.311 
Mortensen also notes that the Australian Constitution’s section 116 drew a large 
measure of inspiration from the United States’ Constitution, yet, the implication of 
a significant discretion being afforded to the States and Territories is 
that religious freedom in Australia is secured principally by the older British and 
colonial tradition of parliamentary self-restraint and a political consciousness that 
government should not interfere in the religious life of the people.312 
                                                     
309 See, eg, McLeish (n 170) 221. 
310 Puls (n 162) 163. 
311 Mortensen (n 149) 176. 
312 Ibid 178. 
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While Mortensen describes the jurisdictional limitation as the ‘principal reason for 
the narrow operation of section 116’313 (the point is well made that non-federal 
polities could interfere in the religious life of the people), strictly speaking, 
Commonwealth law makers are inhibited by a constitutional prohibition and a strict 
list of powers. A fair question here is; ‘so what?’ While it might appear in the text of 
the Constitution that the task of balancing protections and interferences is left to 
the States and Territories, in practice, Federal government does have a role at a 
national level. Indeed, the ALRC has recognised at least four areas of concern for 
substantive Federal law pertaining to religious freedom, including anti-
discrimination and workplace relations laws, marriage laws, and counter-terrorism 
laws.314 Despite a strict list of powers, Mortensen has flagged the significance of the 
external affairs power315 whereby ‘the Federal Parliament has entered the field of 
human rights and anti-discrimination law, granting it powers it otherwise would not 
have’.316 Those powers have encouraged the federal government to adopt a policy 
of national-level protection for religious freedom. 
 The expanding of legislative power, compared to that which was available to 
Commonwealth law makers in 1901, through a combination of the external affairs 
power and a comprehensive series of international ‘treaties’ (themselves motivated 
by a ‘political morality’317) have given the federal legislature legal grounds to 
interfere in the religious life of the people (at least, more extensively than what it 
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314 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 142-153. 
315 Australian Constitution s 51(xxix) 
316 Mortensen (n 149) 186. 
317 See generally, Michael J. Perry, ‘The Morality of Human Rights’ (2013) 50 San Diego Law Review 
775; Research Paper (No. 13-240, Emory University School of Law, June 4 2013). 
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might otherwise) and motivation to re-define the scope of civilised religion. While in 
the States and Territories ‘[t]here is no constitutional or legal reason why reference 
to international law should be made’,318 the Federal government is substantially 
dependent on international treaties to give Commonwealth-wide effect to 
particular kinds of law (the kind that is based upon a political morality). The 
consequence of such laws is that there may be, inter alia, a change (especially a 
narrowing) in the scope of civilised religious practices and beliefs (or both) led by 
national government.  
 Gray is one among many who hold true the notion that: ‘Most western 
states do not ostensibly, or actually, favour one religion over another; nor religion 
over non-religion, or vice versa.’319 Emphasis should be placed on, however, 
‘ostensibly’, especially when the state can be observed as having a role in setting 
the scope of civilised religion. The one thing that we can be sure about is that the 
role of religion and the nature of religious freedom in a society is liable to change 
over time, and with it, the scope of civilised religion. That change is currently 
generating significant concern and debate throughout the political landscape of 
Australia. Not so much because of its expanding scope (though conservative 
rhetoric posing such a threat continues to prove to be a useful political device), but 
because of what is perceived by some (especially those from historically majority 
religious traditions) to be a narrowing (or potential narrowing). This concern should 
be understandable, because ‘religious freedom’ has conceivably tremendous 
implications for the real, internal and external experiences of those in the 
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319 Gray (n 156) 74. 
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community (also, it might be that taking freedoms away will tend to be more 
contentious than when they are given). 
 The values and domestic policies referred to, allude to the Commonwealth’s 
development as a moral authority. Justice Rich may have been able to accurately 
comment in 1943 that a trend towards toleration meant that ‘religious liberty and 
religious equality are now complete’,320 however, Gray can assuredly pose that in 
our current era: 
Conflict now arises regarding the extent to which the right to manifest religious 
belief (free exercise) can and should be limited by the state. This conflict is felt 
more keenly as the size of the state grows, including into areas once the exclusive 
domain of the church.321 
Gray alludes to the development of the state not as a simple authority concerned 
with taxes and non-religious services – but an authority also concerned with moral 
values. An authority concerned with what is good for its people. But in a broad 
sense, it is the values (and conflicting value judgements) that cause conflict in the 
legislature’s processes to craft the law that frames the experience of Australian 
persons. Stated bluntly, the state has in the modern era come to draw from a well 
of doctrine, constituting series of moral imperatives based on a constructed 
morality,322 justifying the balance it draws between interferences and protections of 
religious freedom.  
                                                     
320 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 149. 
321 Gray (n 156) 74. 
322 See, eg, Perry (n 304). 
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 The terms of reference for the expert panel of the Religious Freedom Review 
contained explicit instructions to consider the human right of religious freedom 
which is, purportedly, a reference to the various doctrinal protections of religious 
freedom found in international treaties and covenants that Australia is a signatory 
to and has contract-like obligations under. Within that context, the human right of 
religious freedom has very specific connotations (it refers to a specific series of 
doctrine). Those connotations are explored amply elsewhere and it is sufficient to 
note here that the ‘human right to religious freedom’ is a unique doctrinal 
conceptualisation of the idea, necessarily, accompanied by specific prescriptions 
and proscriptions relating to other human rights (including a value for non-
discrimination principles). Article 18.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, for example, literally states inter alia that: 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.323 
One obvious advantage to the form that the human right to religious freedom is 
delivered is that, as a written rule, it seeks to set out an otherwise complicated 
concept, however; what it expresses with some certainty can be practically as much 
an interference as it is a protection or, at least, a delineation of the abstract idea (if 
one reads it in context of its broader promotion of a ‘political morality’). 
 As seen in limited examples of case law such as the High Court Conscription 
and Jehovah’s judgements, the legal interference with an abstract religious freedom 
                                                     
323 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
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(assuming it passes any threshold of being interference) has sometimes been found 
to be acceptable by authorities. Certain values have trumped any pursuit for a 
widespread, absolute religious freedom which is sometimes conceptualised by 
individuals or associations. A challenge is found in the ease of mixing values with a 
positivist understanding of what the role of the state is. Gray’s claim for example; 
that ‘[t]he state has a legitimate, strong interest in the social organisation of a 
society’,324 might be rebutted by an argument (as a hypothetical) that the law is a 
limit on a person’s liberty325 and the state has as much an interest as it is given by 
the people, to manage those behaviours that harm another and nothing more.326 
But what sort of harm, and suffered by whom? Physical harm? Proprietary harm? 
Economic harm? Emotional harm? Moral harm? The meaning an individual 
attributes to the idea of ‘inherent human dignity’ will impact the priority placed on 
these potential harms. 
 Of course, a religious person does not necessarily need the law to first give 
them permission before they will do, or refuse to do, something. When the law of 
the land creates consequences for a religious identity in following their convictions 
(or even merely identifying with them), a choice of allegiance is posed. Naturally 
though, a legal system that does not inhibit a religious person (or a religious group) 
is going to be materially advantageous (but not necessarily morally, if an identity 
sees a value in their own martyrdom) to a person over a system that does. The 
                                                     
324 Gray (n 156) 103. 
325 Campbell and Whitmore (n 270) 1. 
326 The ALRC notes such a perspective: Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 133 [5.22], citing 
Thomas Jefferson, ‘Notes on the State of Virginia (1781–2)’ in David George Mullan (ed), Religious 
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development of the state as a moral authority manifests itself in the demonstrable 
difficulty with which the state has in promoting the so-called ‘political moralities’ 
that, in some ways paradoxically, have given rise to such notions as the ‘negative 
religious liberty’ espoused by the ALRC in relying on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. This follows the popularising of so-called ‘fundamental 
human rights’ found in a bulk of related international treaties. It may be consistent 
with a generic rule of law that ‘religion has no a priori claim to superiority over 
other fundamental rights’327 but; the origin, meaning, and literal value, of those 
‘fundamental rights’ remains subjective.  
 While, toleration was once a noteworthy value guiding the scope of civilised 
religion, recent years have seen a shift and there is increasingly ‘community 
concern’ over the protection of religious freedom.328 This has especially occurred 
via the promotion of a concept of ‘the good’, which has rendered the state a moral 
authority. Anti-discrimination laws, (also described as equality laws) are just one 
example of the narrowing of civilised religion; diluting religious freedom in favour of 
equality. The state, in its course of becoming a moral authority, has produced 
various solutions to positively protect religious freedom that at the same time, leave 
the state prepared to qualify it. The Religious Freedom Review reported that: 
The Panel does not accept arguments that a right to discriminate in the provision of 
goods and services is required or proportionate to ensure the free and full 
enjoyment of Australians’ rights to freedom of religion under international law.329 
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The international law however, clearly, does not promote a religious freedom that 
everyone will agree with, nor necessarily the same doctrine as the Constitution of 
Australia. This itself should demand more ‘rigorous research’ (which Mortensen 
called for330), not only as to the implications of section 116, but also the nature, 
content, and requirements of the treaties themselves.331 
 The balancing between protections and interferences of religious freedom 
(and thus the scope of civilised religion) in Australia is, while not necessarily posed 
in the language that this work describes it; a subject of political, academic, and 
public discourse. This discourse merely existing is not by itself a problem, but if we 
accept that the ‘issue’ for the abstract idea of religious freedom is the fluctuating 
popular (and political) commitment to it (rendering the scope of civilised religion 
subject to change in Australia); a resolution might be found in the existing 
constitutional institution that sets boundaries on those legal protections and 
interferences. This might be a legalistic ‘resolution’, at law, to the issue facing the 
abstract idea of religious freedom.  
 
2 The Free Exercise Clause – a Resolution to Religious Freedom? 
 If we accept (as many do) that the state has an interest in designing and 
enforcing laws for various ends to be achieved (‘objectives’), and that the state has 
the lawful discretion to determine the wisdom of any given law and how the 
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objectives are to be pursued; there is no issue, in law, for the abstract (and very 
subjective) concept of religious freedom. Whether or not the law should adopt or 
promote a ‘morality’ is a debate for politics. The law is only ‘limited’ in its ability to 
interfere with religious freedom in accordance with that which makes it law – the 
procedures and practical realities of government (including whatever rule of law is 
favoured in that jurisdiction). That a democratic society then, could direct its 
attention towards the treatment of specific religious groups, and, that it could 
collectively decide how they are to be treated and accommodated (if at all and 
under the conditions which it chooses), leaves the debate over religious freedom in 
a subjective haze further complicated by the role that religious identities 
themselves have, in influencing that law.332 
 The question of how the constitutional doctrine might be a resolution at law 
to the broader debate over the abstract idea of religious freedom, requires a 
consideration of the bigger picture. That bigger picture, as has been examined, 
involves a puzzle of multiple pieces: the state has a role regarding religious freedom 
and religious pluralism, the law can either interfere or protect the abstract idea, the 
state (when described legalistically) sets the scope of civilised religion in its 
jurisdiction, and that scope in modern Australia is facing a narrowing in the state’s 
concurrent development as a moral authority. Where though, in this multi-part 
puzzle, does the constitutional doctrine (especially section 116) fit? The question 
really though, is how can law resolve what is fundamentally a subjective and 
political debate over an abstract value? The answer (at least, for a constitutionalist) 
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is that we accept what the Constitution does (and does not do) in designating an 
upper limit on which law is a valid exercise of power (and through which, the scope 
of civilised religion be set) in the respective jurisdiction. Working backwards; the 
Constitution directs the setting of the scope of civilised religion and thus limits 
which protections and interferences can be adopted by law-makers. This also 
confirms that ‘religious freedom’ is not ultimately a civil rights issue, but rather, an 
issue of power. 
 Following from this narrative, this work starts from a point, as Evans does, 
that the conception of religious freedom which should be adopted is by-and-large a 
political issue. This allows us to instead focus on those active legal (and 
institutional) arrangements that purport to engage with it. So, while the balancing 
of protections and infringements is a subjective political debate, the state must still 
abide by its own terms of establishment (for a constitutionalist, the written 
Constitution is the apex of those terms). Functioning as terms of establishment, the 
Constitution, through section 116, expressly limits the capacity of the 
Commonwealth to involve itself with the task of defining the scope of civilised 
religion (on a national level). Due to its limitations however, the section does not 
necessarily altogether prevent the Commonwealth from defining that scope but it 
does modify how it can go about defining that scope. 
 In Division I, this work examined the free exercise clause of section 116 with 
a focus on litigation under the High Court’s construction of the clause. This work set 
out a conceptualisation of the free exercise clause based on the text and context of 
the free exercise clause which refers to the Commonwealth as tolerant and secular. 
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The implications of that conceptualisation for the standard of religious freedom and 
the balancing of competing values, in Australia, are considerable. Especially so, 
when two questions are posed: how does the Constitution impact the scope of 
civilised religion in Australia and how does the Constitution impact the development 
of the state as a moral authority? 
 
How Does the Constitution Impact the Scope of Civilised Religion in Australia – The 
Pursuit of Tolerant, Secular, Governance 
 Plainly, the whole of section 116 responds to the role of the state regarding 
‘religion’ generally, while the free exercise clause directly responds to the role of 
the state regarding ‘religious freedom’ to whatever extent the free exercise of any 
religion can be construed an aspect of ‘religious freedom’.333 Section 116 does not, 
explicitly, iterate any version of any abstract idea of ‘religious freedom’, nor does it 
directly protect such a thing in the relationships between Australian persons.334 
What this indicates, is that section 116 does not by itself impact the scope of 
civilised religion in Australia (notwithstanding that it ostensibly designates any 
religion, which involves an external aspect of pursuing the direct religious authority 
of the Commonwealth, as uncivilised). Section 116 responds to the ability of the 
                                                     
333 This can be extended to the remaining clauses, for example, the establishment clause responds to 
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334 Expert Panel (n 155) 35-36 [1.90-1.91]:  
 [S]section 116 is a limitation on Commonwealth legislative power; it does not create a 
 ‘right’ for individuals to hold or manifest their faith. Nor does it create a positive obligation 
 on the Commonwealth to do anything to ensure freedom of religion …’ 
 129 
Commonwealth itself to set that scope by limiting (albeit, not absolutely) the kind of 
protections or interferences that the Commonwealth can validly enact.  
 If we accept a conceptualisation of the free exercise clause which designates 
the Commonwealth as tolerant and secular (as is argued in Division I to be required 
under a text and context based analysis), we can also accept that in the due course 
of balancing its protections and interferences of religious freedom, the 
Commonwealth must not overstep the relevant boundary which section 116 
comprises. However, because the section is not absolute; the tolerant, secular 
Commonwealth is quite capable of having a role in that balancing act, yet, there is a 
vague constitutional limit (subject to the High Court’s construction). The first aspect 
of this conceptualisation then, raises the question: does setting the scope of 
civilised religion (and conversely some religions as uncivilised) constitute intolerance 
by the Commonwealth? 
 Per the conclusions of Division I of this work, the constitutional prohibition is 
directed at a specific kind of activity and law. Namely, the kind of law that ‘prohibits 
the free exercise of any religion’ and where that ‘intolerance’ (of an exercise) was 
that law’s objective (noting that a law’s objective is related to its effect and that 
there can be several purposes in any law). This is distinguishable from Parliament’s 
(or an individual parliamentarian’s) motivation. To apply this to the state’s role in 
setting the scope of civilised religion, via any mechanism other than an absence of 
law (which is a source of protection for religious freedom – ‘toleration by 
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restraint’335), the state must be (in designating certain external manifestations of 
religion as uncivilised) being intolerant to the now uncivilised external 
manifestation. This necessitates the conclusion that failing to protect (either with 
absolute, indiscriminate positive protections, or via the absence of any intolerant 
law) any religion or religions generally, in all circumstances, will constitute 
intolerance of the kind facially prohibited by the constitutional framework. 
 This is to be considered subject to the qualification of the free exercise 
clause, that whatever rationale is used to limit its effect, it must be a secular 
rationale. As was also concluded in Division I, this does not necessarily limit the 
Commonwealth to relying on a valueless rationale, only that it be non-religious. It is 
not tenable, under the Constitution, for the Australian government to set the scope 
of civilised religion in Australia on the basis of some religious rationale. Beyond this 
however, the so-called ‘toleration’ promoted by the Constitution is entirely a 
question of popular commitment, and courage on the part of the High Court, to 
defend it. What appears to be left outside of this doctrine, prompts a further 
question: if the Commonwealth has no obligation to promote ‘religious freedom’ for 
its citizens, how can it be said that the Commonwealth is being ‘tolerant’ when it 
finds itself enacting positive protections (in the style of exemptions for religious 
identities) from the effect of its own laws? It follows, that the Commonwealth’s 
                                                     
335 But see, Beck (n 164) 119, citing Steven G Gey, ‘More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause 
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 [I]intolerance exists when the state attempts to change or supress a set of religious beliefs 
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positive protection of religious freedom must be an extension of the constitutional 
standard and not anything less. 
 
How Does the Constitution Impact the Development of the State as a Moral 
Authority? – The Constitutional Preference for Freedom 
 The development of the Commonwealth as a ‘moral authority’ has already 
been identified earlier in this work. This development has implications for the 
changing scope of civilised religion in Australia, depending on the balance drawn by 
the Commonwealth between protections and interferences of religious freedom in 
the law. The point to be made here, however, is that the constitutional standard of 
religious freedom is distinct from the ‘human right to religious freedom’ and 
positive legal protections which might satisfy the latter, do not automatically escape 
constitutional scrutiny because of a constitutional requirement for the 
Commonwealth to be ‘tolerant’ (in the sense set out in Division I). When there is 
some contention, the ‘constitutionally required preference for religious liberty’336 
demands an absence of law (unless there is a secular rationale to excuse the 
intolerance). The conceptualisation set out in Division I of this work, of a tolerant, 
secular Commonwealth, is consistent with the notion, opined by Chief Justice 
Latham, that: 
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 [B]ecause the recognition of rights of religious liberty in s 116 of the Commonwealth 
 Constitution, coupled with, a High Court more prepared to expand its interpretation of 
 constitutional liberties, does not suggest a 'balance’ to be struck between anti-
 discrimination standards and rights of religious liberty, but a constitutionally required 
 preference for religious liberty. 
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Section 116 … assumes that citizens of all religions can be good citizens, and that 
accordingly there is no justification in the interests of the community for 
prohibiting the free, exercise of any religion.337 
This assumption in section 116 is rebuttable with a secular rationale. Yet clearly, in 
modern Australia, the Commonwealth holds itself as having an interest in 
promoting a constructed morality that may (subjectively) justify interference with 
religious freedom.  
 The impact of the Constitution on the state’s development as a ‘moral 
authority’ is less obvious than its impact on the scope of civilised religion, because 
(in keeping with the focus on legislative power) it is not necessarily the polity as a 
moral authority which is problematic, but instead, what that polity does as a moral 
authority that is a constitutional issue. From the perspective of a constitutionalist, 
there is no issue in whether or not a person can be described (subjectively) to have 
religious freedom, but, there is in whether the Commonwealth has overstepped its 
responsibilities in setting the scope of civilised religion. While the Commonwealth 
has a role in setting the scope of civilised religion in Australia, that role is subject to 
the constitutional requirement for the Commonwealth to be tolerant. This is all to 
the point that section 116 sets out a constitutional minimum standard of religious 
freedom; leaving a sphere of conversation in the realm of politics, but, derogating a 
specific ambit to the state (ultimately, for the High Court to make determinations 
on in accordance with the Constitution). An effort to positively promote a particular 
kind of religious freedom preferred by the legislature, leaves true tolerance 
questionable because the state implicitly designates some religions (specifically, 
                                                     
337 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 126 [6]. 
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their beliefs or exercises) as uncivilised (even perhaps only on some occasions) when 
that law fails to provide an absolute protection from whatever it is being protected 
against. The Commonwealth, at that point, will have achieved self-determination of 
the qualification of the constitutional requirement to be tolerant – bypassing the 
role of the judiciary ‘to make a judgment about the balancing (prioritising) done by 
Parliament’.338 
 Those four areas of substantive federal law identified by the ALRC (including 
anti-discrimination, workplace relations, marriage, and counter-terrorism) all 
involve some attempt to balance values (for both equality and religious freedom) 
via an amalgamation of protections and interferences. Of the four substantive areas 
of federal law, anti-discrimination and workplace relations laws (being laws that 
broadly impact a freedom of association) have persisted (even while drafting this 
work) to be subject to heated debate, especially so, with an ongoing conversation 
over the enactment of a Commonwealth Religious Discrimination Act (predictably, a 
scheme to cement the negative religious liberty set out by the ALRC). This is 
especially evident in recommendation 15 of the Religious Freedom Review.339 
 
                                                     
338 Gray (n 156) 76. 
339 Expert Panel (n 155) 5:  
 The Commonwealth should amend the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, or enact a Religious 
 Discrimination Act, to render it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of a person’s ‘religious 
 belief or activity’, including on the basis that a person does not hold any religious belief. In 
 doing so, consideration should be given to providing for appropriate exceptions and 
 exemptions, including for religious bodies, religious schools and charities. 
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B The Dichotomy of Freedom and Equality 
 Proceeding on the basis that anti-discrimination laws are symptomatic of the 
state’s development as a moral authority and that the Constitution is poised to limit 
this development if anti-discrimination laws overstep the bounds of tolerant, 
secular government; this work turns to examine the experience of religious 
identities under federal anti-discrimination laws. The question is not only as to what 
extent anti-discrimination laws narrow the scope of civilised religion, but also, how 
do members of Australia’s religious pluralism fare under them? While a purely 
doctrinal analysis of the law might provide an indication about which religious 
beliefs or practices are theoretically legal (or illegal), it must be acknowledged that 
there is a difference between debates over religious freedom for theoretical 
religions (such as a hypothetical religion that pursues human sacrifice which, 
ostensibly, goes without representation in Australia), as compared to debates over 
the active religious identities in Australia’s pluralism who hold beliefs or pursue a 
religious exercise incongruent with the law (polygamy for example, a relatively 
uncommon but nonetheless existent tradition and subject of religious teaching, is 
not supported by the Marriage Act340). If, in theory, everything can be given 
religious significance, we could suggest that discrimination of any kind could 
constitute a religious exercise. But whether or not a religious person actually does 
value religiously motivated discrimination is quite distinct an issue from asking 
whether Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws should accommodate religiously 
motivated discrimination. That question would require a subjective prescription for 
                                                     
340 But see, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Article 18: Freedom of religion and 
belief (1998), 41-42. 
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what a good religious freedom is, while, this work has already identified an 
objective standard in that the Commonwealth must not overstep the constitutional 
requirement to be tolerant and secular. By proactively describing how the members 
of the Australian religious pluralism experience Commonwealth anti-discrimination 
law, we can assess whether there is some legitimate need to invoke the existing 
constitutional doctrine.  
 Consistent with the narrative set-out above in Part A, Commonwealth anti-
discrimination laws relate to religious freedom in two ways generally, including a 
protective (referring especially to the negative religious freedom espoused by the 
ALRC) and an interfering (where the law inhibits positive religious liberty, when it is 
expressed as discrimination). These capacities (where a value for equality manifests 
in legislation) are spread or supported variably across several enactments of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, most notably including the: Racial Discrimination Act341 
(‘RDA’), Disability Discrimination Act342 (‘DDA’), Age Discrimination Act343 (‘ADA’), 
Sex Discrimination Act344 (‘SDA’), Workplace Relations Act345 (‘WRA’), and Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act346 (‘AHRCA’). As for the interfering capacity, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission reported that: 
Commonwealth anti-discrimination law makes it unlawful to discriminate against a 
person on the basis of a person’s personal attributes, such as their sex or sexual 
                                                     
341 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’). 
342 Disability Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘DDA’). 
343 Age Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘ADA’). 
344 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘SDA’). 
345 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘WRA’). 
346 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (‘AHRCA’). 
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orientation, in areas of public life including employment, education and the 
provision of goods, services and facilities ….347 
But also, that: 
Some religious groups or individuals may wish to engage in conduct that may 
constitute unlawful discrimination against others, on the grounds of sex, sexual 
orientation, or the marital or relationship status of individuals.348  
The kind of activity which might fall under the purview of anti-discrimination law 
can be quite broad and has been subject to some change since the first enactment 
of the respective schemes. Section 18C of the RDA reflects this, where an action 
that even offends, insults, humiliates or intimidates a person or group of people 
might be unlawful.349 
 As is typical in law, where anti-discrimination legislation makes certain 
conduct unlawful, exemptions (or ‘exceptions’350) are also provided. Regarding the 
paradox of anti-discrimination law, Mortensen noted that: 
In this respect, Caesar has generally been prepared to render something to God 
through the complex exemptions granted in the discrimination laws to religious 
groups and religious educational or health institutions.351 
                                                     
347 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 129-130 [5.4]:  
 These laws, such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), are intended to give effect to 
 Australia’s international treaty obligations, and other relevant international instruments, 
 and to eliminate various forms of discrimination that have negative social, health, and 
 financial effects for individuals and society. 
348 Ibid 130 [5.5]. 
349 RDA (n 328) s 18C. 
350 Evans distinguishes exemptions and exceptions as between where an application must be made 
for the religious person to be permitted to discriminate or where the religious person explicitly 
excluded from the operation of the law: See Evans (n 2) 140. 
351 Mortensen (n 285) 231. 
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The scope of these exemptions is not only complex, but also inconsistent. For 
example, it has remained the case, since Evans noted in 2012,352 that no exemption 
is provided under the RDA for discrimination as a religious exercise, whereas under 
the SDA, there is.353 The ALRC reported on the issue of these exemptions that:  
A broader concern of stakeholders is that freedom of religion may be vulnerable to 
erosion by anti-discrimination law if religious practice or observance is respected 
only through exemptions to general prohibitions on discrimination.354 
This work will return to the scope of these exemptions later, however. What is 
important to address at this stage is that the ostensible issue, for the religious, is 
that they may value the capacity to discriminate who they associate with, and how 
they associate with them (sometimes amounting to exclusivity). ‘Discrimination’ 
may be required by a religious doctrine, connected to a religious belief or generally 
considered necessary for external religious freedom. On the other hand, 
proponents of anti-discrimination laws broadly value equality and advocate the 
legal protection of a select range of attributes so that others are prohibited from 
‘discriminating’ against them on the basis of those attributes or else be at risk to 
legal action. Thus, we simply have a dichotomy of freedom and ‘equality', where 
promoting one might detract from the other and a balance must be struck.   
 
                                                     
352 Evans (n 2) 148. 
353 See, eg, SDA (n 331) s 37. 
354 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) [5.6]-[5.7]. 
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1 Discrimination as an Aspect of Religion  
 Having already acknowledged that there is a connection between religious 
freedom and religious pluralism, we might commence this section of the work by 
acknowledging the modern religious pluralism of Australia. Census data goes some 
way to revealing this pluralism. The Religious Freedom Review cited 2016 census 
data, that: 
The 2016 Census showed that religion remains an important part of Australia’s 
strong—and diverse—social fabric. The Census results showed that Christianity—
reported by 52.1% of the population—remained the largest faith group, of which 
the two largest denominations were Catholic at 22.6%, and Anglican at 13.3%. The 
second and third largest faith groups were Islam at 2.6%, and Buddhism at 2.4%.355 
‘The Census, however, also showed that nearly a third (30.1%) of Australians 
identified as having “no religion”.’356 The pluralism seen in this data, while it might 
suggest religiosity could be on the decline, does not tell us about how that 
religiosity has leaked into facets of life beyond simple self-identification. This 
notably extends to the education sector and various other industries involving the 
provision of goods or services. Evans noted that religious organisations contribute 
significantly to the economy of Australia.357 This is not to say that religious freedom 
precludes an individual’s freedom. Discrimination however, is notably related to 
association. Notably, Nicholas Aroney has authoritatively set out the associational 
                                                     
355 Expert Panel (n 155) 11 [1.24]. 
356 Ibid [1.25]. 
357 Evans (n 2) 3-5. 
 139 
nature of religious freedom358 but also commented (in an inquiry submission co-
authored with Mark Fowler) that: 
If religious freedom includes an individual’s right to believe and practice their 
religion, but does not include the right to associate with other religious believers in 
accordance with their shared convictions, then something that lies at the heart of 
religious faith and practice will be severely jeopardised.359 
While the concept of an ‘associational’ nature of religious freedom might warrant a 
dedicated discussion for another time, it is sufficient to note for now that as the 
ALRC reported (referencing the attributes protected under the SDA)360: 
Some religious organisations discriminate on these and other grounds, for example 
by only appointing male priests and ministers, by excommunicating people who 
have sexual relationships outside marriage, or employing only teachers who are 
religiously observant in their schools.361 
The details of these ‘religious organisations’ is sometimes shrouded in an 
assumption by commentators that discrimination simply is valued, without any 
specificity as to who actually values it and under what circumstances. While it might 
be pragmatic to suggest that discrimination may be, or is, an exercise of some 
religions in Australia; general knowledge is neither reliable nor does a theoretical 
religious exercise necessarily warrant serious consideration. So then, a proposition 
such as Reid Mortensen’s that: ‘[t]o a large degree in Australia, religious freedom 
                                                     
358 See, Nicholas Aroney, ‘Freedom of Religion as an Associational Right’ (2012) 9 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 153. 
359 Nicholas Aroney and Mark Fowler, Submission No 148 to Australian Commonwealth Parliament, 
Inquiry into the Status of the Human Right of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 1-2. 
360 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 142 [5.72]: 
 [U]nder the [SDA], it is unlawful to discriminate against a person on the basis of a person’s 
 sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, 
 pregnancy, breastfeeding, and family responsibilities. 
361 Ibid 143 [5.73]. 
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only takes on real meaning in the extent to which it is lawful for religious groups to 
discriminate’,362 needs to be critically considered. When, for example, the 
Australian Human Rights Commission reports that: 
[A]ccording to the feedback from the various state and territory anti-discrimination 
bodies, the number of religious discrimination complaints is relatively small and 
limited, reflecting Australia’s acclaimed religious harmony.363 
One might ask which (and why) religious groups (or individuals) wish to 
discriminate, and whether that behaviour gives effect to their religious beliefs or 
merely reflects a primitive prejudice (assuming a distinction).  
 
(Secondary Observational) Evidence of a Value to Discriminate 
 While a number of public studies document the value that some members of 
Australia’s religious pluralism attribute to discriminatory practices, these studies are 
limited. The Expert Panel summarised the data available to it on several subjects 
that fall under the subject matter of association and discrimination, including for 
example, on the provision of goods and services, that:  
A number of stakeholders suggested to the Panel that people of faith should be 
able to refuse to provide goods and services if doing so would be contrary to their 
personal religious beliefs.364 
The operative word here, however, is ‘if’. This does not itself indicate that 
discrimination is, in the course of providing goods and services, a religious exercise 
                                                     
362 Mortensen (n 272) 4. 
363 Australian Human Rights Commission (n 264) 30. 
364 Expert Panel (n 155) 48 [1.155]. 
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per se for any religion. This was similar to a summary regarding ‘charities and faith 
based organisations’,365 wherein, the operative word was ‘might’. The summary 
regarding employment in religious schools is somewhat more specific,366 but the 
Religious Freedom Review did also report, that:  
The Panel did not hear of a single instance of a faith-based school discriminating, or 
wanting to discriminate, against a person on the basis of [race, disability, pregnancy 
or intersex status].367  
While a desire to discriminate ostensibly extended to the enrolment of students (at 
least, the panel suggested that it could368), similar to the issue of employment of 
staff, assessing the appropriate scope of exemptions for a religious school’s 
handling of enrolment was inhibited: 
To the extent that some jurisdictions do not currently allow religious schools to 
discriminate against students … the Panel sees no need to introduce such 
provisions. Very few religious schools or organisations submitted that this was 
necessary.369 
                                                     
365 Ibid 50 [1.172]:  
 The Panel heard from a number of faith-based organisations which were concerned that, in 
 the future, public funding to religious organisations providing services, such as education or 
 healthcare, may be tied to undertaking activities, or giving up exceptions from anti-
 discrimination law, and this might conflict with their religious ethos. 
366 Ibid 56 [1.210]: 
 The Panel heard from a number of religious schools that argued that spiritual education is 
 not just about teaching content in classes, but also the formation of a community or 
 environment that supports the teachings of their faith. A key theme in these discussions 
 was the need for staff to model the religious and moral convictions of the community and 
 to uphold, or at least not to undermine, the religious ethos of the school. The Panel heard 
 repeatedly that faith is ‘caught not taught’.  
367 Ibid 62 [1.248]. 
368 Ibid 68 [1.271]: 
 The Panel recognises, however, that there is a wide variety of religious schools in Australia 
 and that to some school communities, cultivating an environment and ethos which 
 conforms to their religious beliefs is of paramount importance. To the extent that this can 
 be done in the context of appropriate safeguards for the rights and mental health of the 
 child, the Panel accepts their right to select, or preference, students who uphold the 
 religious convictions of that school community.  
369 Ibid 68 [1.273]. 
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‘Necessary’, for what? To abide by a subjective religious law? To be, subjectively, 
morally righteous? 
 Even by its own analysis of the data, the Religious Freedom Review 
recommended that further data should be collected on a range of subjects including 
on ‘forms of discrimination based on religion and suffered by those of faith’ and 
‘the experience of freedom of religion impacting on other human rights’.370  Noting 
the various kinds of ‘perceived’ infringements of religious freedom, the Religious 
Freedom Review reported that: 
There was insufficient information to determine how frequently these issues arise 
… Meaningful interfaith dialogue, as well as a greater level of genuine engagement 
between politicians and faith communities, is needed to come to a deeper 
understanding … and identify appropriate solutions.371  
The Government’s response to Recommendation 17 of the Religious Freedom 
Review recognises that further data collection is desirable.372 Fortunately, the 
Religious Freedom Review is not the only report in recent years to collect or analyse 
data regarding religious freedom in Australia (though, the relevancy of older reports 
may be questioned). In these, we can proactively detect a value for discrimination 
as an aspect of a religion. 
 The subject of ‘faith-based educational institutions’, while a significant 
component of the Religious Freedom Review, prompted another public report in 
2018 which inter alia saw evidence of the ‘use’ of legislative exemptions by faith-
                                                     
370 Ibid 101-102. 
371 Ibid 99 [1.401]. 
372 Ibid 101. 
 143 
based educational institutions.373 Following from the issue considered by the 
Religious Freedom Review, of whether religious schools have a value to 
discriminate, it was reported clearly that several associations valued a discretionary 
capacity to discriminate in order to hold their teachers and students accountable to 
some code of ethics or ‘ethos’ or ‘values’ (in essence, a morality subjective to the 
association).374 A religious belief that implies a value for discrimination was most 
clearly referred to in a single, reported segment: 
For our schools, we generally take the pretty clear view that there is a biblical truth 
around sexuality, a biblical truth around sexual conduct. That's a traditional, 
historical view. And there's a traditional, historical view around marriage that our 
schools would generally hold to. We have got staff in our schools who have 
indicated to the school leadership that they're same-sex attracted, but they take 
the view that it's not what God's best plan is for them. It's a struggle they have, but 
they don't accept it …375 
However, this does not in and of itself suggest that discrimination is an exercise of 
the religion per se, merely that the schools in question wish to adopt a code of 
conduct that might itself prompt discrimination. The submission appears to refer to 
the condemnation of same-sex sexual relations as immoral sexual activity or 
unlawful pursuant to some religious law, but also clearly distinguishes between 
conduct and mere ‘sexuality’.  
                                                     
373 See generally, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, The Commonwealth, 
Legislative exemptions that allow faith-based educational institutions to discriminate against 
students, teachers and staff (2018) 27-30. 
374 See generally, ibid 27-32 [2.28]-[2.50]. 
375 Ibid 32 [2.50], citing Mr Mark Spencer, Executive Officer, Policy, Governance and Staff Relations, 
Christian Schools Australia, Committee Hansard, 19 November 2018, 34–35. 
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 The 2018 report tailored to educational institutions was clearly limited 
(especially by its focus on a single type of association). The older ‘Article 18’ report 
of 1998, produced by the then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(‘HREOC’), examined the value of discrimination more broadly, also noting the view 
of some individuals pertaining to ‘family businesses’ and small organisations. The 
HREOC reported a ‘Brethren Community’ submission, that 
it is at times necessary, on account of our obligation to keep the Christian 
fellowship pure for the Lord Jesus, to exclude (usually temporarily) a person from 
the fellowship. Depending upon the seriousness of the matter, we could not 
employ or continue to employ such a person until it was resolved.376 
The HREOC additionally recorded a co-authored submission which revealed a belief 
that discrimination was obligatory for a ‘Christian’ in the face of immoralities: 
As Christians maintaining and operating a business according to Christian standards 
we again have an obligation to be discriminative. Where the lifestyle and known 
practices of persons are totally opposed to the principles we uphold, the law should 
respect our right to decline to enter into business relationships with such …377 
The AHRC also recorded more general statements, such as, that: 
[S]ome religious groups believe that it is inappropriate for divorced people, or 
practising homosexuals to be admitted to the ranks of the clergy, or to be involved 
as teachers in religious schools.378 
In the less comprehensive 2011 report, the AHRC noted similar arguments, 
recording that:  
                                                     
376 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Article 18: Freedom of religion and belief 
(1998), 106 citing John Allpress Submission R/22. 
377 Ibid 106 citing E S and N G Teiffel Submission R/152. 
378 Ibid 107 citing The University of Queensland Chaplaincy Centre, Submission R/212. 
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[M]any faith-based organisations shared the following assertion: 
 
 ANGLICARE Sydney cannot employ, at any level, someone who is hostile to 
 or unsupportive of its mission, vision or values … Religious charities such as 
 ANGLICARE Sydney also maintain the right, provided this is done in good 
 faith, to decide whether some or all of the positions offered by it carry a 
 ‘faith dimension’.379 
All of these records suggest more than merely a desire to discriminate (which is 
evidenced extensively throughout various reports). These passages indicate a 
relationship between discrimination and religious belief through a standard of 
morality or religious rules. This is to say, discrimination might be something which is 
done to give effect to religious beliefs, in a range of circumstances (including, 
apparently, the provision of goods or services) by some members of Australia’s 
religious pluralism. 
 Mortensen connected the issue of discrimination and religion by referencing 
some sociological material and international case law (while being alert to the 
distinction between a religious belief or exercise and ‘moral preferences’380). Doing 
so, they offered some evidence of a value held for discrimination on the basis of 
different characteristics. On religiously motivated racial discrimination, Mortensen 
wrote that: 
[E]mpirical evidence suggests that in Australia the religious are less likely to 
demonstrate racist attitudes than the non-religious. However, there are religions 
                                                     
379 Australian Human Rights Commission (n 264) 35, citing Submission 1535 Anglicare Sydney. 
380 Mortensen (n 285) 219. 
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and religious denominations closely associated with ethnic communities that could 
have, in effect, racially exclusive practices.381 
This is contrasted to ‘[s]ex discrimination in religious groups’, which Mortensen 
described as ‘common’ and ‘recently been the source of ecclesiastical and 
theological controversy’.382 Mortensen cited evidence of clear Catholic and Anglican 
doctrine that discriminates between the sexes in who can be ‘ordained’ and to what 
ranking.383 Mortensen provides only general insight into ‘[s]exual orientation 
discrimination’ or ‘homosexual or bisexual practices’, positing that in contrast to the 
reasons for racial or sex discrimination: 
Unlike these, homosexual practices are commonly regarded as sin, and therefore 
an effective preference of celibate or heterosexual married individuals over 
homosexuals is more closely related to a religion’s moral imperatives.384 
Mortensen also notes the distinction between orientation and conduct by some 
‘mainstream Protestant churches’.385 Finally, ‘[r]eligious discrimination’, is dealt 
with by Mortensen without explicit reference to any particular religious belief or 
doctrine, opining that: 
                                                     
381 Ibid 221, citing G D Bouma, Religion: Meaning, Transcendence and Community in Australia 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992), 104; J M Yinger, Sociology Looks at Religion (New York: 
Macmillan, 1963), 89-90; Hazan v Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies (990) EOC 92, 298. 
382 Ibid 223. 
383 Ibid 223 citing Canon 1024 Code of Canon Law (London: Collins, 1983); s 3 Law of the Church of 
England Clarification Canon 1992, General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia, November 
1992. 
384 Ibid 227. 
385 Ibid 227 citing Cf the resolution of the national Assembly of the Uniting Church to establish a 
Sexuality Task Group to report in 1997 on how the Church should respond to changing patterns of 
human relationships and sexual activity: Uniting Church in Australia, Minutes and Reports of the Sixth 
Assembly of the Uniting Church in Australia (Brisbane: Uniting Church Queensland Synod, 1991), 38. 
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There would be almost no right to religious liberty if a religious group had no right 
to exclude others who held to different religious conceptions or practices and, 
therefore, a right to exercise some discrimination on the ground of religion.386 
Undoubtedly, this is a considered conclusion. Yet, there is no obvious evidence in 
Mortensen’s writing that such discrimination would technically be an exercise of 
any religion in Australia (but perhaps so, in the United States).387 While this work’s 
assessment might initially appear flippant, there is no reason to assume that 
discrimination (on the basis of religion) is necessarily an exercise of religion. Indeed, 
some religions may not demand sole allegiance, for a person to be ordained. There 
may be merely a ‘moral preference’ for a candidate to have a certain religious 
identity. Or perhaps even, no value at all. To suggest that discrimination on the 
basis of religion is inherent, characterises ‘religion’ as necessarily exclusive, which 
might be contrary to ideals of religious syncretism or the view that ‘religion’ is a 
casual pastime. 
 Mortensen’s reference to international case law was no doubt a practical 
choice in the 1990s, as there are clearly limitations to what observable secondary 
data reveals about the value for discrimination (in its many manifestations) even 
today.388 There is still little indication as to how many, and in what form, the 
members of the Australian religious pluralism discriminate, or desire to, as an 
exercise of their religion. An apparent difficulty is in distinguishing factually 
between discrimination connected to a religious belief and discrimination that is 
                                                     
386 Ibid 229. 
387 Ibid 229-231. 
388 The values of some major religious groups are more easily accessible, see Mortensen (n 272) 11, 
citing Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) 505 [2358]-[2359]; Uniting Church in Australia, 
‘Current policy on homosexuality’ <http://assembly.uca.org.au/assembly97/current_policy.htm>. 
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based on some moral turpitude (eg a refusal to employ an outsider because ‘god 
says to’, would be different from a refusal merely because ‘I do not like those 
outsiders’). Discrimination connected to a religious belief, though, might be based 
on a rule or a less clear ‘moral preference’ to allay a ‘morally objectionable’ 
behaviour (contrast between the two perspectives: ‘god requires that I not 
associate with active homosexuals’, and, ‘active homosexuals are immoral, I would 
rather not associate with them’).  
 It is clear that some members of Australia’s religious pluralism do (and 
probably will continue to) value discrimination as a part of their religious freedom. 
This is most especially apparent as a value in how they treat others and to some 
extent, how they expect to be treated. This discrimination appears to be of a nature 
that falls particularly under the themes of the Commonwealth RDA, SDA, and WRA 
(not so much the ADA or DDA). However, it is not necessarily clear when this 
discrimination is an exercise (in a broad sense) of a religion or merely something to 
be done because of a prejudice. The distinction between the two is obviously 
context specific. The difficulty in assessing which description applies is 
demonstrated where the conflict between freedom and equality is documented 
clearly, and what better example of such records, than the judgment of a court? 
Indeed, it would be consistent to examine such material as it seems a favoured 
strategy of those who hold a value for discrimination and want to promote its lawful 
exemption, to point toward publicised accounts of discriminatory activity by, or 
against, religious identities.389 
                                                     
389 Expert Panel (n 155) 98 [1.398]. 
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Examples of a Manifest Value to Discriminate in Case Law 
 While the Expert Panel tabled statistics so that we might extrapolate that 
there are a ‘minimal’ number of discrimination complaints annually (and clearly, it 
could hardly be said that discrimination is prevalent), this has not prevented the 
judiciary from becoming involved in disputes. A range of Australian cases390 (both 
landmark and relatively unpublicised) are cited throughout the literature for the 
various controversies that arise from the dichotomy of freedom and equality. Evans 
considered the decision in Griffin v Catholic Education Office (1998) EOC, and (as 
described by Evans in 2012) ‘the most significant case to date dealing with the 
exception for religious bodies’ of OV & OW v Members of the Board of the Wesley 
Mission Council [2010] NSWCA 155.391 Both of those matters demonstrate the 
dichotomy of freedom and equality, but this work turns to a third matter (which for 
Evans in 2012 was yet to be resolved) of Cobaw Community Health Services v 
Christian Youth Camps Ltd.392 Gray has in a more recent work since considered the 
implications of the case which has been finalised since the initial tribunal decision393 
in an overturned appeal in the Supreme Court of Victoria (‘Cobaw’)394 and a 
subsequently refused application for special leave to appeal in the High Court of 
                                                     
390 International cases are often cited by ‘stakeholders’ in discussions over anti-discrimination law 
due to involving comparable legislation, legal principles, and plausible factual circumstances. This 
work’s concern is the Australian pluralism so, here, we focus on Australian cases. See Gray (n 156) 
for an example of comparative work in this area. 
391 Evans (n 2) 156-159. 
392 [2010] VCAT 1613. 
393 See generally, Gray (n 156) 77-83. 
394 Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd [2014] 308 ALR 615 (‘Cobaw’). 
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Australia.395 Alex Deagon similarly considered Cobaw alongside Bunning v Centacare 
[2015] FCCA 280.396 It is convenient for this present work to consider the Cobaw 
case. Setting aside the quality of the various findings of fact and law, Cobaw 
evidences both a value for discrimination by a modern Australian religious identity 
and the dichotomy of freedom and equality.397  
 While the law of primary concern in Cobaw was Victorian anti-discrimination 
legislation (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation), the matter 
remains relevant to our consideration of Federal anti-discrimination legislation 
because of the substantive overlap in the form and function of the various state and 
federal schemes. In Cobaw, the complaint was based on the then in-force Victorian 
Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (which, inter alia, prohibited discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services and accommodation).398 
The defence was relevantly, inter alia, based on sections 75 and 77 of the 1995 Act 
which provided respective exemptions to both ‘a body established for religious 
purposes’ (where the discrimination respectively ‘conforms to the doctrines of the 
religion … or is necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of people of 
the religion’),399 and ‘a person’ generally (‘if the discrimination is necessary … to 
comply with the person’s genuine religious beliefs or principles’).400 The Tribunal 
                                                     
395 Christian Youth Camps Ltd v Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd [2014] HCATrans 289. 
396 See generally, Deagon (n 208). 
397 Cobaw was also noted in the Religious Freedom Review:  
 (CYC v Cobaw) was referred to in submissions as an example of the difficulty in crafting laws 
 that ‘prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
 against discrimination’ as required by article 26 of the ICCPR while burdening the right to 
 manifest religious belief both individually and in community to the smallest extent possible. 
Expert Panel (n 155) 44 [1.143]. 
398 Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) ss 42(1)(a), (c), 49(1). 
399 Ibid s 75(2). 
400 Ibid s 77. 
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was required, inter alia, to determine whether the ‘refusal to accept the application 
for accommodation’ was because of, or substantially because of, the attribute of 
sexual orientation.401 
 The basic facts of Cobaw can be summarised quickly:  Cobaw Community 
Health Service (‘CCHS’) sought in 2007 to book a camping resort at ‘The Phillip 
Island Adventure Resort’, which ‘provides accommodation, conference facilities and 
associated activities on an 85 acre site at Phillip Island’.402 Christian Youth Camps 
Ltd (‘CYC’) operates the adventure resort, and was ‘associated with the Christian 
Brethren Church’.403 A representative of CCHS contacted CYC to hire the resort for 
‘the purpose of conducting a weekend camp for same-sex attracted youth as part of 
the “WayOut Project”’.404 The manager of the resort (‘Rowe’) in that phone call, 
effectively, refused to allow CCHS to hire the resort. The actual reason for that 
refusal (and whether there was actually a ‘refusal’) was contentious, regardless, 
‘CYC and Rowe were opposed to homosexual sexual activity on the ground that it 
was contrary to the Bible’.405   
 The actual words exchanged in the phone conversation was at issue. The 
Tribunal assessed the quality of the evidence and found that ‘Mr Rowe was not told 
the focus of the forum was the promotion of homosexuality as a natural and 
healthy lifestyle.’406 The Tribunal made this finding, even after 
                                                     
401 Cobaw (n 281) 626 [42] 
402 [2010] VCAT 1613, 3 [5]. 
403 Cobaw (n 281) 615 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. 
406 [2010] VCAT 1613, 43 [179]. 
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Ms Hackney had agreed in cross examination that the effect of telling young people 
homosexuality was part of the normal and healthy range of human sexualities was 
to tell them it was okay to be homosexual.407 
The Tribunal rejected an argument that ‘regardless of the words used by Ms 
Hackney, the effect of what she told Mr Rowe was that the purpose of the forum 
was to promote homosexuality’.408 The Tribunal considered the language of Rowe, 
for whom: 
In effect, promotion of homosexuality, or a homosexual lifestyle, as [Mr Rowe] 
used those terms, meant encouraging or persuading a group of people he regarded 
as impressionable by reason of their youth to do something abnormal and wrong, 
namely to choose to be homosexual.409 
The Tribunal went on: 
So understood, the respondents’ attempts to distinguish between homosexuality 
and promoting homosexuality fail. Mr Rowe’s objection to promotion of 
homosexuality is, in truth, an objection to same sex attraction, or as the 
respondents characterised it, homosexuality.410 
What followed was a proclamation of sexual liberty by the Tribunal, leading to a 
conclusion, that: ‘An objection to telling a person (same sex) sexual orientation is 
                                                     
407 Ibid 43 [183]. 
408 Ibid 43-44 [183]. 
409 Ibid 44 [187]. Her Honour went on to say: 
 I am satisfied that the effect of Mr Rowe’s evidence is that, to him, promotion of 
 homosexuality or a homosexual lifestyle involved any conduct, whether engaged in by same 
 sex attracted people, or those with a personal association with people identified by their 
 (same sex) sexual orientation, which accepted or condoned same sex attraction, or 
 encouraged people to view same sex attraction as normal, or a natural and healthy part of 
 the range of human sexualities. 
At 45 [189]. 
410 Ibid 45 [190]. 
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part of the range of normal, natural or healthy human sexualities is, in truth, an 
objection to (same sex) sexual orientation.’411 
 The value for discrimination held by Rowe and CYC is indicated by 
documentary evidence, recorded by the President of the Court of Appeal Maxwell 
when they partially replicated the original Tribunal’s judgement. In fact, ‘[t]he land 
on which the resort is situated is owned by the trustees of the Christian Brethren 
Trust’,412 under the trust deed, ‘made on 1 August 1921’:413 
[N]o person would be permitted to use the premises to preach or expound God’s 
word, or perform acts of religious worship, if they promulgated any doctrine or 
practice contrary to the “fundamental beliefs and doctrines” of the Open Brethren 
(as they were then known).414  
Without consulting the trust deed directly, this suggests that the ‘Christian Brethren 
Trust’ sees a value in discriminating as to who would use the premises for preaching 
or acts of religious worship. The discrimination was clearly exclusive in nature. Yet, 
this does not direct us to as the motivation for this discrimination, that is, why the 
Trust sought to exclude certain persons from use of the premises. It does not 
                                                     
411 Ibid 46 [199]. 
412 Cobaw (n 281) 658 [199]. Details of the company were noted at 658 [204]:  
 ‘CYC is the lessee of the resort land from the trustees. CYC is a company limited by 
 guarantee … It operates the resort. By the terms of its constitution, CYC operates the 
 “camping program” or “camping ministry” … According to the constitution, the objects for 
 which CYC is established are:  
  (a) to conduct such camping, conferencing and similar facilities … in accordance 
  with the fundamental beliefs and doctrines of the Christian Brethren and in  
  particular the doctrines referred in the trust deed dated 1 August 1921 … 
413 Cobaw (n 281) 658 [201]. 
414 Ibid [202]:  
 [N]o preaching would be permitted which was contrary to the following “doctrines” listed in 
 the deed: Eternal Sonship and Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, The full efficacy of His 
 atonement only for the Sins of whomsoever believeth: The resurrection Ascension and 
 Coming again of Our Lord Jesus Christ: The quickening indwelling and sanctifying Power of 
 the Holy Spirit: the Eternal Punishment of the wicked and the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy 
 scriptures. 
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appear to indicate any ‘rite’ involving discrimination, but it does indicate a moral 
preference favouring those who share their ‘fundamental beliefs and doctrines’ and 
an intolerance of those who do not (or at least, intolerance of opposing doctrines 
and practices). 
 Besides this documentary evidence, the testimony of Rowe and expert 
witnesses on behalf of CYC415 demonstrated a real value to discriminate, directly to 
the Court. It was recorded in the Court of Appeal, that:  
The basis of Mr Rowe’s objection to the proposed camp was made quite clear, both 
in his statement and in his oral evidence … he said:  
 It offends my Christian beliefs that young people in particular are told that 
 there is nothing wrong with homosexual sexual activity.416 
President of the Court of Appeal Maxwell attempted to explain the viewpoint of 
Rowe, saying that: 
What he [Rowe] would object to was the active expression of same-sex 
orientation. In other words, he would not permit attendance by a group which 
would be explicit about same-sex orientation or its appropriateness.417 
This view was reportedly shared by expert witnesses, including Mr Buchanan. The 
Tribunal summarised Mr Buchanan’s testimony, that: 
                                                     
415 Ibid 669 [254]:  
 Those witnesses were, respectively: 
  • Ms Vicki Mustafa, the senior Pastor of a Christian Brethren church; 
  • Mr Peter Keep, the senior Pastor of a different Christian Brethren church; 
  • Mr George Buchanan, the Director of Ministries of the Association of Christian 
  Brethren Fellowships of Victoria, and a director of CYC since its establishment in 
  2001; and 
  • Revd Canon Peter Adam, an Anglican Minister and theological scholar, and  
  Principal of Ridley College in Melbourne. 
416 Ibid 626 [43]. 
417 Ibid 631 [64]. 
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[H]e was not in favour of the promotion of homosexual practices at CYC campsites, 
including the adventure resort … he, the board of CYC and the trustees of the 
Christian Brethren Trust would be most concerned that a group could attend the 
adventure resort for the purpose of promoting same sexual practice [sic] to young 
people. 418 
Further evidence was given by Ms Mustafa and Mr Keep, recorded respectively as 
saying ‘that it would not be alright to allow a group of people involved in same sex 
relationships and the promotion of that to a CYC camp’419 and (in summary by the 
Court) that ‘what was objectionable in respect of homosexuality was homosexual 
sexual activity, not the fact of sexual orientation itself’.420 
 An issue for the Tribunal ‘was whether CYC could rely on the exemptions 
under the Equal Opportunity Act’.421 The reasons for the finding on that issue also 
point to a value for discrimination: 
For the Christian Brethren, conformity with their beliefs about sex and marriage 
required them to restrict their own sexual activity to sex within marriage. Their 
beliefs permitted same sex attracted people to participate in worship, although 
they would not permit people who were in sexual relationships outside marriage 
(whether same sex attracted or heterosexual) to participate in worship.422 
But the Tribunal explicitly held that the religiously motivated discrimination did not 
extend to merely contacting same-sex orientated persons.423 The value to 
                                                     
418 [2010] VCAT 1613, 77 [337]: ‘He said he did not believe that homosexuality was part of a natural 
or normal range of human sexuality and did not believe that this should be communicated to young 
people of any age.’ 
419 Ibid 78 [340]. 
420 Ibid 78 [341]. 
421 Evans (n 2) 161. 
422 [2010] VCAT 1613, 73 [320]. 
423 Ibid 73 [321]:  
 There was no evidence to suggest that conformity with their beliefs about marriage and 
 sexuality required them to avoid contact with people who were not of their faith and who 
 did not subscribe to their beliefs about God’s will in respect of sex and marriage. 
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discriminate in the context of providing accommodation was, effectively, 
designated by the Tribunal to be insufficiently connected to Rowe and CYC’s 
religion.424 
  The Tribunal was, to adopt the language of this work, expecting that the 
religious parties identify the discrimination as a substantial rule of their religion 
rather than something based on mere moral preference (a moral objection to 
Cobaw’s activities).425 This may seem unrealistic, in fairness, to expect. A narrow 
view of the religious party’s arguments that discrimination was ‘a part’ of their 
religion was prejudiced by an apparent difficulty (noted by Gray), that: 
No Christian scripture calls for religious organisation property owners to refuse to 
rent premises to gay individuals or organisations supporting gay people. Indeed, 
such an attitude can seem at odds with the kind of tolerance and ‘love thy 
neighbour’ ideals espoused by the Bible.426 
The judiciary may not have been second guessing the religious doctrines in Cobaw, 
but there certainly was a measure of scrutiny.  
 That scrutiny was justified by the court through its construction of the 
statutory exemptions. This included a narrow interpretation of the word conformity 
to mean ‘where the religion gave the adherent “no alternative but to act (or refrain 
                                                     
424 Ibid 74 [343]:  
 It is not part of the doctrines, beliefs or practices of the Christian Brethren that they avoid 
 contact with people who do not share their religious beliefs, Nor [sic] is it part of their 
 doctrines or beliefs that they must avoid contact with same sex attracted people who do 
 not share their religious beliefs. Nor is it a doctrine or belief of their religion that they are 
 required to openly express their disapproval of same sex attraction when in contact with 
 same sex attracted people. 
425 For Rowe and CYC, it must have been the case that accommodating persons (thereby ‘associating’ 
with them) that they felt would do something repugnant was objectionable (to speculate, it may 
have been either because the Rowe and CYC felt they might implicitly support the immoral activity, 
or, perhaps because they wanted to discourage an immoral behaviour). 
426 Gray (n 156) 93. 
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from acting) in the particular way”.’427 Gray criticised this as being inconsistent with 
the natural meaning, which does not ‘contemplate compulsion’.428 Further to this, 
an objective test as to what act is necessary to avoid injury to religious sensitivities 
was adopted in Cobaw, and accepted by Gray, that: ‘There must be some basis in 
the religious text, or religious doctrine from an objective source, linking the 
claimant’s belief with religion.’429 Gray argued that: 
It cannot be sufficient, in order to enliven a religion based exemption to generally 
applicable law, that someone merely asserting their religious belief requires them 
to discriminate.430 
Indeed, under this objective approach, a belief would need to be crystallised before 
a religious identity could access any exemption.431 We would naturally expect that a 
more clearly evidenced connection between a religion and discrimination would be 
more persuasive. 
 The judiciary is quite capable of making a finding on the connection between 
a religion and any discrimination. In Cobaw, the moral preference held by Rowe and 
CYC which manifest as discrimination, while argued to be on the basis of the 
‘promotion’ of ‘homosexuality’, overlapped with discrimination on the basis of a 
protected attribute (on this occasion, same-sex orientation). Justice of Appeal 
                                                     
427 Ibid 93 citing Cobaw (n 381) 675 [286]. 
428 Ibid 93. 
429 Ibid 95. 
430 Ibid. 
431 One could wonder whether enforcement of the trust deed referred to in the case, implying 
discrimination vaguely on the basis of religion, might face a difficulty under this same approach for a 
lack of scripture (if religious discrimination was to be made unlawful in similar terms). Refusing to 
rent one’s church premises to another religion repugnant to one’s own, could then become 
unlawful. 
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Redlich characterised the value for discrimination in Cobaw, perhaps generously, 
that: 
To the applicants, acceptance of the booking would have made them morally 
complicit in the message that was to be conveyed at the forum and within the 
community.432 
This perception was not clearly conveyed by the religious persons in Cobaw.433 
While there may be biblical authority (which is the authority emphasised in Cobaw 
by the religious parties, under ‘plenary inspiration’) for the condemning of false 
teachers, what was conveyed by the religious persons did not necessitate that the 
religious identity itself refuse to associate in commercial enterprise (or even 
generally) with others who were themselves (subjectively) morally culpable.  
 While their discrimination may have been argued to be based on one 
reason, there was an inconsistency between the discrimination and the moral 
imperative pronounced by the judiciary. In the facts of Cobaw there was an 
inevitable victory for the party sided with the law-sponsored equality. The Tribunal 
spent some time espousing the notion of equality. On this basis, the judiciary were 
clearly disinclined to allow the discriminatory conduct. Indeed, the religious 
intolerance based on a moral preference, was not tolerated in Cobaw. The moral 
imperative for equality demonstrably overrode an absolute religious freedom 
where a vague belief might be relied on, and lent itself to a kind of religious 
                                                     
432 Cobaw (n 381) 745 [565]. 
433 Certainly, at least, it was not apparent in the judgements that an argument was that the religious 
identities would be morally responsible for the actions of CCHS. 
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freedom, wherein, discrimination based on a moral preference (when inconsistent 
with the moral imperative protected by law) is an uncivilised act. 
 
The Dilemma – Toleration of the Intolerant 
 The data observed in this work confirms that discrimination is valued by 
some members of Australia’s religious pluralism. Case law contributes to our 
understanding of this value by demonstrating that discrimination can manifest as an 
exercise of some religions in Australia but also that the discrimination can be 
prompted by a rule of the religion, or a moral preference of its members. This is to 
say, for some religious identities, discrimination is something to be done to give 
effect to religious beliefs – there is a ‘cause and effect’ relationship between 
religion and discrimination. Yet, the experience of religious identities under federal 
anti-discrimination law has been observed in this work as one where discrimination 
faces designation as an uncivilised external aspect of religion, and especially so, 
where the religious identity has trouble articulating its own value for the 
discrimination. Even where a connection (between the religion and discrimination) 
can be positively identified, a challenge is posed in the contending moral imperative 
of equality. 
 From this, a significant question (distinct from whether any discrimination 
meets a threshold for a religious exemption) arises as to whether discrimination 
based on a moral preference generally falls under the banner of ‘something done to 
give effect to a religious belief’? This was a question which the religious identities of 
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Cobaw sought to address in the High Court on appeal. They relied upon a segment 
of Justice of Appeal Redlich’s judgement, that: 
There is an unfortunate irony in the argument of Cobaw and the Commission 
seeking to distinguish between freedom to believe something and the 
manifestation of those beliefs. It is redolent of the same problematic and unfair 
differentiations between identity and conduct, and between public and private that 
have been used in the past to oppress those with same sex orientation.434 
Another way of posing the question is whether the law should allow a religious 
identity without a crystallised understanding of its own beliefs, to discriminate in 
areas of life potentially of great significance to those being discriminated against.  
 Reflecting on the issues, this work considers that it is not rational to suggest 
that a belief and connected moral preference cannot translate into discrimination. 
It would be the same process at work where a person boycotts another’s product 
on the basis of criminal history (for example, ostracising a person because they 
committed sexual assault). Except, a religious element is added. Discrimination, 
when valued by the religious, may not be (objectively, to the view of an external 
observer) attached to any doctrine. It may just be something done to ‘give effect to 
a belief’. Especially, a belief that someone or someone’s conduct is immoral. Where 
discrimination is consistent with the religion, the discrimination might be motivated 
by it (really, the discrimination merely need not be inconsistent with the religion). 
This is obviously broader than suggesting that discrimination must be mandated by 
the religion. However, the first recognises the fluidity inherent to what ‘religion’ is.  
                                                     
434 [2014] HCATrans 289, 10 [345] citing Cobaw (n 381) 739 [543]. 
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 The act of discrimination might be viewed by others as a primitive thing, on 
par with a practice that literally involves distancing oneself physically from sin 
(consider, the biblical scapegoat). However, when a religious belief converges with 
a perception of what is facing a religious person circumstantially; it behoves the 
religious person to behave consistently with their belief. To appreciate the 
connection between belief and action, it would benefit an observer to focus on the 
beliefs of the identity, rather than categorising the identity. Labelling terms such as 
‘Christian’ can be quite unhelpful where it assumes certain behaviour is typical. 
Clearly though, communicating religious beliefs might require effort on the part of a 
religious identity and its counsel. 
 Yet this is not to say that we must automatically accept any subjective claim 
that discrimination based on a religious belief is genuine. It is not inconsistent with 
this view, to suggest we examine the religious identity’s claims rigorously, to ensure 
that there is a genuine connection between the belief and discrimination (and, 
explicitly, not some other reason). Else, they may merely be holding to bigotry or 
hypocrisy. In Cobaw for example, the court contrasted the conduct of CYC with the 
religious persons of the UK matter of Bull v Hall435 who took steps to manifest their 
value for discrimination.436 Certainly then, if a religious identity in the community 
became known for its discriminatory exercise, it would not preclude the general 
                                                     
435 [2013] 1 WLR 3741. 
436 Cobaw (n 381) 661 [211]:  
 There, the proprietors of a private hotel held the same religious belief as the Christian 
 Brethren, namely, that it was sinful to have sexual relations except within a marriage 
 between a man and a woman. Unlike CYC, however, they stated clearly in their online 
 booking form that rooms with double beds were not available for booking by same-sex 
 couples; and when a telephone inquiry was made, the caller would be asked whether the 
 booking was for a married couple. 
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public from themselves treating the religious persons in accordance with their own 
values (especially if discrimination on the basis of religion was not unlawful). If a 
religious identity expects to exercise their religion, surely, they appreciate that it 
might mean adversity. Piety is not free. That there might be a cost to the honest 
exercise of a religion need not cease when an exercise is disingenuous. 
 The subjective danger, for some religious identities, is that their life 
experience will be marked by the standard of humanity that humanity has defined 
for itself. By way of illustration: even if the most important commandment for a 
self-identified Christian is to ‘love the Lord God with all your heart’ and that means 
(for them) to avoid even indirectly supporting an immoral act of someone else (be it 
because they feel complicit to the act, or, merely want others to not be), they will 
be required to ‘love their neighbour’ in accordance with the law of the land. 
Perhaps not in all things, perhaps only when buying and selling goods or services. 
But is this really the kind of religious freedom that the Australian polity values? One, 
where a religious identity may not live according to their own moral proclivities? 
Are there even any religious Australians who would take issue with this 
arrangement?  
 Regardless of our answer to the question of how remote the discrimination 
can be from a religious belief before an exemption can apply (which relates to the 
constitutional issue of what ‘kind of activity’ the free exercise clause is directed at); 
if we positively conclude that ‘discrimination’ is an element of the ‘exercise of any 
religion’ in a broad sense (which the evidence does point to), we can attempt to 
examine the nature of the conflict between religious freedom and anti-
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discrimination laws. We can start by categorising the religiously motivated 
discrimination as, logically, its own form of intolerance.437 The issue in this line of 
inquiry then becomes obvious, must the state tolerate intolerance? The implication 
for Australia’s pluralism transforms the question; must the state tolerate the 
intolerant? This conundrum has been the focus of much discussion in the secondary 
literature, and indeed, it is a problem facing jurisdictions beyond the shores of 
Australia (as Gray’s comparative work reveals438). 
 While the value for discrimination is not necessarily prevalent, this does not 
diminish the quality of the problem. While the ‘experience’ of religious freedom 
was also the language utilised in the Religious Freedom Review, we know that there 
is prolific lobbying to maintain or expand exemptions and some lobbying to prohibit 
discrimination against religious and non-religious. Even among the religious, there 
are contending perspectives on the imperative of anti-discrimination laws 
themselves. In this way, the religious experience of anti-discrimination law is bi-
polar, overshadowed by a fundamental dichotomy between the imperatives 
belonging to freedom and equality. On the one hand, some religious identities value 
a reserved ‘right’ to discriminate in accordance with at-times seemingly arbitrary 
religious doctrines and beliefs. On the other hand, some religious identities value 
protection from the same treatment. 
                                                     
437 Substitutions might be found in the terms anti-social or simply discriminatory. However, an 
attempt to avoid negative legal connotations are quite possibly hopeless when the behaviour is 
widely morally condemned. 
438 Gray (n 156). 
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 Regarding the dichotomy of freedom and equality: while state sponsored 
sociological material indicates that a value for religiously motivated discrimination is 
not prevalent, case law demonstrates clearly that when it is manifest, the moral 
imperatives of some religious identities are inconsistent with the state’s moral 
imperative of equality prompted by ‘inherent dignity’. Some of those identities who 
value discrimination, have been rendered uncivilised. Incidentally, those identities 
are in the minority. However, the data considered in this work is limited. It likely 
does not inform us of all the religious identities that value discrimination, nor the 
details of when or why they value it. 
 When Gray describes the issue, even with language favourable to equality, 
the subjectivity of both sides is exposed: 
The philosophical argument in cases like Cobaw and Bull v Hall is that whilst the 
religious belief and conscience the staff member and organisation had was sincere, 
by seeking to manifest such beliefs by refusing to lease accommodation to a gay 
youth support group, they infringed the fundamental rights of members of that 
group to equality and dignity.439 
From the objective standpoint though, a ‘fundamental right’ has as much claim to 
empirical truth as subjective claims over the truth of religious texts and beliefs (or 
even if certain behaviour is consistent with the true interpretations). These are 
indeed ultimately issues for politics because the law does value evidence based 
enquiry.440 While ‘[o]ur system recognises conflicting interests here, leaving it to the 
                                                     
439 Ibid 106. 
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legislature to appropriately balance the rights’,441 that same legislature is, 
absolutely, subject to its own terms of establishment (ie, the constitutional law).  
   
C The Constitution and Equality Law 
 Pursuant to the conceptualisation of the free exercise clause of the 
Australian Constitution, entailing that the Commonwealth be tolerant and secular, 
this work has considered that the Constitution offers the constitutionalist a 
resolution to the debate over religious freedom. In section B of this Division, it was 
observed that federal law (which generally prohibits discrimination) threatens to 
designate the exercise of religion via discrimination to be an uncivilised 
manifestation of religion. The apparent abstract, political dilemma is whether 
Federal Parliament should tolerate religiously motivated discrimination. The 
underlying conceptualisation of the free exercise clause, as a guarantee of a 
tolerant, secular government, draws the constitutionalist to consider two major 
issues objectively facing anti-discrimination laws. Namely: do anti-discrimination 
laws constitute intolerance of an external aspect of any religion by their narrowing 
the scope of civilised religion, and if so, do anti-discrimination laws rely on a secular 
rationale to justify that intolerance?  
 This work has confirmed that ‘[s]ome religious groups or individuals may 
wish to engage in conduct that may constitute unlawful discrimination against 
others’, but also, that discrimination might be broadly motivated by a religion, 
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which is to say, that discrimination might be an exercise of a religious person’s 
religion. This work has also confirmed that the conclusion of the ALRC’s, that 
there is no obvious evidence that Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws 
significantly encroach on freedom of religion in Australia, there is nevertheless a 
degree of community concern …442 
is based on a substantiated concern that when subject to anti-discrimination laws, 
the religious who seek to exercise their religion may face intolerance by the State. 
 Having observed that there is some conflict in the experience of religious 
persons under anti-discrimination law in Australia, it is appropriate to the very real 
and relevant question: are federal anti-discrimination laws constitutionally valid, 
considering the free exercise clause as an existing protection of religious freedom? 
If ‘anti-discrimination laws’ fail to meet the constitutional standard of validity, they 
may be struck down to the extent a religious identity is prohibited from 
discriminating as an exercise of their religion. 
 As has been observed, the anti-discrimination schemes most likely to be of 
real concern to members of Australia’s religious pluralism are the SDA443 and the 
RDA. This work refers to these schemes primarily. However, the reasoning of this 
work is equally applicable to any law which designates a religion or its exercise as 
                                                     
442 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 248) 152 [5.123] 
443 The SDA is facing potential amendments in light of, inter alia, (as of at the date of writing) the ‘Sex 
Discrimination Amendment (Removing Discrimination Against Students) Bill 2018’. While anti-
discrimination laws can interact with religious freedom in other ways, discrimination on the basis of 
attributes covered by the RDA is topical and subject to much greater public discourse than other 
schemes. It is focused on by the literature and public inquiries as being the scheme that is most likely 
to cause a conflict with religious freedom and is facing controversial changes. Considering this, the 
present article considers the SDA primarily, with some reference the RDA which has also been seen 
above in the work to have a potentially restrictive function on the exercise of religion. 
 167 
uncivilised. This means that if further information about Australia’s religious 
pluralism was to be gathered, which indicated that discrimination on the basis of an 
attribute covered by the ADA or the DDA (or even the WRA and the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth)444) is an exercise of any religion then those schemes would face similar 
constitutional concerns. This naturally extends to any new schemes as they are 
introduced (such as a Religious Discrimination Act445). 
 From the text-book standpoint, the High Court’s method to assessing the 
constitutional validity of a law is well set out. There is a multi-part test involving 
several necessary steps before we can determine the constitutional validity of a law, 
including; characterising the relevant law and identifying any prohibition or 
limitations to the legislative power.446 This work will consider the constitutional 
validity of law on a theoretical level, but a full analysis of the technicalities of 
federal anti-discrimination legislation is left to others. 
 
1 Characterising Anti-Discrimination Laws 
 Fortunately, because section 116 ‘is directed to a law’s making and not its 
administration’, we do not need to wait for a set of facts before we can consider the 
law’s validity under section 116. Additionally, because the prohibition on the 
exercise of religion occurring is not a prerequisite for invalidity, we can consider the 
issues from a primarily theoretical standpoint while being supported by the 
                                                     
444 The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) contains negative duties regarding discrimination and exemptions to 
those duties in section 351. 
445 Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Exposure Draft, 29 August 2019). 
446 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios (n 303) 127. 
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observed data. At this preliminary stage, the text of the relevant anti-discrimination 
schemes can plainly indicate what both the effect and purposes are, on a theoretical 
(or abstract) level. The full breadth of administrative possibilities under a law is not 
identifiable on its face, but that is something which secondary sources might assist 
with in future inquiry. 
 
Heads of Power 
 The first thing to be acknowledged about anti-discrimination laws is that 
there is prima facie validity, insofar, that there are available heads of power. 
Federal anti-discrimination schemes refer quite directly to various heads of power 
and sometimes infer others, but, it is generally accepted, that common to them all 
is the external affairs power found in section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution, which 
enables federal government to, inter alia, implement ratified international 
treaties.447 
 The connection to, and reliance on, the external affairs power is significant. 
To the extent that the external affairs power is relied upon, there is a connection to 
international treaties, which themselves, carry a ‘political morality’ (and a moral 
imperative). This is demonstrated in the schedule to the SDA, wherein, a convention 
is replicated containing a noting by the ‘States Parties to the present Convention’: 
                                                     
447 See generally: Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 
158 CLR 1. 
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[T]hat the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men 
and women …448 
We see in these treaties the subjective notion of ‘fundamental human rights’ (note 
the phrasing ‘faith’) and the constructed moral principle of ‘dignity and worth’. 
 As has been seen earlier in the work, the external affairs power enables 
Federal Parliament to legislate for non-discrimination universally across Australia. 
Without it, Commonwealth discrimination law would be constrained to the various 
other heads with a foreseeable result of being less comprehensive. Where the RDA 
is fairly universal in its application (referring to ‘any act … in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life’449), the SDA’s negative duties are 
selectively applied to work and other areas such as education and 
accommodation.450 
 
The Objectives of the Race and Sex Discrimination Acts  
 The terms of the discrimination schemes reveal (variably) the objectives of 
the respective schemes. Section 3 of the SDA explicitly states its objectives, 
emphasising the political morality by speaking of eliminating, ‘so far as possible’, 
discrimination in various areas, giving effect to a range of international instruments, 
and promoting the ‘principle of the equality of men and women’.451 This is 
                                                     
448 SDA (n 331) sch Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
449 RDA (n 328) s 9(1). 
450 See generally, SDA (n 331) divs 1, 2. 
451 Ibid s 3:  
 The objects of this Act are: 
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contrastable to the RDA which contains no explicit objectives clause, but clearly 
implicitly, does have an objective of implementing international treaties because of 
its conferral of power to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and its consistent reference throughout the act to 
that convention.452 Because of the internal communication of the objectives of the 
law, we hardly need to consider external sources to the legislation (such as 
explanatory memorandums or debates) to ascertain secreted objectives. 
 
A Duty to Not Discriminate 
 The next thing to note about the anti-discrimination schemes, generally, is 
that they create negatives duties directed at ‘discrimination’. In other words, anti-
discrimination schemes create torts (in the strict sense, that discrimination is a civil 
wrong). The SDA generally provides that no person shall ‘discriminate’ on the basis 
of several characteristics (sex, sexual orientation and so forth) For example, section 
22 subsection 1 of the SDA provides, that: 
                                                     
  (a)  to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
  Forms of Discrimination Against Women and to provisions of other relevant  
  international instruments; and 
  (b)  to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination against persons on the ground 
  of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship 
  status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy or breastfeeding in the areas of work, 
  accommodation, education, the provision of goods, facilities and services, the  
  disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the administration of Commonwealth 
  laws and programs; and 
  (ba) to eliminate, so far as possible, discrimination on the ground of family  
  responsibilities in the area of work; and 
  (c)  to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination involving sexual harassment in 
  the workplace, in educational institutions and in other areas of public activity; and 
  (d)  to promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle 
  of the equality of men and women. 
452 See generally, RDA (n 328) ss 7, 10, 20. 
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It is unlawful for a person who, whether for payment or not, provides goods or 
services, or makes facilities available, to discriminate against another person on the 
ground of the other person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex 
status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, or 
breastfeeding …453 
The precise meaning of ‘discrimination’ is defined throughout the schemes, for 
example, the SDA in-part defines the act of ‘discriminating on the basis of sex’, as 
where the ‘discriminator treats the aggrieved person less favourably than … the 
discriminator treats or would treat a person of a different sex’.454 
 
Positive Exemptions for Religion 
 Significantly, and obviously related to the issue of religious freedom, is that 
the anti-discrimination schemes contain exemptions to the operation of the 
negative duties. This is to say, the negative duties (especially of the SDA) are 
curtailed by Parliament’s own positive exemptions, including section 37 of the SDA, 
which provides inter alia, that the negative duties do not apply to: 
[A]ny … act or practice of a body established for religious purposes, being an act or 
practice that conforms to the doctrines, tenets or beliefs of that religion or is 
necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that 
religion.455 
This is a markedly similar arrangement to the Victorian legislation tested in Cobaw. 
Which, as noted above, when constructed narrowly by a court can provide minimal 
                                                     
453 SDA (n 331) s 22(1). 
454 Ibid s 5(1). 
455 Ibid s 37(1)(d). See also s 38. 
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‘protection’ for a religious identity. The availability of exemptions to negative duties 
are inconsistent across the various discrimination schemes, the RDA provides for a 
negative duty but no explicit exemption for religious identities.456 
 
2 The Free Exercise Clause as a Prohibition or Limitation 
 Up to this point, this work has characterised anti-discrimination laws very 
generally, and having accepted that there is prima facie validity, the next step is to 
identify whether there are any potential prohibitions or constraints upon the 
lawmaking power or the laws.457 This work has identified one possibility in the free 
exercise clause of section 116 of The Australian Constitution, being a clause which 
requires that the Commonwealth’s positive protection of religious freedom must be 
an extension of the constitutional standard and not anything less. This is the 
strategic issue of whether the full sum of exemptions made available to religious 
identities fall short of the constitutional requirement for the Commonwealth to be 
tolerant and secular. The doctrinal question is, plainly, whether the SDA (and RDA) 
can be fairly characterised as ‘laws for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’? 
 Division I of this work identified four elements that would need to be 
addressed in an argument of invalidity under the free exercise clause. ‘That the 
                                                     
456 RDA (n 328) s 9(1):  
 It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
 preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the 
 purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
 equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, 
 cultural or any other field of public life. 
457 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios (n 303) 127. 
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Commonwealth has made a law’, is clearly not a point of contention. The remaining 
three elements; ‘that the effect of that law prohibits the free exercise of any 
religion’, that ‘the purpose of that law is to prohibit the free exercise of any 
religion’, and that ‘the law is not justified by being for some public interest’, do 
warrant consideration. This work proceeds to consider each of these elements, 
before making some final conclusions. 
 
The Kind of Action (Discrimination as the Exercise of Religion) 
 The question is whether ‘discrimination’ is an ‘exercise of any religion’, and 
thus, protected by the Constitution. Is there a common factor in the kind of activity 
protected by the constitutional law yet interfered with by anti-discrimination law? 
This work has already observed in secondary empirical evidence that members of 
Australia’s religious pluralism value discrimination and that the nature of that value 
does substantiate a conclusion that discrimination is an ‘exercise’ of some religions 
in Australia. However, it was also seen that the nature of the connection between 
the religion (or religious belief) and discrimination is varying. While the connection 
between religion and discrimination is ultimately context specific, in theory, an 
‘exercise’ of a religion can be construed to refer to both discrimination when it is 
part of a rite of the religion, but also, where the discrimination is something done 
generally to give effect to a moral preference.  
 Given that the most current constitutional jurisprudence entails a broader 
understanding of ‘exercise’ in the free exercise clause, it follows that the kind of 
action protected by the free exercise clause can extend to ‘discrimination’ even 
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when it is merely something done to give effect to a belief as a moral preference 
(and not necessarily objectively mandated by a religious rule or similar mechanism). 
While there is room for the orthodoxy to be contended, at present; a plaintiff could 
argue their discrimination is a ‘religious exercise’ even when there is only a vague 
moral preference (connected to a religious belief) to not associate with someone. 
This discrimination could be quite public in its manifestation, notably, impacting 
those who do not share the religion. This leads us to consider the overlap with anti-
discrimination law. 
 With respect to parliament, the self-imposed limitations on the negative 
duties of discrimination law are to a point, deceptive. The negative duties and their 
exemptions reflect intolerance of certain manifestations of religiously motivated 
discrimination. (Both for what is excluded from the text of the exemptions and for 
what might occur in the case of a narrow interpretation of the chosen language; 
‘conforms’ and ‘necessary’.) A narrow interpretation of the exemptions, as seen in 
Cobaw, will inevitably cede religious freedom to the moral imperative of equality. 
Plainly, the narrower the exemptions, the narrower the scope of civilised religion. A 
case such as Cobaw, demonstrates clearly the zealousness which a court can have in 
promoting the principle of equality (especially when it is given to referencing, at 
length, the philosophical reasons for that equality), at the expense of a religious 
party’s freedom to act in accordance with their moral preferences. This should not 
be surprising. History shows that courts are willing to impose on its populace’s 
moral proclivities where the state has sufficient motivation (consider the practice of 
military conscription). 
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 The subjectivity involved in what a ‘religious exercise’ is, highlights the 
individuality of religious freedom. When the connection between a person’s action 
and a religion can vary so dramatically between individuals, a federal law even risks 
constitutional invalidity when a negative duty applies to individuals but the 
exemptions do not. This is further complicated by a narrow interpretation of the 
statutory exemptions being encouraged by interpretative rules458 combined with a 
legislative purpose that emphasises a moral imperative which is inevitably going to 
be repugnant to the moral proclivities of some religious persons. Yet, for the 
exemptions to be consistent with the constitutional requirement that the 
Commonwealth be tolerant, a broader construction of the exemptions is preferred. 
Yet, even when this is achievable on the strict text of anti-discrimination law, in 
practice, the judiciary seems inclined to take the side of equality (for lack of, until 
now, an articulated response to that siding). However, the fluidity in the language 
chosen in the drafted exemptions, does leave it to a court to determine the kind of 
activities that are actually protected by those exemptions.  
 If there comes a time to test the extent of the exemptions in the SDA, the 
constitutional doctrine requires that those exemptions be as wide as needed to 
protect a broad form of religious exercise. The complete lack of exemptions in the 
RDA is distinctly concerning due to what will inevitably lead to a debate over the 
whole negative duty, rather than the quality of a particular exemption clause or the 
propriety of a construction.  
                                                     
458 See, eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). 
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 This does not necessarily mean that exemptions to anti-discrimination laws 
should be identical in form to the constitutional protection – a combination of 
exemptions in wholly different terminology might substantiate, practically, 
exemptions for the exercise of any religion. However, the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws in accordance with their explicit objectives exacerbates the risk 
of invalidity. There is clearly a proactive effort, on the part of Federal Parliament, to 
minimise discrimination. The issue then, is whether federal anti-discrimination laws 
(via their exemptions) extend the constitutional standard, or, whether a narrower 
test is implemented. 
 This approach does not preclude a high evidentiary threshold from being 
placed on the religious identities who seek to discriminate. However, the argument 
that is determinative of constitutional validity must be whether the discrimination is 
an exercise of the religion, not, whether the discrimination is ‘necessary’ or ‘in 
conformity’ (especially in a narrow sense). The latter draws attention to the 
consequences of the discrimination, and requires its value to the religious identity 
to be weighed against the value of equality. The constitutional approach (as 
considered in this work to be pairable with a legalistic one) requires us to merely 
examine the relationship between the discrimination and religion – to describe 
whether there is a connection or not. 
 To the question of whether exemptions to the negative duties (in anti-
discrimination laws) are wide enough to cover the religious exercise of 
discrimination, the answer is maybe. It is to some extent dependant on a court’s 
construction of the available exemptions (of course, where there are no exemptions 
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whatsoever, there is a serious risk of invalidity). A narrow construction of the 
exemptions, in accordance with the objective to promote equality, would narrow 
the scope of civilised religion. Where then, a challenge exists for law makers: 
The role of exceptions in discrimination legislation raises difficult challenges for 
legislators. Such legislation’s primary purpose is to protect the individual from 
discrimination on the basis of their inherent characteristics. This is essential to the 
‘inherent dignity of the human person’ as set out in the preamble of the ICCPR. At 
the same time, such laws may require the rights of others to ‘give way’ or be 
limited, at least to some extent.459  
An even larger challenge exists for the judiciary because, where parameters for 
lawmakers are well set out, the judiciary should (if their impartiality can be 
expected) assess the contending imperatives while avoiding the temptation to 
insert their own personal inclinations as to the public interest of the law. This brings 
us to the question of whether anti-discrimination laws, to the extent they do 
prohibit the free exercise of any religion, are the ‘kind of law’ that falls under the 
constitutional limitation, by being for it. 
 
The Kind of Law (‘Laws for Prohibiting Discrimination’) 
 While there is a common factor between the constitutional and anti-
discrimination law of ‘discrimination’ when it is a religious exercise, we are left 
asking what parliament’s intention is towards this activity. The next element (to 
assess invalidity under the free exercise clause) requires that the prohibition be an 
                                                     
459 Expert Panel (n 155) 43 [1.137]. 
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objective of the law. Is it the objective of the SDA and the RDA to prohibit the free 
exercise of any religion?  
 The objective of anti-discrimination law, as apparent in the legislation itself, 
is multi-faceted and complex. It was concluded in Division I that the objective of a 
law is significant. Deagon describes the purpose (ie, the ‘objective’): 
The purpose of the anti-discrimination legislation is to promote equality in society, 
and the means used to achieve that purpose is to prohibit discriminatory 
conduct.460 
Yet, per the conclusions of this work, to ‘promote equality’ in the way anti-
discrimination laws do, is tantamount to prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion. Deagon went on to comment, that: 
The purpose is clearly legitimate, but prohibiting discriminatory conduct as the 
means to achieve that purpose may impinge upon the functioning of representative 
government by preventing the wedding photographer from fully participating as a 
citizen in society in a way consistent with their religious convictions. 461 
While Deagon takes a focus on proper democracy – political theory – this work has 
described the same problem in the objective terms of a ‘scope of civilised religion’. 
Deagon’s conclusion, with respect, represents a lack of deep consideration for the 
significance which a law’s objective ultimately has on a law’s construction, 
subsequent enforcement, and constitutional validity (thereby they enter a political 
debate). 
                                                     
460 Deagon (n 208) 283. 
461 Ibid 284. 
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 It is both Parliament’s goal to ‘promote equality as far as possible’, and the 
actualised effect of prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, which should be 
heavily scrutinised by liberal theorists. It would be logical, for example, that 
attempting to promote equality as far possible would involve prohibiting 
discrimination (and the promoting of it) by those educational institutions that 
prepare youth for future life. Yet, exemptions for educational institutions are 
provided grudgingly. Even though some allowance is made for religiously motivated 
discrimination, the law has the apparent effect of technically prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion. This is especially clear when the provided exemptions are 
enforced narrowly, in accordance with the objectives of that same law. The effective 
prohibition of the ‘free exercise of any religion’ is not merely incidental, if it was, 
the effect would be severable. If we accept that the effective prohibition is built into 
the law when the whole of the law is considered; implicitly, the prohibition is what 
anti-discrimination laws are for. 
 Having concluded that a law can have multiple objectives, that the 
objectives need not be explicit, that the objectives are related to what the law does, 
and that narrowing the scope of civilised religion constitutes intolerance 
(antithetical to the role of the free exercise clause), we are left to conclude that 
anti-discrimination laws are ‘laws for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion’ as 
that phrase is understood in the High Court’s orthodoxy. It clearly is the case, that 
anti-discrimination laws move past tolerance by restraint, and look to prohibit the 
free exercise of any religion (when we understand that concept broadly). It does do 
this perhaps, just, not explicitly or honestly. 
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 This conclusion is consistent with the law’s explicit objectives, implicit 
objectives (in the case of the RDA), and their projected effects. However, we have 
yet to consider how the rationale for anti-discrimination laws might impact their 
validity. Even though the SDA and RDA are laws for prohibiting the free exercise of 
any religion, they may be (or at-least, argued to be) motivated by an overriding 
public interest. 
 
The Qualification of the Clause (the Public Interest Test) 
 Even though discrimination can be a religious exercise, and anti-
discrimination laws are variously for prohibiting that exercise, the law (as theorised 
in Division I) can be excused under the constitutional doctrine if it relies on a secular 
rationale (as an overriding public interest). This is based on the concession that a 
strict application of the free exercise clause would potentially result in absurdity. If 
the free exercise clause was applied strictly, with no qualification permitted 
whatsoever, there would be little room to argue in the Commonwealth’s favour; 
that anti-discrimination legislation did not have a prohibited objective. With the 
secular test, a legalist can avoid subjective public interest tests (such as the 
‘proportionality’ or ‘undue infringement’ tests). This work has identified the secular 
test as an alternative approach, consistent with the underlying conceptualisation of 
the clause as a guarantee of a tolerant, secular Commonwealth. This test holds that 
the free exercise clause’s prohibition on intolerant law may only be qualified by a 
secular rationale (referring to a law’s objective, not a law maker’s motivation). 
Using the language of ‘secular’, as this work has already done, we refer simply to a 
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non-religious objective. If a law’s intolerance meets a secular objective, the free 
exercise clause may be qualified. This necessarily precludes objectives based in a 
constructed morality (a supernatural belief of a moral truth or a series of moral 
imperatives giving effect to such a belief). 
 The issue might be posed thusly: is an objective of the SDA or RDA 
synonymous to being a religious objective? If so, that objective cannot be relied 
upon to qualify the free exercise clause. Adopting a definition of religion that 
emphasises law as an empirical system, we may instead ask: is an objective of the 
SDA or RDA identifiably referring to either a belief (in a supernatural being, thing, or 
principle) or a code of conduct (that itself gives effect to such a belief)? While this 
work might raise this issue, it ultimately remains for the Commonwealth to raise the 
excuse that a secular objective qualifies the free exercise clause. However, it is 
important to remember the distinction drawn between parliament’s motivation and 
a law’s objective. The objectives of Commonwealth anti-discrimination law and 
their proximity to religion shall now be considered. 
 There is, for many, a good interest in the Commonwealth’s legislating for 
anti-discrimination. This is to say, there is literally a public interest. A reasonable 
person will hardly complain when their material opportunities are protected by law, 
or, when they have a cause of action even simply made available to them, under 
law. The Prime Minister Scott Morrison is on record, suggesting that: 
Australia is a place where discrimination on the basis of a person’s identity — 
including their religious identity — is unacceptable. It is also a place where we 
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respect the right of religious institutions to maintain their distinctive religious 
ethos. Our laws should reflect these values.462 
The natural, inquisitive, response to such an aspirational statement, is ‘why?’ A 
statement such as this alludes to a value, not for religious freedom generally 
(because that freedom, as we have seen, is reserved to institutional expressions), 
but instead for a certain kind of society. It is this motivation that prompts the 
conflict and dichotomy of freedom and equality. 
 It is the same well we draw from, to identify the head of power relied upon 
for the universal application of Commonwealth-wide anti-discrimination laws, that 
we also find the rationale for the laws related to this value for a certain kind of 
society.463 The distinction between the SDA and RDA, and the treaties which they 
respectively rely upon, is significant here. The SDA, through the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, refers clearly to moral 
ideals (and value judgements). The same is true of the RDA through the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
however, the latter also refers to the propriety of scientific theories of race 
(described as ‘doctrine of superiority’).464 In the case of the SDA, the law’s objective 
is (inter alia) to eliminate as far as possible discrimination in various areas, to give 
                                                     
462 Prime Minister and Attorney General, ‘Government Response to Religious Freedom Review’ 
(Media release, 13 December 2018) <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/government-response-
religious-freedom-review>. 
463 The connection is that Parliament has adopted the rationale for the anti-discrimination 
legislation, as found in the international treaties. It could be distinguished (but this must be a 
question for another time) that Parliament’s rationale for anti-discrimination legislation is a broader 
international policy concern (for example, to protect trade or international relations). However, even 
in the latter case, parliament is reliant on the ideas in the treaties and is ultimately implicitly 
supporting them. While there may not be a connection subjectively, there is, objectively.  
464 RDA (n 328) sch International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Article 4. 
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effect to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, and to ‘promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the 
principle of the equality of men and women’.465 Whilst, for the RDA, the objective is 
at least implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. The issue is whether religiosity is identifiable in the 
objectives of the SDA or RDA. Do the objectives of either the SDA or RDA refer to a 
belief (in a supernatural thing, being, or principle) or a code of conduct (itself giving 
effect to such a belief)? 
 Regarding the SDA and RDA giving effect to a belief; when we consider the 
treaties cited by the SDA and RDA, it is proper to describe anti-discrimination laws 
(in the language used throughout this work), really, as laws that give effect to a 
belief in ‘inherent human dignity’. The belief in inherent human dignity, culminating 
in a belief in ‘fundamental human rights’, evidently involves a measure of faith. But, 
at times, the principles of non-discrimination are based in a decrying of flawed 
scientific theory. For in the case of the RDA, the law condemns both the scientific 
truth and moral turpitude of racial theory. It is clearly possible to delineate between 
discrimination based on either a constructed morality or a scientific theory. Yet, it 
should not be surprising that when a morality is given effect, as seen especially in 
the SDA, that the law draws more attention for its impact on the scope of civilised 
religion. When the law is reliant on a constructed morality, as both the SDA and 
RDA substantially are, the law’s justification (to the view of a critic and non-
believer) is built on sand. One might expect that this is the exact kind of conflict that 
                                                     
465 SDA (n 331) s 3. 
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would occur if a traditionally acknowledged religious belief was relied upon to 
justify the law’s intolerance (for example, if humanity’s dignity was said to be 
derived from a god rather than ‘inherently’).  
 Regarding a code of conduct giving effect to a belief; as observers, we can 
distinguish between the various kinds of harm which the law is attempting to 
eradicate. Is it economic harm? To some extent, perhaps, but in Cobaw the point 
was not, merely, economic. Along with the inconvenience of needing to find other 
accommodation, emotions of the victims were cited.466 If the law in Cobaw was 
working as the Victorian Parliament intended, and assuming that the equivalent 
federal law operates similarly,467 there is clearly more than just tangible fiscal 
interests being protected in the SDA (and likely the RDA). The kind of harm 
identified is harm which assaults inherent human dignity – a constructed principle 
and something with no tangible value – a belief in a supernatural principle or thing. 
 The most crucial question then, is whether a belief in ‘inherent human 
dignity’ is a religious one for the purposes of law (and thus, whether relevant 
international covenants are codes of doctrine giving effect to that belief). A belief, 
which its proponents are ascribed as having faith in. A principle which seemingly 
has no tangible value or admissible evidence for its truth. It is perhaps foretelling 
that, even in 1943, Justice Rich adopted the language of ‘freedom of faith’ in the 
context of section 116 of the Constitution.468 Faith, which really refers to a 
                                                     
466 [2010] VCAT 1613, 37 [155]. 
467 This is to be considered in light of alternative constructions of exemptions to anti-discrimination 
legislation. Cf OV & OW v Members of the Board of the Wesley Mission Council [2010] NSWCA 155. 
468 Jehovah’s Witnesses Case (n 5) 148. 
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confidence in something unseen, of course is closely associated with religion (as 
should be expected when religion involves a belief in the supernatural. This is the 
same characteristic that inhibits the law’s ability to ‘know the truth’ of traditionally 
acknowledged religious beliefs and, incidentally, also constructed moralities (which 
are only subjectively true, to their constructors). Surely, on the face of the law, the 
belief in ‘inherent human dignity’ is a religious one. Especially so, when the moral 
imperative (codes of doctrine) giving effect to it self-identify as a system of faith. 
 It is quite possible for a federal parliament to legislate for negative duties 
prohibiting discrimination without relying on a belief in ‘inherent human dignity’ (a 
constructed moral principle). Yet, it has chosen to prohibit discrimination at the 
expense of the moral preferences of Australians to a universal degree under the 
external affairs power (in accordance with international treaties) and exposed itself 
as a moral authority. The Commonwealth is concerned with a certain kind of 
society, and is directed to it by a faith not shared by an apparent minority of the 
members of Australia’s religious pluralism. This is problematic under the Australian 
Constitution. 
 While the objectives of anti-discrimination legislation are complex, their 
rationale appears indistinguishable from a belief in inherent human dignity. It is not 
this work’s argument that the discrimination laws cannot have a secular rationale; 
but clearly, there is something more than just a secular rationale currently at work. 
At the risk of leaving this work on the edge of a precipice: there is a serious legal 
question, as to what kind of rationale is being relied upon to justify anti-
discrimination law. It is, perhaps ironically, not the kind of question a court of 
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modern Australia is best suited to answering. Yet, it may nonetheless be necessary. 
The concept of ‘religion’ is central to this issue and demands deep consideration. 
On this point, when the issue comes to a head, it may be mark a turning point in 
Australian legal history. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The free exercise clause of the Australian Constitution is an oft forgotten 
aspect of the debate over religious freedom and equality in Australia. This work has 
shown how the constitutional doctrine can resolve the debate over religious 
freedom, by designating the Commonwealth as a tolerant, secular government. 
Where the Religious Freedom Review of 2018 glosses over the role of the 
Constitution as it relates to religious freedom in Australia, as considered in Division I 
of this work, this is an inappropriate approach. 
 Potential litigants concerned with the validity of anti-discrimination 
legislation should approach the free exercise clause while conceptualising it as 
guaranteeing a tolerant, secular government (relating to the legislative power of 
Federal Parliament). Likewise, the judiciary should adopt this conceptualisation and 
adjust itself to better accommodate broader forms of evidence that can adequately 
argue the issues arising from the High Court’s construction. 
 To describe anti-discrimination laws in the language adopted by this work 
(objectively responding to the issue of religious freedom): anti-discrimination laws 
(subject to selective limitations and exemptions) designate discrimination as an 
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uncivilised exercise of religion. This has implications for Australia’s religious 
pluralism. For example, in the SDA, discrimination by institutions and bodies 
remains a civilised exercise – but not discrimination by lone actors (especially, under 
section 24469). In order to access the exemptions, for full freedom of association and 
of religion, a ‘person’ appears to need be an association or club (a ‘body established 
for religious purposes’). It appears as though the state encourages identification 
with an organised religion, and, that discrimination is to only occur in the confines 
of that religious affiliation. On a basic assessment, the negative duties of anti-
discrimination legislation in comparison to their exemptions are universal.470 This is 
consistent with the objectives of the SDA to advance equality as far as possible – 
that religious identities are restricted to manifesting their own intolerance to a 
private domain. This is an issue because some members of Australia’s religious 
pluralism value discrimination as an exercise of their religion. This appears to 
constitute a literal intolerance on the part of the Commonwealth. However, the 
extent of the value placed on discrimination by the members of Australia’s 
pluralism warrants further research. 
 The requirement for Federal Parliament to be tolerant must be observed 
strictly in those subject matters where the Commonwealth relies upon international 
covenants and treaties to legislate for equality. Where it is reliant on those 
                                                     
469 SDA (n 331) s 24(1):  
 (1) It is unlawful for a person, whether as principal or agent, to discriminate against another 
 person on the ground of the other person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex 
 status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, or breastfeeding: 
  (a)  by refusing or failing to dispose of an estate or interest in land to the other  
  person; or 
  (b)  in the terms or conditions on which an estate or interest in land is offered to 
  the other person. 
470 SDA (n 331) ss 5, 5A, 5B, 5C, 6, 7, 7AA, 7A. 
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covenants, the Commonwealth is reliant on a moral imperative which is at the very 
least, at risk of, functioning as a religious rationale as it is based on a constructed 
(‘supernatural’) belief. Yet, the requirement to be tolerant can only be qualified 
where the public interest in the law amounts to a secular rationale. The extent to 
which the Federal Parliament is dependent on international covenants and treaties 
is indicative of both the existing inconsistencies between one constructed morality 
of ‘inherent human dignity’ and the beliefs of certain members of Australia’s 
religious pluralism, but also, that the free exercise clause is limited as to its ability to 
inhibit the legislating for anti-discrimination (such as where acting on a flawed 
scientific theory is being prohibited).  
 References to a moral imperative of equality, and the constructed morality 
(perhaps, the religious belief) of ‘inherent human dignity’, should be expelled from 
the text of federal anti-discrimination law. Concurrently, no court should accept or 
rely upon those concepts (drawn from international doctrines) in its construction 
and application of exemptions or duty provisions of Commonwealth anti-
discrimination laws. It is foreseeably a valid exercise of power, for Federal 
Parliament to legislate for anti-discrimination under a head of power where it does 
not depend on a political morality (especially, a power other than the external 
affairs power). Relying on international treaties appears to be synonymous to 
relying on a substantially religious rationale. If the Australian people value ‘equality’ 
sufficiently to see it legislated for, political lobbying will naturally work to (and 
would need to) change the Constitution. At present, the federal government has 
entered a space that it was never constitutionally permitted to, under section 116 
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as a limitation on its legislative power. As a moral authority, the Federal Parliament 
has overstepped the existing boundary of a tolerant, secular Commonwealth.  
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